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“Lift your weapons. Here is the one that resists intentions.”
Clark Coolidge 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical takings of Indian lands erode the Indian peoples’ political
and cultural autonomy. 2 As “domestic dependent nations” they are
distinguished from other minority groups within the United States. 3 As
1.
The Crystal Text, in PRIMARY TROUBLE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POETRY 443 (1996).
2.
Physical takings of Indian lands involve the wrongful appropriation,
seizure, or interference with the Indians’ right to otherwise dispose of, or control, their
lands. See, JULIUS L. SACKMAN, 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.05[1], at 6-56
to 6-58 (3d ed. 1997).
3.
Before European discovery, Indian peoples represented fully
sovereign nations. But after discovery, their international legal status was that of
“domestic dependent nations.” See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) l, 17
(1831).
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self-governing societies long before America was discovered by sixteenthcentury European explorers, their rights to self-governance and cultural
autonomy were embodied in many treaties with European governments. 4
The federal government likewise entered into Indian treaties that
confirmed the Indian peoples’ land titles and governmental authority. 5
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives effect to
these sovereign bargains by barring state or private interference with the
Indian peoples’ lands or their self-governance therein. 6
But these sovereign bargains have demonstrably failed to
preserve the Indian peoples’ most valuable asset-their lands. Many Indian
treaties prohibited the federal acquisition of Indian lands except with the
express consent of a majority of the adult male members of the affected
Indian tribe. 7 Indian consent to federal land cessions served to legitimate
the treaty-making process. But this idea of Indian consent, along with the
broader concept of tribal sovereignty, was swamped by the nineteenthcentury land demands of non-Indian settlers who had little sympathy for
the Indian peoples or their treaty rights. Indian treaty making in the midto-late nineteenth century became the diplomatic “cover” for coerced and
patently unfair Indian land cession agreements.8 Millions of acres of

4.
Indian Treaties evidenced an “essential [sovereign] equivalence”
between the European nations and the respective treaty tribes. STEVEN CORNELL, THE
RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICAL RESURGENCE 46 (1988). The
treaties were multifaceted diplomatic instruments whose purposes included mutual
declarations of peace and friendship, establishment of trading relations, and the
legitimation of major transfers of land from the Indian peoples to the respective
discovering nations. Id. at 46–47.
5.
The United States continued during and after the Revolutionary War
to regard the Indian peoples as independent sovereign nations. 1 FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE GREATFATHER: THE UNITED STATES AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS
31(1984).
6.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
7.
Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, for example,
declared that no part of the Kiowa and Comanche lands would be ceded without the
consent of at least three-fourths of the adult male members of the tribe. Treaty with
the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct.
1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585. But Congress, by its Act of June 6, 1900, ratified
the agreement of the Jerome Commission for the Indians’ cession of their reserved
lands, even though far fewer than the required number of Indians had consented to
that agreement. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676. This disregard of the
Indian consent provision prompted Lone Wolf, a Kiowa Indian, to sue to enjoin
Interior Secretary Ethan Allen Hitchcock from implementing that act on his
reservation. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 107 U.S. 43 (1903).
8.
Treaty-based Indian land cessions are characterized by Stephen
Cornell as the “characteristic form” of dispossession of the Indian peoples during the

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

18

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 11:39 AM

Special Issue

Indian lands were taken by the federal government in outright
congressional defiance of the Indian consent provisions of many treaties. 9
Spurious land cession agreements and coerced Indian land transfers in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century were devastating for the Indian peoples:
they today retain only some fifty-seven million acres of their lands that
once stretched from the Atlantic Seaboard to the Pacific Coast. 10 More
significantly, the contemporary Indian peoples’ survival as distinct
cultural and economic entities has been jeopardized by this rapid and
massive shrinkage of their land base.
The demonstrable failure of these Indian treaties to prevent the
federal taking of Indian lands requires resort to an alternative legal strategy
for the contemporary preservation of the remaining Indian lands. A
modern Indian takings doctrine holds perhaps the best hope for achieving
this goal. Such a doctrine is compatible with Chief Justice Marshall’s
historically imposed Indian bargaining model. 11 It also complements the
contemporary “government-to-government” relationship between the
federal government and the Indian peoples. 12 This proposed doctrine
“Indian conflict years” from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries. CORNELL,
supra note 4, at 45.
Peter Wolf estimates that Indian land cession agreements between 1789 and
1850 transferred some 450 million acres of Indian land to full federal ownership. The
amount paid to the Indians for these lands amounted to 90 million dollars or an average
price of 20 cents an acre. See PETER WOLF, LAND IN AMERICA: ITS VALUE, USE, AND
CONTROL 69 (1981).
9.
Cornell emphasizes that in 1800, after nearly 200 years of European
colonization, the bulk of what are now the “48 states” was Indian land. But by 1900,
the Indian lands were almost entirely in non-Indian hands. What had occurred in the
interim was not just the dispossession of the Indian peoples of their aboriginal lands,
but the larger transformation of the American economy as a capitalist society that
successfully commercialized land, labor, and capital as marketable commodities.
Indian lands were gradually incorporated into this larger American economy.
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–38.
10.
“Indian tribes and (individual tribal members) own approximately
56.6 million acres of land, an increase of more that 4 million acres since 1980. . . .
Alaskan Natives hold another 44 million acres as a result of the Alaskan Native Claims
Settlement Act. In all, Native American groups hold about 4.2% of the land in the
United States.” DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20 (3d ed. 1993).
11.
Marshall's Indian bargaining model derived from older sources such
as Article III of the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. Act of Aug. 7, 1789 (Northwest
Ordinance), ch. 8, art. 12, 1 Stat. 50, 52. That article committed the United States to
display the “utmost good faith” toward the Indian peoples and pledged that their “land
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent.” Id.
12.
President Richard Nixon in his 1970 Indian Message to Congress
called for a new federal policy of “self-determination” for the Indian peoples.
Congress responded by enacting several new Indian statutes that confirmed the
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would mitigate the federal takings incentive that implicitly derives from
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. Marshall’s model has effectively
cloaked from judicial scrutiny spurious Indian land cession agreements or
unilateral federal action that rapidly shrunk the Indian land base from its
1848 size of a billion plus acres to some forty-million acres by 1934. 13
By contrast, a modern Indian takings doctrine would explicitly
acknowledge the indispensable role that land plays in sustaining
contemporary Indian societies as viable cultural, and economic entities.
Ironically, Marshalls Indian bargaining model likewise acknowledged
Indian lands as essential for the governmental, cultural and economic
survival of the Indian peoples. But his model grew out of assumptions that
even by his era were patently untenable. Marshall envisioned Indian
treaties as the consensual means for organizing the chaotic field of Indian
affairs over a wide array of subject-matter areas: trade, criminal
jurisdiction, war and peace, and land transactions. 14 Indeed, reigning
nineteenth century economic theory suggested that such a consent-based
system would yield sovereign bargains that represented “Pareto-superior”
outcomes for both the federal government and the affected Indian
peoples. 15

inherent sovereign powers of the Indian peoples and sought to establish a meaningful
“government-to-government” relationship between federal agencies and the affected
Indian peoples. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 253–59.
13.
In 1903, the Supreme Court decided, based on Chief Justice
Marshall’s Indian law opinions, that Congress enjoyed a “[p]lenary authority over
tribal relations . . . not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the
government.” Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). The Lone Wolf
doctrine permits the federal government to unilaterally abrogate Indian treaties if they
conflict with an overriding federal interest or no longer serve the best interest of the
affected Indian people.
14.
Indian treaties were multifaceted diplomatic instruments that allowed
for the mutual adjustment of military, jurisdictional, trading, and land issues between
the federal government and the Indian peoples. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 46.
15.
The Pareto principle assumes that as “long as individuals know what
is best for themselves, they can enter only into those bargains that are best for
themselves.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 8–9 (1993). The
Indian peoples and the federal government are regarded by the treaty-making process
as if they were a single person that knows “its” preferences when measured against
the pretreaty circumstances. Epstein concludes that assuming the “stringent Pareto
conditions are satisfied,” there is no “reason to worry about the terms and conditions
that the (federal) government attaches to its bargain.” Id.
The absence of constitutional limits on state power creates a socially
destructive “prisoner’s dilemma,” wherein disorganized land owners are unable to
prevent the state from imposing “collateral or unrelated” conditions upon their
continued use of their lands. Id. at 79.
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But Marshall’s seemingly laissez faire system of Indian
bargaining was undermined from the outset by background demographic
changes and evolving military realities. The Indian peoples should have
expected, given the nature of bargaining process that they were free to
bargain regarding any issue and that bargains, once made, would bind both
the federal government and the affected Indian peoples.16 But these
idealized background conditions have rarely, if ever, governed Indian
bargains with non-Indians regarding land cessions. Some of the eastern
Indian peoples may have possessed a temporary bargaining equality with
the European colonizers that made land cession agreements between them
both feasible and practicable. 17
But fundamental practical and

16.
Richard Epstein and other constitutional scholars recognize that there
must be a limit to state coercive power over private property rights because the
“creation of (state) monopoly power (over those rights) poses a great danger of abuse.”
Id. at 78.
17.
Whether the Indians ever willingly sold their lands to the European
colonists and fully appreciated that they were forever giving up their land titles has
long been a subject of historical debate. Some historians argue that the eastern Indian
tribes had fairly well-developed concepts of land tenure especially with regards to the
assignment of territory for the purposes of planting and residence. Actual property
rights in the Indians’ lands resided in the individual or family unit. See ALDEN T.
VAUGHN, THE NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS, 1620–1675, at 105–
07 (1979).
The historian Wilcomb E. Washburn also challenges the “prevailing
assumption among Americans that the bulk of the land of the United States was simply
appropriated from the Indians without benefit of law or compensation.” WILCOMB E.
WASHBURN, RED MAN’S LAND, WHITE MAN’S LAW 109 (2d ed. 1995). He cites
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia (1787) wherein Jefferson asserts:
That the land of this country [was] taken from them [(the Indians)]
by conquest, is not so general a truth as is supposed. I find in our
historians and records, repeated proofs of purchase, which cover a
considerable part of the lower country; and many more would
doubtless be found on further search. The upper country we know
has been acquired altogether by purchases made in the most
unexceptional form.
Id.
Other historians agree that early colonial land practices generally observed
the formal niceties of purchase of Indian land title. The respective Puritan
governments apparently controlled their subjects’ purchases of Indian title and
required that any potential purchaser of Indian lands obtain prior governmental
consent or that they purchase Indian lands through governmental agents. These nonIndian purchasers used standard deed forms but many times required the signatures
not only of the individual land claimant but of the tribal “sachem” as well. These
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demographic changes in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
substantively undermined the Indian peoples’ ability to negotiate fair
terms and conditions of land cession agreements. 18 The Indians’ ability to
prevent non-Indian takings of their lands increasingly depended on their
diplomatic acumen in forging trading or military alliances with rival
European or colonial interests. 19 But the triumph of the British Crown
over the French in 1763, followed by the successful American revolution
against British rule in 1783, effectively eliminated the Indians’
opportunity for strategic alliances that would preserve their lands from
non-Indian intrusion. 20
The substantial erosion of the Indian populations and their military
capability directly contributed to their reduced nineteenth-century legal
status. This reality was candidly acknowledged by Chief Justice

colonial era purchasers were also careful to make their deeds of purchase as specific
as possible to avoid later challenge from competing non-Indian claimants.
But Indian land, because the epidemics of 1616–17 and 1633–34 had
devastated the eastern Indian populations, became a surplus commodity in New
England. The colonialists offered the Indians hoes and metal knives—implements of
great value to a neolithic people—and in exchange acquired vast tracts of Indian lands.
VAUGHN, supra note 17, at 107–08.
18.
The eastern Indian tribes’ power to upset the delicate balance of
European power in the New World of the early eighteenth century was exploited by
the Iroquois and the southern Indian nations—the Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, and
Cherokees—as a means of protecting their lands and economic resource bases.
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 26–27.
19.
Cornell contends that the major eastern Indian tribes were able to
resist non-Indian encroachment on their lands through a “fortuitous combination of
elements: military strength, European alliance and practical economics.” Id.
20.
By the latter half of the eighteenth century, French power in the New
World collapsed with the Treaty of Paris in 1763, by which France ceded all of its
territory east of the Mississippi to Britain. The eastern Indian tribes could no longer
play off the European powers against each other in order to preserve their lands and
resources. Id. at 27.
By the Treaty of Paris of 1783 ending the American Revolutionary War, the
British Crown transferred its territorial claims east of the Mississippi to the United
States. The newly formed Continental Congress took a radically different attitude
toward these territories; whereas the British Crown considered those lands “Indian
Country,” the American Congress viewed its new territories as a source of revenue
and as a means for pacifying and paying off restive war veterans. Id.
As a practical matter, the Eastern Indian peoples now faced one single
power, the United States, and were no longer able to play off competing European
powers against one another for their own security and advantage. 1 PRUCHA, supra
note 5, at 31.
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Marshall in his Indian law opinions. 21 He referred to the Indian peoples’
diminished political and legal status as the “actual state of things.” 22 This
contemporary reality justified their incorporation as “domestic dependent
nations” into the body of the United States. 23 Marshall had earlier
concluded that it justified the incorporation of the Indians’ aboriginal land
titles into the federal system of property rights. 24
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model envisioned the federal
government as the senior partner and the Indian peoples as the junior
partners in any future sovereign bargaining process. Indeed, his opinions
implicitly authorized a federal bypass of recalcitrant Indian bargainers by
allowing the federal government to make out grants of Indian lands subject
to continued Indian use and occupancy rights. 25 Although modern legal
parlance recognizes that imbalances in economic and legal powers make
a mockery of the bargaining process, 26 such power imbalances were
hardwired into Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. Marshall’s Indian law
21.
Marshall’s Indian Law Trilogy includes the following decisions:
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
22.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
23.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
24.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
25.
In Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1877), the Supreme Court held
that the United States could grant good title to Indian lands:
The grantee, it is true, would take only the naked fee, and could not
disturb the occupancy of the Indians: that occupancy could be
interfered with or determined by the United States. It is to be
presumed that in this matter the United States would be governed
by such considerations of justice as would control a Christian
people in their treatment of an ignorant and dependent race. Be
that as it may, the propriety or justice of their action towards the
Indians with respect to their lands is a question of governmental
policy. . . . The right of the United States to dispose of the fee of
lands occupied by them has always been recognized by this court
from the foundation of the government.
Id. at 525.
Father Prucha emphasized that Marshall’s legal theory eventually evolved
into a dictum that the United States held virtually absolute dominion over the Indian
lands leaving the Indian peoples with merely a usufructuary interest in the lands they
occupied. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 15–16.
26.
The modern contract doctrine of “unconscionability” focuses on
those disparities in bargaining power that are evidenced by a “party’s employment of
sharp practices, . . . the use of fine print and convoluted language and an inequality of
bargaining power.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 314–15 (1982).
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opinions undermined the Indians’ inherent sovereignty over their
aboriginal lands. 27 He judicially restricted the Indians’ power to cede their
lands to anyone but the federal government. 28 He nonetheless insisted that
they possessed sufficient legal capacity to ensure fair land dealing with
their paramount sovereign, the federal government. 29 Modern bargaining
theory would candidly acknowledge that the Indian peoples’ subordinated
legal status fundamentally compromised their ability to bargain fairly with
the federal government. 30 Thus, it is not surprising that Marshall’s Indian
bargaining model has failed to preserve the Indians’ lands and cultures.
Today’s near extinction of the Indian peoples’ cultures and
economies cries out for a new land-based relationship with the federal
government. This new relationship would not presume that today’s Indian
peoples are equal bargainers with the federal government. Indeed, it
would presume the opposite-that today’s Indian peoples face a heightened
risk of federal takings of their lands given Congress’ now plenary power
over their remaining lands. Such a relationship would recognize that
Indian lands are the essential means for the realization of the contemporary
federal policy of tribal self-determination. This new relationship would
further acknowledge that the development of contemporary Indian
economies and cultures are inextricably linked to the preservation of their
lands. 31
A modern Indian takings doctrine would help mitigate the federal
taking incentive that unavoidably arises from the congressional plenary
power over Indian lands. First, it would unequivocally require the
payment of just compensation for the federal taking of any Indian lands.
Second, it would require the award of, under the appropriate factual
circumstances, substitute or replacement value for those lands. The
27.
Richard Epstein speaks of the government’s threat of force as the
major destabilizer of any system of property rights. Such property rights remain in
Epstein’s “state of nature” absent not only their definition but their successful
enforcement and protection, as well. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 76.
28.
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587.
29.
Indian treaties are misleading, Cornell asserts, because they suggest
an “essential (sovereign) equivalence” between the United States and the respective
signatory Indian tribes that the Supreme Court has never honored. CORNELL, supra
note 4, at 46–47.
30.
Epstein rejects as morally reprehensible the “bargaining game”
wherein governmental threat may involve the use of force against an individual’s
person or property. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 41. The Indian peoples were on many
occasions confronted with the federal government’s “offer they could not refuse.”
31.
Land is inextricably bound up within the Indians’ “webs of kinship,
ritual and custom” so that at a conceptual and practical level each “received the imprint
of the other.” CORNELL, supra note 4, at 38–39.
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federal judiciary would be empowered to ensure that the affected Indian
peoples, like other land owners, are justly compensated for their lost
resources. 32
Such a doctrine would not, by itself, ensure the preservation of
contemporary Indian societies as viable economic and cultural entities.
But coupled with other features of today’s Indian self-determination
program, it would contribute to those goals.
This Article develops a modern Indians taking doctrine by
critically examining the unfolding of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model
through three distinct eras:
1. Chief Justice Marshall’s construction of the Indian
bargaining model as an American adaptation of the
European doctrine of discovery;
2. the Supreme Court’s subsequent reformulation of
that model as the Indian plenary power doctrine; and
3. the Court’s failed reconciliation of the Indian
plenary power doctrine with the just compensation
command of the Constitution.
These three eras are summarized and then fully analyzed as the backdrop
that demonstrates the necessity for a modern Indian takings doctrine. A
sketch of such a doctrine is provided by a case study of the most
egregious modern Indian taking: the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation.
This taking triggered a forty-three-year-long
struggle by the Fort Berthold Indians for just compensation. This
struggle encapsulates the legal and practical disadvantages that confront
Indian peoples who bargain with Indian congressional committees over
the terms governing the taking of their lands. From this case study are
extracted economic and doctrinal principles that will form the backbone
of modern Indian takings doctrine.

32.
Indian lands, especially treaty reserved lands, arguably qualify as
“public facilities” whose taking require compensation measured by the reasonable cost
of a “substantially equivalent substitute.” 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note
2, § 12C.01(3)(d), at 12C-38.
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A. Chief Justice Marshall’s Construction of the Indian Bargaining Model
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model broke down for two simple
reasons. First, the Indian peoples had been disabled by Marshall’s
opinions, which prevented the Indians from alienating their lands to
anyone but the federal government. The United States enjoyed the
enviable, strategic position of a “super-monopsonist”—the sole, sovereign
buyer of the Indian peoples’ lands. 33 Second, the federal government was
implicitly empowered by Marshall’s opinions to repudiate its Indian
bargains if they later conflicted with overriding federal interests. 34
But the shadow of Marshall’s vision and the inertia of history has
long prevented judicial reexamination of the Indian bargaining model. Its
historic weight squelched the Indian peoples’ taking claims based on
alleged governmentally coerced Indian land transfers, inadequate
compensation payments, or the disregard of federal trust or fiduciary
obligations. In its contemporary and refurbished version, it sanctions
Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands by foreclosing judicial scrutiny
of putative “good faith” federal takings of Indian lands. 35 It is time now
to fundamentally reassess that model that has so long countenanced the

33.
Exclusive federal control over Indian lands must be viewed as one
means for realizing emergent national interests in the mid-to-late nineteenth century.
Stephen Cornell argues that intertwined nineteenth-century ideas of progress,
nationalism, and religious mission forms the backdrop for understanding America’s
attitudes towards Indians and their lands. Chief Justice Marshall, and other Indian
policy makers, confronted an American West that was controlled and peopled by
Indians. His task was the practical and hopefully fair incorporation of those Indian
lands as the raw materials out of which a future vision of America would be shaped.
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–39.
34.
Marshall had casually analogized the Indian peoples’ relationship to
the federal government as like that of “ward to his guardian.” Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). A later Supreme Court decision transformed
that casual analogy into a “[p]lenary [congressional] authority over tribal relations . .
. not subject to control by the judicial department of government.” Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
The Lone Wolf doctrine permits the federal government to abrogate federal
Indian treaties or agreements if those agreements conflict with an overriding national
interest or are no longer deemed in the best interest of the affected Indian people. Nell
Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Taking of Indian Land: An
Analysis of the Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245, 254–55 (1982).
35.
Professor Newton traces the legal history of Indian taking claims
against the United States and concludes that Congress’ plenary power over Indian
lands still “qualif[ies] the extent to which a tribe can recover on the merits [of its
claim].” Newton, supra note 34, at 254–55.
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federal taking of Indian lands in derogation of the just compensation
command of the Constitution. 36
The Indian consent provisions of many Great Plains Indian treaties
were intended to mitigate the recognized disparity in nineteenth-century
bargaining power between the federal government and the respective
Indian peoples. If they had been judicially enforced to their terms and
tenor, there would doubtless be far more Indian lands than there are today.
But these consent provisions were soon swamped by Congress’ obsession
with national goals, which loomed far larger than its promises to the Indian
peoples. 37
In his 1823 opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh, Marshall concluded
that the federal government possessed the sovereign and exclusive power
to acquire Indians lands via purchase or conquest. 38 Thus, the Indian
peoples’ aboriginal lands were subjected to Congress’ paramount
authority. 39 This underlying dynamic of federal paramount power over
Indian affairs was fundamentally transformed as a congressional power to
unilaterally redefine Indian property rights. The Supreme Court held that
Congress possessed this judicially unreviewable power over Indian lands
in Justice White’s 1903 opinion in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 40
Indian land owners thus have been deprived of the constitutional
protection afforded other land owners under the Just Compensation
Clause. 41 That clause prohibits the uncompensated or undercompensated
taking of privately owned lands. This Indian exemption has had stark
consequences for these culturally distinct, land-based societies; once
fiercely self-reliant and economically independent, Indians now constitute
America’s most impoverished and insular minority population. 42
36.
Congress exercises plenary power over Indian lands and may take
those lands as an incident of its trusteeship authority over the Indian peoples. Id.
37.
Cornell cites the following ideas of “manifest destiny, dreams of
empire and vision of Progress” as “fueling [the United States’] westward expansion.”
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 38.
38.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823).
39.
See id. The noted historian Wilcomb E. Washburn views Marshall’s
opinion in Johnson as “the basis of all subsequent determinations of Indian right.”
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
40.
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
41.
Newton emphasizes that Indian land owners do not enjoy the same
constitutional protection from uncompensated takings as do other private landowners
under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Newton, supra note
34, at 248–49.
42.
“Per capita income for Native Americans in 1991 was slightly more
than $8300, the lowest for all racial groups in the United States, and less than half the
level for the entire population.” GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 16. The Indian
unemployment rate as of 1991 was 45%. That is 3% lower than 1989 but still more
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B. The Giving and Taking of Indian America
The Indian peoples are traditionally depicted as the willing and
fairly compensated “givers” of their lands to the European colonizers. The
familiar painting of the Canarsie Indians’ bargain in 1626 that transferred
Manhattan Island to Peter Minuet, Director of the Dutch West Indian
Company, for twenty-four dollars in Indian trade goods, trinkets, and rum
exemplifies this European view of Indian bargaining. 43 But the Indians’
counternarrative views the Europeans as the “takers” of their lands. The
1948 photograph of the taking of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
powerfully depicts this reality. 44 There, Tribal Chairman George Gillette
of the Three Affiliated Tribes covers his eyes with his left hand as he
openly weeps beside Interior Secretary Krug—the Indians’ trustee—as he
signs the documents taking the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site
for a large federal water project. 45

than 37% higher than the average unemployment rate for the United States as a whole.
Id.
43.
Indian giving of land title did not always redound to the benefit of
Europeans. American humorist Nathaniel Benchley contends that the Dutchman
Minuet was, in fact, the unwitting victim of the first Indian “bait and switch” con in
America! Chief Seyseys, the unscrupulous leader of the Canarsee Indians, exploited
Minuet’s ignorance about which Indian tribe actually held the “use and occupancy”
rights to Manhattan Island. Nathaniel Benchley, The $24 Swindle, AM. HERITAGE,
Dec. 1959, at 62.
Benchley asserts that another Indian tribe, the Weckquaesgeeks, actually
held title to the upper two-thirds of Manhattan Island. As Benchley tells the story, the
wily old chief Seyseys readily agreed to remove his few tribal members from lower
Manhattan Island and “he took the sixty guilders’ worth of knives, axes, clothing, and
beads (and possibly rum), and went chortling all the way back to Brooklyn.” Id. at
93.
44.
This photograph may be viewed in PETER IVERSON, PLAINS INDIANS
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 144 (1985).
45.
Historian Roy Meyer describes “an emotion filled ceremony” on May
28, 1948, in Secretary Krug’s Washington, D.C., office. There, Chairman Gillette and
thirteen other tribal council leaders signed a contract by which the Fort Berthold
Indians relinquished title to over 153,000 acres of treaty-reserved lands as the site for
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir. Chairman Gillette remarked that “our Treaty of Fort
Laramie, made in 1851, and our tribal constitution are being torn into shreds by this
contract.” Roy G. Meyer, Fort Berthold and the Garrison Dam, 35 N.D. HIST. 215,
259 (1968).
The Garrison site was selected by Colonel Lewis A. Pick of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers as essential to the success of the Pick-Sloan Project even though
his predecessor had rejected that site as unsafe. Major General Lytle Brown had
reported to Congress in 1931 that the Garrison site was rejected because it was
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The Indian peoples’ challenges to the underlying validity of Indian
land cession agreements have long been stifled by uncritical adherence to
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. Indian complaints that they did not
understand the cession agreements that they had signed, or that the federal
treaty commissioners had obtained their signatures by threat, or during
their collective, liquor-induced stupor, or through outright fraud, have
been shrugged off as not within the federal courts’ jurisdiction. 46 Such
Indian complaints were simply not heard by the courts unless Congress
expressly granted them legal or equitable jurisdiction to do so. But the
widely varying jurisdictional terms of these statutory grants subjected
Indian land rights to a “rigged lottery” approach to just compensation. 47
Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands has been only
modestly limited by contemporary judicial decisions. 48 Federal courts
may now scrutinize federal Indian legislation under the rational basis
test. 49 But this modest review standard does not significantly alter the
egregious power disparity that is exhibited most fulsomely in the federal
takings of Indian lands. 50 The Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in United
States v. Sioux Nation of Indians 51 reaffirmed the federal government’s
plenary power over Indian lands. While the Court in Sioux Nation rejected
the irrebutable presumption of congressional good faith that it had
declared in its Lone Wolf decision, and replaced it with a “good faith in

“entirely impracticable because of the lack of suitable foundation for a dam of such
magnitude.” Id. at 239 n.2.
46.
Because many Indian tribes were at war with the federal government
in 1863, the Congress barred the Indian peoples from bringing any claims against the
United States in the Court of Claims. The tribes needed a special act of Congress that
waived the sovereign immunity of the United States in order to bring and maintain
such a claim. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 311.
47.
Rosenthal concludes that the admitted inadequacy and inconsistency
of these special jurisdictional acts cried out for congressional reform in Indian claims
processing. H.D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN
CLAIMS COMMISSION 20 (1990).
48.
Newton concludes that contemporary Indian law “grants too much
deference to assumed congressional powers and too little weight to Indian rights.”
Newton, supra note 34, at 250.
49.
Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977).
50.
Newton, supra note 34, at 245.
51.
448 U.S. 371 (1980). The Sioux Nation rule does not allow a federal
court to inquire into the adequacy of consideration that an Indian tribe received in
compensation for a federal taking of its lands. Instead, an Indian tribe whose lands
have been taken by the federal government must overcome the Sioux Nation’s good
faith test if it is to receive just compensation for its taken lands or resources. Newton,
supra note 34, at 258–59.
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fact” test, it did little to ensure that Indian peoples will be justly
compensated for their taken lands. 52
Indeed, the Sioux Nation decision judicially immunizes the federal
government from liability for all but the most heavy-handed and patently
self-interested Indian takings. 53 The best evidence of this is the “good
faith” defense that was offered by the federal government in Sioux Nation
itself. 54 The government theorized that, as the trustee of the Sioux peoples,
it demonstrably acted in their best interests by agreeing to provide them
subsistence rations in perpetuity in exchange for the Indians’ cession of
the Black Hills.55 This “good faith” exchange arguably immunized the
government from any takings liability despite the objective disparity in
value between the Black Hills’ resources and the value of the Indian
subsistence rations. 56 The federal government vociferously insisted that
its past provision of strategically motivated subsistence rations to the
destitute and starving ancestors of today’s Indian claimants immunized it
from any financial liability for the unjust taking of the Black Hills in South
Dakota. 57
52.
The Indian plenary power doctrine permits the federal government to
“take” Indian property and give it to others. One constitutional scholar contends that
the Constitution’s Takings Clause was intended to limit the federal government’s
power to confiscate, seize, destroy, or regulate private property. EPSTEIN, supra note
15, at 3.
53.
Newton wryly concludes that in “less egregious instances of
involuntary [Indian] land acquisitions, the plaintiff tribes have rarely been successful.”
Newton, supra note 34, at 259.
54.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 407–17.
55.
Id. at 416–17.
56.
There must be a limit to state coercive power over private property
rights because the “creation of [state] monopoly power” over those rights “poses a
great danger of abuse.” EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 78. Epstein may have been
referring to Native-American landowners when he describes the “prisoners’ dilemma”
game that individual landowners face in direct bargaining with a state that seeks to
impose “collateral or unrelated” conditions upon their continued use of their private
property. Epstein references the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a means of
restraining state power over otherwise “disorganized citizens” so as to allow them to
escape from the socially destructive game. Id. at 79.
The Court’s failure to specify an objective yardstick against which to
measure the federal government’s assertion that it gave a good faith value for the
Indians’ taken land, imposes an “illogical test [that] turns most [Indian land]
confiscations into [the] actions of a trustee.” Newton, supra note 34, at 261.
57.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 420–21. This decision sought to
“harmonize” congressional plenary power over Indian affairs with the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause. The Supreme Court attempted to reconcile the federal
government's role as the Indian peoples’ trustee with its sovereign eminent domain
power over privately held land. Newton criticizes the failure of that attempted
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These decisions mean that the federal government may no longer
invoke the “slam dunk” immunity to Indian takings claims that it enjoyed
under Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 58 But the death of the irrebutable
presumption doctrine does little to limit Congress’ retained plenary power
over Indian lands. The Sioux Nation decision does little to ensure that just
compensation is, in fact, paid to those Indian peoples who suffer
devastating economic losses due to a federal taking of their lands. 59 Its
“good faith” standard of judicial review focuses on the wrong end of the
just compensation telescope in Indian takings cases. It focuses on the
federal government’s legitimation of its exercise of plenary power over
Indian lands, not on the actual economic losses suffered by those Indian
peoples whose lands are taken for a federal purpose. 60
C. The First Era: Americanizing the European Doctrine of Discovery
Indian occupation of the American West presented a perplexing
early nineteenth-century legal challenge. Chief Justice Marshall seized on
the 1823 case of Johnson v. M’Intosh 61 as the means to resolve the ticklish
and potentially dangerous issues that arose from the non-Indians’ unruly
competition for the control of the western Indian lands. Marshall invoked

synthesis. This failure stems, she contends, from the “good faith” defense that allows
the federal government to subjectively assert that it has “given compensation as a fair
equivalent for the land taken, even though it is far less than the land’s fair market
value.” Newton, supra note 34, at 259.
58.
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
59.
Newton illustrates this point by hypothesizing a contemporary Indian
land sale by Congress on behalf of its Indian wards. Because the federal government
fails to conduct a geological survey or obtain competitive bids for these Indian lands,
the lands are sold at a price that is three or four times lower than their actual fair market
value. She concludes that this congressional action would likely fall short of the
blatant and egregious “bad faith” conduct that triggered Fifth Amendment liability in
Sioux Nation. For that reason, the United States would likely be shielded from fiscal
or political accountability for the economically disastrous consequences that befell its
Indian wards due to its actions. Newton, supra note 34, at 262–63.
60.
Newton asks, why should the federal trust relationship immunize the
federal government from Indian takings claims? She concludes that the Sioux Nation
Court’s focus on the federal trustee’s subjective judgment about the Indian peoples’
best interests undervalues and potentially ignores the “real world” economic losses
that federal takings impose on the Indian peoples. This decision does little to protect
them from the federal government’s negligent or uninformed judgments that result in
the taking of Indian lands. See id. at 263–64. This decision requires the federal
judiciary to “abdicate its normal judicial role” in takings cases. Id. at 264.
61.
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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the European doctrine of discovery as the legal basis for his opinion. 62 He
established an exclusive preemptive right in the federal government to
acquire Indian lands as the rightful successor to similar sovereign
prerogatives that had been held by Spain, France, and Great Britain. 63 But
the Indian peoples were deemed by Marshall to retain their inherent right
of exclusive use and occupancy of their aboriginal lands until those lands
were acquired by the federal government. 64 The purchase of those lands
was to be the preferred means of legitimate federal land acquisition.65
Legal commentators understandably emphasize Marshall’s
practical motives and result-oriented rationale in his opinion. 66 First, they
read Johnson as holding that the federal government possesses the
exclusive authority to prescribe the terms and conditions for future nonIndian settlement of the western Indian lands. 67 Second, they read that
decision as restricting the Indian peoples’ inherent sovereign power to
alienate their aboriginal land titles to anyone but the federal government. 68
They view the Indians’ exclusive use and occupancy rights as a temporary
accommodation that served primarily to ensure the federal government’s
paramount ownership over a vast, federalized public domain that would
eventually extend to the Pacific Ocean.69
62.
Historical scholars agree that the Indian peoples’ right to “complete
sovereignty, as independent nations” was diminished by Marshall’s opinion that
European “discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” WASHBURN, supra
note 17, at 66.
63.
Despite Marshall’s personal misgivings about the justice of the
discovery doctrine, he declared that “if the principle has been asserted in the first
instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if
the property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned.” Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591.
64.
Marshall viewed the Indian peoples as the “rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according
to their discretion.” Id. at 574.
65.
The Indian peoples’ “right of possession has never been questioned”
by the federal government that has the “exclusive power of acquiring” Indian title. Id.
at 603.
66.
Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn emphasizes Marshall’s “practical”
appreciation of the “economic and political demands of the millions [of non-Indians]”
who populated the continent at the time of his decision. WASHBURN, supra note 17,
at 66.
67.
Professor George C. Coggins views that decision as laying the “legal
predicates for the federal [land] disposition program and the westward expansion.”
GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 49 (3d ed.
1993).
68.
Id. at 54 (citing FELIX S. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 468–93 (Rennard Strickland ed., 1982)).
69.
Id.

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

32

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 11:39 AM

Special Issue

But Marshall’s accommodation of the Indian peoples’ exclusive
use and occupancy rights in their lands derived from federal commitments
to protect Indian land rights that were embodied in many federal Indian
treaties. 70 It likewise justified the federal government’s paternalistic
interest in prohibiting unauthorized Indian land transactions by private
parties, states, or rival foreign governments. 71 Furthermore, it was the
self-executing nature of the European doctrine of discovery that
supposedly divested the Indian peoples of their inherent right to freely
alienate their lands to anyone but the federal government.72 Marshall’s
accommodation of this doctrine to nineteenth-century American
circumstances was arguably intended to serve the complementary interests
of the federal government and the Indian peoples.
The federal government, through its Indian treaties, defined the
evolving boundary line between Indian Country and those lands available
for non-Indian settlement. Indian consent not only legitimated the treatymaking process, but was the preferred means for defining Indian
Country. 73

70.
Indians as “original inhabitants” of America were “admitted to be the
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion.” Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at
574.
71.
Washburn cites the Johnson decision as the federal government’s
basis “for all subsequent determinations of Indian right.” WASHBURN, supra note 17,
at 66.
72.
Marshall weighed issues of conscience, expediency, and law in his
recasting of what Washburn calls the “natural rights of Indians.” Id. He reworked the
Indians’ land rights in terms of the “speculative” rights of the discovering European
nations, the “juridical” rights of the successor American states, and the “practical”
economic and political demands of those non-Indian settlers that came to populate the
American continent. Id.
73.
President George Washington and War Secretary Henry Knox both
emphasized respect for the Indian peoples’ aboriginal land titles and rights. President
Thomas Jefferson described the federal government’s preemptive right in the Indian
peoples’ lands:
not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or
paramountship whatever, but merely in the nature of a reminder
after the extinguishment of a present right, which gave us no
present right whatever, but of preventing other nations from taking
possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the Indians had
the full, undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they
choose to keep it, and that this might be forever.
1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 59.
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Indeed, Indian diplomacy resulted in many Indian treaties,
including those that confirmed vast roaming and hunting reserves to the
powerful Great Plains Indian tribes. 74 Some view these Indian treaties as
a monument to Marshall’s Indian law legacy. 75 But they would later loom
Henry Knox echoed that sentiment on pragmatic, moral grounds, writing to
President Washington:
that a nation solicitous of establishing its character on the broad
basis of justice would . . . reject every proposition to benefit itself,
by the injury of any neighboring community, however
contemptible and weak it might be, either with respect to its
manners or power. . . . The Indians being the prior occupants,
possess the right to the soil. It cannot be taken from them unless by
their free consent, or by the right of conquest in case of a just war.
Id. 59–60.
Marshall’s opinions describe the Indian peoples as independent political
entities that despite their status as “domestic dependent nations” were assumed to have
retained the power of self-governance over their members and their territories. But
Indian reformers after the Civil War began to agitate for the unilateral and coercive
extension of federal law and jurisdiction into Indian Country. The Board of Indian
Commissioners declared in 1871 that “we owe it to them, and to ourselves, to teach
them the majesty of civilized law, and to extend to them its protections against
lawlessness among themselves.” 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 676.
74.
The Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851 was drawn up at one of the most
dramatic meetings of Indian peoples and federal treaty negotiators. Some ten thousand
Indians—Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapahos, Crows, Assiniboine, Gros Ventres, Mandans,
and Arikaras—assembled along the Platte River at Horse Creek, where there was
enough pasturage to support such a large gathering of Indian peoples and their horses.
Francis Prucha describes the meeting as “slowly paced and formal” as Superintendent
Mitchell’s comments had to be translated by interpreters on behalf of many tribal
nations. Despite some confusion and missteps by the treaty commissioners, the treaty
was signed on September 17, just before the federal supply train arrived with goods
for distribution to the Indians.
The Indian peoples agreed in the treaty to cease hostilities among the tribal
groups and to accept the respective hunting and roaming boundaries declared in the
treaty for each of the respective tribal groups. They also agreed to the United States’
establishment of roads and military outposts in Indian Country, and to pay restitution
for wrongs committed against non-Indians who lawfully passed through their lands.
The federal government, in return, agreed to protect the Indian peoples from nonIndian depredations and to pay annuities of $50,0000 annually. FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY 238–
39 (1994).
75.
Charles Wilkinson characterizes these treaties and the resulting
reservation system as “intended to establish tribal homelands for the tribes, islands of
tribalism largely free from interference by non-Indians or future state governments.”
CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 14 (1987).
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as a major impediment to the United States’ realization of the late
nineteenth-century dream of manifest destiny. The task of empire building
required a judicial revision of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. Only
by fundamentally reformulating that model could Marshall’s opinions be
made to serve the national imperatives of rapid western settlement and
development. In reformulating its inherited model, the Court unleashed
the much criticized, but never repudiated, congressional plenary power
doctrine to take Indian lands. 76
Marshall’s opinions provided the context for the later judicial
reformulation of the Indian bargaining model. 77
D. The Second Era: The Indian Peoples’ Descent from Sovereign to
Wardship Status
Indian treaties inextricably bound the Indian peoples and federal
government together in a land-based relationship. 78 The treaties
committed the federal government to protect the Indians’ exclusive use
and occupancy rights from infringement by increasingly raucous and
numerous non-Indian settlers who clamored for the opening of the Indianowned western lands. 79 But federal Indian policy became inexorably
driven by the late nineteenth-century notion of an American manifest
destiny to acquire and settle all of the western lands to the Pacific Ocean. 80
The Indian Country concept had assumed that sufficient land was
available on America’s western frontier to accommodate the Indians’ and
non-Indians’ settlement needs. By the 1830s, the eastern Indian tribes had
already been compelled to cede their lands east of the Mississippi and

76.
See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); see also PRUCHA,
supra note 74, at 356.
77.
The Indian peoples did not possess “complete sovereignty” over their
territories because their status had been diminished by “the original fundamental
principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” WASHBURN, supra
note 17, at 66.
78.
See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 34–38; supra note 9.
79.
Congress originally sought to define and maintain a meaningful
boundary around Indian Country for a variety of practical reasons. For this reason,
Congress asserted, under various Indian trade and intercourse acts, regulatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians who intruded into Indian Country or sought to purchase
Indian lands. Id. at 47.
80.
William Gilpin wrote in 1846 of the American people’s
“untransacted destiny . . . to subdue the continent—to rush over this vast field to the
Pacific Ocean . . . to establish a new order in human affairs.” Id. at 38. But between
Gilpin and the Pacific Ocean lay many Indian peoples who were willing to fight to
preserve their land and territory. Id.
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remove to an Indian Territory west of the Mississippi. President Jackson
convinced himself and others that this Indian removal strategy could be a
cornerstone of Indian policy. 81 Indian peoples could always be removed
farther west to arguably equivalent and conveniently distant western
lands. 82
Indian bargains could be fairly revised so as to accommodate
emerging non-Indian settlement needs. 83 This simple faith in a boundless
western frontier made easy those treaty promises that the Indian peoples
would retain their lands for as “long as the grass is green and the rivers
flow.” 84 But by the 1870s, this convenient view had proven a disastrous
failure. Non-Indian settlement of western lands proceeded at such a
breathless pace after the Civil War as to make nonsense of any future
Indian bargaining strategy. 85
81.
Removal of the eastern Indian peoples had been a central concern of
federal policy makers since the War of 1812. President Jackson’s warning in 1830 to
the Chickasaws to either emigrate or submit to state law served to formalize the Indian
removal idea as policy. Id. at 47–48.
82.
The concept of a permanent Indian Country contemplated a secure
western territory for the resident Indian peoples in which federally sponsored
programs of acculturation and education would have sufficient time to transform many
of the Indian peoples into civilized and acceptable neighbors. PRUCHA, supra note 74,
at 235–36.
83.
The earlier acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 allowed
President Andrew Jackson to implement the Indian removal policy on a large scale in
the 1830s. President Jefferson had earlier suggested that the eastern Indian peoples
could be granted western lands in exchange for their aboriginal lands that lay east of
the Mississippi River. President Jefferson’s notion of a western geographic expanse
vaguely called “Indian Territory” took concrete shape by the 1860s when many of the
eastern Indian peoples had been relocated into a concentrated area now known as
Oklahoma. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42.
The westward removal of the eastern Indian peoples during the 1830s served
a variety of goals held by the early federal Indian policy makers. It quickly cleared
Indian lands for non-Indian settlement. It effectively insulated the removed Indian
peoples from a proximate, unhealthy and conflict-ridden contact with non-Indian
frontiersmen. Cornell emphasizes that the federal government’s Indian policy goal
was both the progressive extinction of Indian land title and the displacement of Indian
cultures with non-Indian values and norms. Id. at 40–41.
84.
Wilkinson cites promises by treaty commissioners that the Indian
peoples would possesses their reservations as “permanent home(s) from which there
will be no danger of your moving again.” WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 17.
85.
Indian removal and assimilation policies were fused in 1887 by the
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331–358, 381 (1994)). It authorized the president to allot communally held Indian
lands in severalty as among the members of the respective resident Indian peoples.
Indian heads of households would generally receive 160-acre parcels and single Indian
individuals or children would receive smaller parcels of tribal land. Allotted lands
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Sovereign bargains can be enforced only through legally binding
proceedings or at gunpoint. 86 The Indian peoples, unable and unwilling to
once again accommodate the federal government’s land cession demands,
engaged in a lengthy, but ultimately futile, military defense of their
roaming and hunting reserves. 87 The Indian peoples’ resort to the gun
ended with the ignominious 1890 massacre by federal cavalry of Big
Foot’s ragtag band of a few Sioux warriors and many women, children,
and old men. 88
The Indian peoples’ resort to the federal courts to enforce their
sovereign bargains came in Lone Wolf. 89 The Comanches and Kiowas
sued for an injunction to prevent the federal allotment and sale of their
were originally to be held in federal trust for twenty-five years for the individual
allottees. But Indian lands that were deemed surplus to the allotment requirements of
a specific reservation could be put up for sale by the president to non-Indian settlers
with the sales proceeds being placed in Treasury accounts for the benefit of the
affected Indian people. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42–43.
86.
Marshall’s Indian bargaining model presumed that later revision of
the Indian peoples’ territorial rights would come through good faith bargaining that
was reasonably free of federal coercion, threat, or unfair inducements to obtain the
Indians’ consent to future land cessions. But federal Indian policy soon deviated from
this standard by countenancing treaty negotiation practices that bordered on the
coercive, if not downright fraudulent. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50.
87.
Custer’s defeat by the combined forces of Sioux and Cheyenne
warriors on June 26, 1876, at the Little Bighorn effectively bookends Stephen
Cornell’s Indian conflict era, which stretched from the late eighteenth to late
nineteenth centuries. Id. at 14.
88.
A small Sioux band of some 100 Indian warriors and 250 women and
children surrendered near the South Dakota Badlands to troops of the Seventh Cavalry
on December 28, 1890. These Indians were surrounded, as they camped near
Wounded Knee Creek, by 500 soldiers and several pieces of Hotchkiss light artillery.
Apparently, the frightened soldiers searched the Indian camp for firearms the next
morning and a scuffle ensued in which an Indian warrior fired a gun. Both Indians
and soldiers exchanged fire and the non-Indian commander ordered the firing of the
Hotchkiss artillery at the fleeing Indian women and children as they retreated into a
ravine near the camp. The Indian bodies would eventually stretch for miles as some
200 Sioux Indians were killed by the federal troops. Id. at 3.
The military subjugation of the Apaches, Sioux, and Nez Perce by the federal
cavalry in the 1870s marked the effective end of armed Indian resistance on the Great
Plains and Far West. The collapse of Indian military might left the Indian peoples
vulnerable to retributive congressional action and the pressures of treaty
negotiators. Cornell cites the words of Shoshone Chief Washakie in 1878 as the
closing elegy of this era: “Our fathers were steadily driven out, or killed, and we, their
sons, but sorry remnants of tribes once mighty, are cornered in little spots of the earth
all ours by right—cornered like guilty prisoners and watched by men with guns.” Id.
at 50.
89.
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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treaty reserved lands in contravention of the Indian consent provisions of
the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek. 90
Congress decided in 1871 to repudiate future Indian treaty
making. Some non-Indians wanted Congress to go further and repudiate
all existing Indian treaties.91 But the 1871 statute only prohibited the
president from future negotiation or execution of treaties with the Indian
tribes. 92 Congress expressly declined to abrogate the many Indian treaties
negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate before
1871. 93 Several of these treaties allocated vast tracts of hunting and
roaming lands to powerful Great Plains Indian tribes. 94 Further, those
treaties required that at least a majority of the adult male members of the
tribes consent to any future cession of their lands to the federal
government. 95
Congress avoided the wholesale abrogation of existing Indian
bargains, but the Supreme Court was directly confronted with the
abrogation issue in Lone Wolf. 96 It had to decide whether the Kiowas and
90.
Lone Wolf’s attorney, William C. Springer, filed an injunction action
against Interior Secretary Hitchcock on June 6, 1900, in the equity division of the
Supreme Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the allotment and sale of the
Indians’ land violated their due process rights. BLUE CLARK, LONE WOLF V.
HITCHCOCK: TREATY RIGHTS AND INDIAN LAW AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 62–63 (1994).
91.
Termination of Indian treaty making, Indian reformers believed,
would allow individual Indians to be integrated into white society via a stringent
educational program and the extension of private property rights into Indian lands.
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 73.
92.
Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
93.
Existing Indian treaties are expressly preserved by the statute's terms.
WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 138 n.3.
94.
The 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1859), with the Sioux,
Cheyennes, Arapaho, Crow, Assiniboins, Gros Ventres, Mandans, and Arikaras
spelled out the hunting and roaming boundaries for each signatory tribe. But Prucha
emphasizes that it was the Sioux, along with their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies, who
“dominated the conference” and achieved federal acknowledgment of their “power”
and effectively allowed them to dominate the reserved hunting grounds. 1 PRUCHA,
supra note 5, at 343.
95.
See, e.g., Article 12 of the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek with
the Kiowa and Comanche peoples, which stated that “[n]o treaty for the cession of any
portion or part of the reservation herein described . . . shall be of any validity or force
as against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all
the adult male Indians occupying the same.” Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche
Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat.
581, 585.
96.
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Comanche Indians could prevent the federal government from allotting
their reservation and selling the so-called surplus tribal lands to non-Indian
settlers in violation of the Indian consent provisions of the 1867 Treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek. 97 Indian treaties—such as the Medicine Lodge
Creek Treaty—had long legitimated the federal acquisition of Indian
lands. 98 Such Indian land agreements were portrayed as the outcome of
mutually beneficial arms-length negotiations between the federal
government and the affected Indian peoples. 99
But Congress’ 1871 decision to abandon Indian treaty making
presented the Supreme Court with a dilemma. The Court had two options
in Lone Wolf. 100 It could accept Lone Wolf’s argument that the Indian
consent requirement bound Congress and prevented the coerced allotment
of their reservation. That provision required that at least three-fourths of
the adult male members of the tribes consent to any future tribal land
cessions to the federal government. 101 It had been inserted in the 1867
97.
Art. 12, 15 Stat. at 585. Clark reports that “[f]riends of the Indian
approached the court appeal buoyed with an air of positive anticipation [because]
never before had the executive, legislative or judicial branches seized Indian property
and thrown it open without at least the tacit consent of the Indians.” CLARK, supra
note 90, at 67. They were hopeful that the judiciary would enforce Article 12 of the
1867 Medicine Lodge Treaty after Congress ratified the Jerome Commission
agreement for the Indians’ cession of their reserved lands, even though far fewer than
the required number of Kiowas and Comanches had consented to that agreement. See
Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 813, 31 Stat. 676. This disregard of the Indians’ treatyguaranteed property rights was the basis for the suit of Lone Wolf, a Kiowa Indian, to
enjoin Interior Secretary Hitchcock from implementing that act on his reservation.
CLARK, supra note 90, at 67–76.
98.
CLARK, supra note 90, at 99.
99.
The Lone Wolf decision stripped away the Indian reformers’ delusion
that the Indian peoples enjoyed the unqualified ownership of their treaty-reserved
lands. Congress, thereafter, proceeded with the opening of many treaty-established
Indian reservations. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 775–76.
100. Lone Wolf argued that Indian consent to the Jerome Agreement had
been procured by misrepresentation or threat and that, in any case, fewer than the
required three-fourths of the adult male members had signed the agreement. The
Court’s possible acceptance of this due process argument represented option one.
Alternatively, the Court could choose to reformulate Marshall’s Indian bargaining
model so as to allow Congress to exercise plenary power over the Indian peoples’
lands and resources. PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 355–60.
101. Article 12 of that treaty provided that:
No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation
herein described, which may be held in common, shall be of any
validity or force against the said Indians, unless executed and
signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians
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treaty to specifically reassure those Indians who wanted a federal
guarantee of their future, undisturbed use and occupancy of their reserved
lands. 102 But stringent judicial enforcement of this and similar Indian
consent provisions would likely throttle any envisioned federal opening of
the vast western Indian lands subject to similar treaty
provisions. 103 Alternatively, it could decide that Congress was morally,
but not legally, bound to respect its Indian bargains. Only by
fundamentally reformulating Marshall’s Indian bargaining model could
the Court sustain Congress’ coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands in
defiance of its treaty commitments. 104
The federal government was freed from its treaty promises by the
Court’s redefinition of the relationship between the Indian peoples and the
federal government. 105 The Court seized on Marshall’s early dictum in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 106 Marshall had casually analogized the
relationship of the federal government and the Indian peoples as like that
of a guardian and its wards. 107 But the Court in Lone Wolf transformed
this casual analogy into a sweeping doctrine of federal plenary power over
Indian affairs. The repercussions of the Lone Wolf doctrine for the
Indians’ land base were deep and long lasting. It swept away any legal
impediment to the coerced allotment and sale of Indian lands to non-Indian
interests. The short-and long-term effects of this decision on the Indians’
land base have been devastating. Between ninety and one-hundred million
acres of Indian lands were lost to Indian ownership. 108
occupying the same, and no cession by the tribe shall be understood
or construed in such a manner as to deprive, without his consent,
any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land
selected by him as provided in Article III of this treaty.
Art. 12, 15 Stat. 581.
102. Kiowa warriors such as Satanta were opposed to the reservation
system. He asserted that when Indians “settle down, we grow pale and die.” CLARK,
supra note 90, at 24. These warriors much preferred a life of freedom. The treaty
negotiators held out the prospect of “gifts, annuities, [and] houses” as inducements to
these warriors to agree to this treaty. Id.
103. Id.
104. The new Lone Wolf doctrine conceived of the Indian peoples as
governmental “wards [to be] confined on Indian reservations, with the power and
dignity of independent nations supported by treaty guarantees all but forgotten.”
PRUCHA, supra note 74, at 358.
105. Id.
106. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
107. Id. at 17.
108. Congress’ 1887 allotment program fused earlier disparate Indian
removal and assimilation policies in a dramatic and global manner. Between 1887
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The Lone Wolf decision drove a stake through the heart of Indian
consent doctrine. Presumed congressional good faith in its Indian
dealings, not Indian consent, would govern future Indian land cessions to
the federal government. Furthermore, Congress was judicially authorized
to take Indian lands incident to its exercise of guardianship power over the
Indian peoples. The Court’s action unleashed the federal government’s
forced Indian assimilation program that was aimed at the systematic
dismantling of traditional tribal governance and cultural systems. 109
The Lone Wolf decision authorizing the congressional allotment
and sale of the Indian peoples’ treaty-reserved lands and birthing the
federal plenary power doctrine represents the second era of Marshall’s
Indian law legacy. 110
E. The Third Era: Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of
Indian Title
The demolition of the Indian consent principle signaled a low
point for the Indian peoples. 111 However, the Indian peoples and their
advocates did not give up hope of somehow protecting their lands from

and 1934, when Congress officially repudiated its allotment program, some 60% of
the remaining Indian land base—more than 86 million acres—had passed into nonIndian hands. These lands were transferred from Indian ownership through a variety
of means. Much of those lands were directly sold to non-Indians under the federal
surplus lands acts. Some of those lands were lost to Indian ownership through
amendments to the Allotment Act that allowed individual Indians to sell or encumber
their lands as a means of obtaining some income for subsistence needs on the new and
substantially diminished Indian reservations of the twentieth century. CORNELL, supra
note 4, at 44–45.
109. Professor Getches suggests that the Indian plenary power doctrine
grew out of three basic assumptions: first, strict adherence to the terms of Indian
treaties would have distributed an unfair share of the nation's wealth to Indians;
second, federal courts declined the role of enforcing arguably imprecise treaty terms;
and third, the Indian plenary power doctrine preserves federal flexibility to adapt
Indian policy in light of fundamentally changed circumstances. GETCHES ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 208.
110. Indian allotment served as the characteristic dispossession device of
the “reservation era,” dating from the late nineteenth century to the 1930s. CORNELL,
supra note 4, at 42–43.
111. Allotment marked the beginning of a new process of incorporation of
Indian lands into the surrounding American economy. The Indian peoples’ descent
under the federal plenary power doctrine from their historic status as semisovereign
nation to dependent ward mirrors their cultural and economic subordination by
assimilative and antitribal programs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Id. at 44–50.
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federal takings. 112 Did Lone Wolf absolutely immunize the federal
government from Indian takings claims? This issue was squarely
presented to the Supreme Court in the 1938 case of Shoshone Tribe v.
United States. 113 In Shoshone, the Court upheld the lower court’s
judgment that awarded just compensation to the Shoshone Indians for
Congress’ late nineteenth-century decision to settle another Indian tribe,
over the Shoshone’s vehement objection, on those lands reserved for the
exclusive use and occupancy of the Shoshone Tribe. 114 That decision
heartened Indian peoples. 115 The Court seemed poised to overrule its 1903
Lone Wolf decision. 116 Did the Shoshone decision really establish a per se
Indian just compensation rule? Was the federal government required to
pay just compensation to injured Indian peoples when it took their lands
for federal purposes? 117
Any hope for a broad-gauged Indian takings doctrine was soon
derailed. One factor in this derailment was Congress’ creation in 1946 of
the Indian Claims Commission (“ICC”). 118 The ICC was to hear and
determine all those jurisdictionally defined claims for relief that the Indian
peoples may have against the United States. 119 The ICC’s creation,
coupled with the Supreme Court’s 1955 decision in Tee-Hit-Ton Band of
Indians v. United States, doomed any easy optimism. 120 Tee-Hit-Ton
112. Professor Nell Newton contends that extending generally the just
compensation principle to Indian lands “would strike a fair balance between the
competing interests of federal power and Indian rights.” Newton, supra note 34, at
264.
113. United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
114. Because the Shoshone Tribe held a federally recognized right of
occupancy in their lands, Congress’ exercise of eminent domain to transfer them to
the use and occupancy of another Indian tribe required the payment of just
compensation to the wronged Indian tribe. Id. at 115.
115. Governmental interference with Indian lands, not the scope of title
held by the Indians, has been regarded by some commentators as the Indians’ “key to
recovery” in the Shoshone decision. Daniel G. Kelly, Jr., Indian Title: The Right of
American Indians in Lands They Have Occupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 655, 666 (1975).
116. Id. at 668.
117. Id.
118. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat.
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). The Indian Claims
Commission terminated on September 30, 1978, by the terms of 25 U.S.C. § 70v.
119. President Truman signed the ICC legislation to allow the “First
Americans” the opportunity to “vindicate their property rights and contracts in the
courts against the violations of the federal government itself.” ROSENTHAL, supra
note 47, at 92.
120. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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dashed the Indians’ hopes of realizing Fifth Amendment protection of their
aboriginal use and occupancy rights. That case reinterpreted Johnson so
as to restore the Lone Wolf doctrine that courts must defer to Congress’
plenary power over Indian lands. 121
The Court’s failure in Tee-Hit-Ton to circumscribe the federal
plenary power doctrine by extending just compensation protection to the
Indian peoples’ aboriginal use and occupancy rights represents the third
era of Marshall’s Indian law legacy. 122
F. The Final Era: Reexamining the 1949 Taking of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation
In 1949, Congress took 156,035 acres of Indian lands located
within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a massive
multipurpose water resource development project known as the PickSloan Program. 123 The Fort Berthold Indians’ impassioned, but ultimately
futile, struggle to preserve their historic reservation demonstrates the
contemporary impact of Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. As will be
demonstrated in Part V, the clash between the Fort Berthold Indians and
the combined forces of the Army Corps of Engineers and two powerful
congressional Indian committees starkly illustrates the need for a modern
Indian takings doctrine. 124 Extending just compensation protection to the
remaining Indian lands would require no heroic innovations in existing
legal doctrine or practice. The 1949 Fort Berthold taking reveals the deep
disadvantages faced by contemporary Indian peoples who must bargain
with the federal government to preserve their unique land-based tribal
cultures and economies. 125

121. Id. at 290–91.
122. From a constitutional standpoint, Professor Newton contends that
there is no defensible reason “for treating Indian property different from non-Indian
property.” Newton, supra note 34, at 264. She concludes that shielding the federal
government from potentially large Indian takings claims should not be deemed an
overriding governmental interest that shields the federal government from liability in
these cases. Id.
123. Flood Control Act of 1944, ch. 664, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887,
897–98 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 16 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 43 U.S.C.).
124. See Meyer, supra note 45.
125. Id.
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II. THE FIRST ERA: AMERICANIZING THE EUROPEAN
DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY
A. The Prologue to Johnson v. M’Intosh
Sovereign bargaining between the federal government and the
Indian peoples would be unthinkable absent Marshall’s 1823 opinion in
Johnson v. M’Intosh. 126 He created the needed bargaining framework via
the concept of Indian title. 127 By federalizing Indian land titles he
established Congress as the exclusive dealer in Indian lands. Three
foundational principles were declared by the Johnson decision: First, only
the federal government may acquire Indian lands by purchase or conquest.
Second, only the federal government may grant Indian lands, subject to
their right of use and occupancy. Third, only the Indian people have the
right to use and occupy their lands, subject to future federal divestment of
those rights. 128
The commodification of Indian lands reflected the nineteenth
century’s changed valuation of the western lands. Increasing scarcity of
available lands for non-Indian settlement prompted states and private land
syndicates to acquire vast tracts of land directly from the Indian peoples.
Avoiding needless bloodshed and conflict between the encroaching
settlers and those Indians who would fight to protect their remaining lands
was the goal of early federal Indian policy makers. 129
Congress in 1790 had asserted its regulatory authority over Indian
lands by enacting its first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act.130 But its
meaningful enforcement was a problematic affair along the volatile
frontier of Indian Country. Although federal regulations prohibited the
unauthorized acquisition of Indian lands, private land speculators and
states’ rights advocates openly defied Congress’ assertion of an exclusive

126. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
127. Id. at 574.
128. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 78.
129. The federal government sought to establish a boundary around Indian
Country via Indian treaties and the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over Indian land
and commercial transactions under the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act. This federal
regulatory effort was directed at restraining private and state efforts to dispossess the
Indian peoples of their lands. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 47.
130. President Andrew Jackson’s efforts to remove the Five Civilized
Tribes—the Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Seminoles—from their
lands in the southeastern United States helped to undermine the federal government’s
commitment to protecting Indian lands. Id.
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police power over these resources. 131 Indeed, similar initiatives by the
British Crown to restrict private commercial intercourse with the Indians
had prompted widespread evasion by rebellious colonial interests.
Frontiersmen and private land-speculation syndicates likewise greeted the
federal government’s feeble efforts to protect the Indian lands with
disdain. They openly challenged the federal government’s authority to
restrict their asserted natural liberty to acquire land directly from the
Indian peoples. 132
B. The Devolution of Original Indian Title
Sovereign bargaining via Indian treaty making had arguably
served the European nations’ need for exclusive control over Indian
lands. 133 Marshall assumed that it could also serve that same goal on

131. The 1796 version of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act specified a
discrete boundary line between the whites and Indians. Indian Trade and Intercourse
Act, 1 Stat. 469, 469 (1796). Prucha points to this as the first such formal statutory
designation of Indian Country. Despite frontiersmen dissatisfaction with a law that
intended to frustrate their direct dealings with, or depredations upon, the Indians,
Congress reenacted the statute in 1799 without amendment and with little debate.
Apparently, Congress valued the friendship and pacification of its Indian allies more
than it feared the outrage of those frontiersmen who felt they were deprived of their
settlement opportunities or natural liberties by Congress’ high-handed treatment of its
own citizenry. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 92–93.
132. Enforcement of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act in frontier
America of the early nineteenth century proved well-nigh impossible. The American
frontier had spawned a subculture of a breed of lawless, sometimes depraved, men
who lived off clandestine intercourse with the Indians. The Indian fur trade literally
created these men who went off with their packs for months on end into the wilderness.
Prucha emphasizes that though they often took Indian wives, they nonetheless
“mercilessly exploited the Indians, debauched them with whiskey, and then robbed
them of their furs.” 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 95. They totally disregarded legalities,
and their well-heeled capitalist masters, such as John Jacob Astor of the American Fur
Company, sought legislative relief against overstrong enforcement of federal Indian
treaties and the various federal protective statutes. Id.
133. Id. at 113–14. Marshall’s Indian law decisions laid the legal basis for
such federal regulation of Indian Country by declaring the principles of federal
preemption over Indian lands and tribal sovereignty. Prucha reads these decisions as
establishing the federal government’s exclusive power to extinguish the Indian
peoples’ aboriginal rights of occupancy in their lands. But the federal government
was interested in exercising its legal power to protect Indian land rights only up to a
point. The federal government’s main interest was in policing the process of nonIndian settlement of Indian lands so as to ensure that it was achieved with as little
disorder and bloodshed as possible. Indeed, the notion of Indian removal far west of
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behalf of the federal government. 134 Curbing non-Indian incursions into
Indian lands was also an important goal of the early federal government. 135
Such bitter land-related conflicts helped convince the framers of the
Constitution that an unregulated Indian commerce was unwise and
dangerous. Constitutional responsibility for regulating Indian commerce
was explicitly assigned to the federal government by the 1787
Constitutional Convention. 136
But a major practical issue was left undecided: who held legal title
to the western Indian lands? Whoever held that title would control the
destiny of non-Indian western settlement. Marshall recognized that the
peculiar facts and issues presented in Johnson offered the Court an
opportunity to domesticate Indian title in a manner favorable to the federal
government. 137
Johnson involved private land transactions with Indian tribes in
1773 and 1775, prior to the United States’ existence. 138 The Court’s
ostensible task in Johnson was to determine which of the two competing
private claimants had the better title to a large tract of former Indian lands
in the Ohio Valley. 139 One of the non-Indian claimants traced his land title
to private land purchases in 1773 and 1775 directly from the chiefs or
headmen of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians. 140 The other non-Indian
claimant traced his land titles to a later federal grant of those lands that
was subsequent to a land cession agreement between the federal
government and those same Indians. 141
Marshall seized the opportunity to address the broader question of
who had the power to grant “good title” to Indian lands—the federal
government or the respective Indian peoples? 142 By a creative
interweaving of sixteenth-century European notions of sovereignty over
the Mississippi convinced some Indian policy makers that they could forever defer the
problem of non-Indian encroachment on Indian Country. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 108–14.
136. The new Constitution vested exclusive authority in Congress to
regulate trade and commerce and make treaties with the Indian peoples. This was a
“far simpler and clearer” declaration of federal legislative authority over Indian affairs
than had been contained in the superseded Articles of Confederation. GETCHES ET
AL., supra note 10, at 70–71.
137. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815–1835, at 710–11 (1991).
138. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 571–72 (1823).
139. Id. at 572.
140. Id. at 543–71.
141. Id. at 571–72.
142. Id. at 572–73.
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“heathen and infidel peoples” with the practical necessity for the orderly
western settlement, Marshall established the federal government’s
paramount title to Indian lands. 143 Based on the European sovereigns’
preemptive rights over Indian lands, he concluded that only the federal
government could grant “good title” to former Indian lands. 144 Despite
Marshall’s personal doubt that the Pope or the European monarchs
possessed any such power to grant Indian lands to their colonizing
expeditions or chartered companies, 145 he nonetheless concluded that the
American courts were bound by established European law and custom to
recognize the federal government’s power over Indian lands. 146
The de facto success of the Europeans in incorporating the Indian
lands into their respective domestic system of property rights established,
for Marshall, a judicially unassailable “actual state of things.” 147 By
Marshall’s “velvet revolution,” the United States acceded to paramount
title over Indian lands, without resort to a gruesome and expensive war of
conquest against fierce tribal opponents who would fight rather than
surrender their lands to non-Indians. 148
But Marshall was required to tweak the discovery doctrine to
adapt it to American circumstances. 149 Marshall’s moral disquiet about
the seeming dispossession of the Indian peoples may have prompted his
143. Id. at 591.
144. Id. at 587–92.
145. Id. at 590–91.
146. The discovering European nations had the “sole right of acquiring the
soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it.” Id. at 573. The United
States likewise “maintained, that discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish
Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest.” Id. at 587.
147. Marshall reasoned that the British Crown had successfully asserted
its “limited sovereignty over [the Indian peoples], and the exclusive right of
extinguishing the title which occupancy gave them.” Id. at 588. This sovereignty and
preemptive right over the Indians’ land passed to the United States after its successful
revolution against British authority in 1783.
148. The discovery doctrine, however much it “may be opposed to natural
right, and to the usages of civilized nations,” is yet “indispensable to that system under
which (the United States) has been settled.” Id. at 591.
149. Marshall’s task in Johnson was to:
consider not only law but conscience and expediency as well. The
“natural” rights of the Indians had to be seen in terms of the
“speculative” rights of the earlier European monarchs, the
“juridical” rights of their successor American states, and the
“practical” economic and political demands of the millions who
now populated the continent.
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 66.
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action. 150 Judicial confiscation of the Indians’ aboriginal land titles was
arguably allowed by the European doctrine of discovery. But he had also
to elide a delicate public relations problem: such dispossession would have
outraged international public opinion and led to the condemnation of his
new nation. 151
Marshall could not confirm the Indian peoples’ inherent authority
to alienate their lands to whomever they wished. That decision would have
frustrated the revenue raising capability and expansionist ambitions of the
federal government. 152 He avoided this dilemma by legally bifurcating the
Indian peoples’ land titles into two federally recognized property
interests. 153 The Indians, as first possessors of the soil, held the right of
exclusive use and occupancy in their aboriginal lands. This possessory
right was declared to be as legally sacred as the Anglo-American right of
fee ownership. 154 However, the United States, as the sovereign successor
in interest to the European discovering nations, held the paramount fee
simple title to the Indians’ lands. 155
This bifurcation of Indian title both justified and necessitated a
land-based relationship between the federal government and the Indian
150. Washburn characterizes Marshall’s opinion as balancing “conscience
and expediency” in justifying what may be regarded as his dispossession of the
Indians’ “natural right” to the full ownership of those lands they had occupied from
time immemorial. Id.
151. G. Edward White described Marshall’s difficulty as arising from
distinct legal principles that apply to the Indian peoples:
The Indians had been the initial possessors of the American
continent: the land and, presumably, the property rights emanating
from it were theirs. . . . The Indian tribes had been recognized from
the outset of white settlement as nations and had entered into legal
relationships, such as treaties or contracts, with whites.
Theoretically, then, Indian tribes holding land had not only rights
of sovereignty but a bundle of natural rights deserving of legal
recognition, rights related to the concepts of liberty, property, and
self-determination that occupied so exalted a position in earlynineteenth-century jurisprudence.
WHITE, supra note 137, at 704.
152. But the availability of this land and resources for American expansion
“was dependent on the dispossession of the original inhabitants.” CORNELL, supra
note 4, at 35.
153. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591–94.
154. Id.
155. Marshall’s message in Johnson to the Indian peoples was that “the
natural rights of human beings to dispose of property that they held by virtue of
possession did not apply to Indians in America.” WHITE, supra note 137, at 710.
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peoples. Doubtless, the Indian peoples would have charged, if they had
been consulted, that the Johnson decision wrongfully impaired their
preexisting sovereign authority over their lands. They lost their inherent
right to sell or alienate their lands to anyone but the federal government. 156
Doubtless, the non-Indian settlers and speculators, if they had likewise
been consulted, would have charged that the Johnson decision ignored
their God-given natural liberty to acquire lands from the Indians.
Furthermore, the Indian peoples, private land dealers, and state rights
advocates would have protested the judicially created and exclusive power
of the federal government to prescribe those terms and conditions by
which private parties would hereinafter acquire title to western Indian
lands. 157 Few of the now innumerable grantees of federal land titles know
or care that the Indian peoples had originally granted those lands to the
United States. 158
C. Marshall’s Creation of an American “Charter of Discovery”
Marshall extolled the sacredness of the Indian peoples’ use and
occupancy rights in their aboriginal lands. 159 To some this seems mere
156. The natural law idea was reduced in Johnson to an “advisory
capacity.” White concludes that the Indians’ inherent right to dispose of property had
been subordinated to the “positive enactments of American states and the federal
government.” Id. at 710–11.
157. Theorizing about the Indian rights played little role in the thinking of
the non-Indian settler or the eastern Indian land speculator. Prucha remarks that “they
saw the rich lands of the Indians and they wanted them.” 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at
108. John Sevier’s natural liberties philosophy served to legitimate the aggressive
attitudes of the frontiersmen. He argued that the “law of nations . . . agree[s] that no
people shall be entitled to more land than they can cultivate.” Id. His frontiersman’s
philosophy triumphed because the federal government could make only sporadic and
relatively feeble military efforts to regulate this non-Indian pressure to settle Indian
lands. Id. at 111–12.
158. The incorporation of the Indian lands into the American property
system was essential for the realization of nineteenth-century visions of America’s
destiny. Thomas Jefferson, as champion of the social agrarian movement, promoted
the commercialization and appropriation of western Indian lands as the basis for
founding an independent-minded “yeoman” class of free-holder farmers. By contrast,
William Gilpin focused in 1846 on the idea of progress and manifest destiny when he
wrote: “The untransacted destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent—
to rush over this vast field to the Pacific Ocean . . . to establish a new order in human
affairs.” CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37–38. Common to both of these visions is the
need to incorporate the Indian lands as a commodity for future federal disposition.
159. The United States government treated the Indian peoples as if they
were autonomous foreign nations. Marshall concluded that this treaty-making history
confirmed an “autonomous nationhood” for Indian peoples. But Marshall could not
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judicial sugarcoating that shrouds a culturally biased taking of Indian
lands. 160 But contemporary efforts to mitigate or prevent the federal taking
of Indian lands require a critical revaluation of Marshall’s Indian
bargaining model.
This analysis focuses on two elements: (1) Marshall’s adoption of
a conflated notion of European sovereignty over the “heathen and infidel”
peoples of the New World; 161 and (2) Justice Reed’s later revision of the
Johnson decision in holding that the Indians’ aboriginal use and
occupancy rights are not compensable property interests. 162 The federal
government may take aboriginal use and occupancy rights without any
payment of judicially mandated compensation. 163
But Reed’s opinion confounds Johnson and extends it beyond its
facts and rationale. By the time of Justice Reed’s opinion in 1955, the
West had long been settled. 164 Doubtless Johnson foreclosed Indian land
recognize that the Indian peoples retained full sovereignty over their aboriginal lands.
Id. at 57–58.
The qualified character of Indian sovereignty over their aboriginal lands is
evidenced in Jefferson’s proposed constitutional amendment that would have
authorized the federal government’s acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from
France in 1803. Although he proposed a recognition of Indian land rights, he limited
that recognition to an exclusive right of occupancy in their aboriginal lands. The
proposed language read:
The right of occupancy in the soil, and of self-government, are
confirmed to the Indian inhabitants, as they now exist. Preemption
only of the portions rightfully occupied by them, & a succession to
the occupancy of such as they may abandon, with the full rights of
possession as well as of property & sovereignty in whatever is not
or shall cease to be so rightfully occupied by them shall belong to
the U.S.
Id. at 59.
160. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN
LEGAL THOUGHT 308–17 (1990).
161. The European doctrine of discovery was intended to broker discovery
claims of “new lands” between competing European monarchs. 1 PRUCHA, supra note
5, at 15. But Marshall turned this doctrine against the governmental and property
rights of the Indian peoples as the aboriginal occupants of America.
162. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–85
(1955).
163. Id.
164. The noted Indian historian Wilcomb E. Washburn interprets
Marshall’s opinion in Johnson as holding that the “Indians of the United States did
not possess an unqualified sovereignty despite the centuries of relations conducted
with them in terms of treaties and diplomatic agreements.” WASHBURN, supra note
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claims by foreign governments, private parties, or states that were based
solely on ostensible agreements with Indian tribes. 165 But did it authorize
the federal taking of Indian lands without compensation as claimed by
Justice Reed?
Contemporary historical scholarship reveals that the European
doctrine of discovery was a hotly contested notion by sixteenth-century
legal and religious scholars. Indeed, by the time of Marshall’s Indian law
opinions it was clearly rejected as an international normative principle for
the regulation of Europeans’ treatment of indigenous peoples and their
lands in the New World. 166 Furthermore, Marshall’s interpretation of the
discovery doctrine also conflicted with the purpose, tenor, and intent of
French, British, colonial, or American treaties with those many and
powerful eastern Indian tribes. 167 Many influential sixteenth-and
seventeenth-century European jurists and thinkers who soundly
condemned the Europeans’ treatment of the Indios of the New World
would have also condemned Marshall’s interpretation of the discovery
doctrine in Johnson. A cursory examination of those thinkers’ writings
flatly contradicts Marshall’s claim of an extant and clear European
consensus that would legitimize his interpretation of the European
doctrine of discovery. 168

17, at 66. He cites Marshall’s dictum that the European doctrine of discovery
governed American law: because “the property of the great mass of the [non-Indian]
community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned.”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 591 (1823)). Washburn
asserts that Marshall recognized that “title to the real estate of the nation,” as well as
the “economic and political demands of the millions [of non-Indians] who now
populated the continent,” hinged upon his decision in Johnson. Id. at 65–66.
165. Id. at 66.
166. L.C. GREEN & OLIVE P. DICKASON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
NEW WORLD 201–26 (1989).
167. Conciliation of the Indian peoples and centralization of Indian
commerce was the motivating force that directed British Imperial policy toward the
Indian peoples. Indian trade was the economic lifeblood of colonial life in America
and it behooved the European and colonial government to cultivate diplomatic
relationships that ensured the continued flow of Indian goods and furs into the larger
European economic system. See 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 18–28.
168. The Indians’ legal status provoked sharp debate between, among
others, Juan Gines de Sepulveda (1490–1573) and Fray Bartolome de Las Casas
(1484–1566) at Valladolid, Spain, in 1551. Las Casas denounced Spain’s reliance on
the papal bulls of 1493 as conveying any title to the Indian peoples’ lands. Sepulveda,
relying on the authority of Aristotle and St. Augustine, concluded that the Indian
peoples were obligated to “accept Spanish domination because of the their idolatry
and human sacrifice.” GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 166, at 201–09, 204.
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D. Reassessing the Contemporary Value of the Charter
Justice Reed later candidly admitted that America’s nineteenthcentury dream of a manifest destiny would not have been realized but for
the Johnson decision. 169 But Reed mistakenly read Johnson as a “just so”
story that explained that the United States’ ascension to power necessarily
doomed the Indian peoples. 170 Reed bluntly acknowledged the spurious
logic by which Marshall extended preemptive federal title over a vast
expanse of Indian lands that were occupied by numerous and powerful
tribes who were prepared to militarily contest the federal government’s
claimed ownership of their lands. 171
Reed implicitly rejected Marshall’s touted reliance on the
established “actual state of things” as mostly wishful thinking that
anticipated the federal government’s successful conquest of the Indian
West. Many of the western Indian tribes continued to exercise full
sovereignty over their lands well after the Johnson decision. 172 Marshall
and Reed’s shared grim vision of the Indian peoples’ future derived not
from a hypothetical sixteenth-century European charter of discovery but
from the nineteenth-and twentieth-century desire to possess Indian
lands. 173
Substantial growth in the nineteenth-century non-Indian
population, supplemented by the influx of many landless European
immigrants, required the states and private land syndicates to shift from
an Indian “trading” to an Indian “raiding” strategy as the more efficient
means of acquiring Indian lands. 174
The Johnson decision, by
monopolizing federal control over Indian lands, effectively closed this
troublesome gap in federal authority. Only Congress may prescribe the

169. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–80 (1955).
170. Id. at 279–91.
171. Justice Reed described Marshall’s opinion in Johnson as
rationalizing the subordinate legal position of the Indian peoples. Id. at 279.
172. Justice Reed concluded: “Every American schoolboy knows that the
savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force.” Id.
at 289–90.
173. Justice Reed’s opinion is noted for its arguably “pejorative”
references to the Indians’ “nomadic” stage of development and “savage” land-tenure
concepts. He deploys these notions as the basis for his conclusion that aboriginal
occupancy rights may be extinguished without just compensation. WASHBURN, supra
note 17, at 114.
174. Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An
Economic Model of Indian-White Relations, 37 J.L. & ECON. 39 (1994).
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terms and conditions for the future non-Indian settlement of the American
West. 175
But Marshall’s theory of federal ownership of Indian lands would
have left many sixteenth-century jurists and theologians dumbfounded. 176
They would have flatly rejected his hypothesized charter of discovery as
wrongfully dispossessing the Indians of their lands. The Indios of New
Spain were considered by most reputable European theologians and jurists
to be entitled to the possession and ownership of their aboriginal lands. 177
But the key distinction between the Johnson decision and the ruling
sixteenth-century opinion regarding the Indians’ land rights in the New
World is this: the Spanish Crown of the sixteenth century sought to
incorporate the Indian peoples into the larger political and social order,
whereas the federal government of the United States sought only to
incorporate the Indian lands into its domestic legal order.178
175. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279–80 (citing Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587–88 (1823)).
176. Brutality toward the Indians of New Spain endangered the Spaniards’
souls, according to Father Bartoleme de Las Casas, who was to become known as “the
protector of the Indians.” Las Casas’ personal conversion to the cause of the Indians
may have been hastened by a Dominican priest’s refusal of the sacraments in 1614
because he owned and exploited Indian slaves. Nonetheless, Las Casas devoted his
life to persuading both the temporal and spiritual authorities of the sixteenth century
that the Indians’ rationality as men entitled them to respect and protection under
Spanish law. His entreaties to Emperor Charles V were rewarded with authority to
establish an Indian mission colony at Terra Firme in Venezuela. Others, such as Fray
Antonio de Montesinos, challenged the conquistador community to honor the royal
edict that proclaimed Indians to be free men in a sermon that asked: “Are these Indians
not men? Do they not have rational souls?” FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE FOUNDERS OF
AMERICA 131–32 (1993).
177. GREEN & DICKASON, supra note 166, at 196–97. Vera Cruz, a
Spanish professor of theology at the newly created University of Mexico, lectured
extensively on Amerindian rights and concluded that the Indians had been “true lords
of their lands” from time immemorial and that the Spanish Crown had no right under
natural law to grant their lands to anyone without their express consent. Id. at 197.
Professor Green surmises that Vera Cruz’s lectures are “another . . .
indication [that] Europe’s expansion into the Americas did not accord with proclaimed
principles.” Id. at 198.
178. The Spanish Crown accepted its “special obligation” to protect and
preserve its Amerindians. Id. at 203. Las Casas and other Spanish theologians
denounced the institution of encomienda as an “iniquitous and tyrannical” usurpation
of the Amerindians’ land and political rights. Id. at 202. Las Casas specifically
rejected the civilizing rationale for Spanish conquest of the Amerindians by observing:
Not only have [Amerindians] shown themselves to be very wise
peoples and possessed of lively and marked understanding,
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But the Johnson decision can be read as far more than a temporary
accommodation of the Indians’ use and occupancy rights pending ultimate
federal disposition of their lands. 179 Indian use and occupancy rights were
to be protected by federal regulatory and military action, if necessary, as
against defiant non-Indian settlers. Ironically, the minimal successes by
the federal government in this regard seemed only to hasten the Indian
peoples’ undoing. The federal military forays undertaken to protect the
Indian use and occupancy rights served only to outrage frontiersmen and
states’ rights advocates. 180
But the Indian bargains generated via Marshall’s model proved to
be a potent barrier to non-Indian settlement of the American West.181 The
Indian peoples proved to be far more astute bargainers than Marshall may
have anticipated. 182 Many of the federal treaties with the powerful Great
Plains tribes required an express Indian consent to the future cession of
Indian lands. Unless three-fourths of the adult male tribal members

prudently governing and providing for their nations [as much as
they can be nations, without faith or knowledge of the true God]
and making them prosper in justice; but they have equaled many
diverse nations of the world, past and present, that have been
praised for their governance, politics and customs, and exceed by
no small measure the wisest of all of these, such as the Greeks and
Romans, in adherence to these rules of natural reason.
Id. at 208–09.
179. Marshall concluded that “Indian title [is] entitled to the respect of all
courts until it should be legitimately extinguished.” Johnson, 21 U.S. at 592.
180. The federal government did use military force to drive illegal settlers
off Indian lands. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 112–13. But the settlers always seemed
to win out eventually in their goal of settling Indian lands. Prucha cites the
insufficiency of federal military forces and the unwillingness of civil authorities to
fairly prosecute non-Indian violators of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act. Id.
Prucha also surmises that the federal government acquiesced in illegal settlements on
Indian lands that had gone on so long and thoroughly as to be irremediable in nature.
Id.
181. Marshall’s Indian law decisions and related federal treaties confirmed
the Indian peoples’ exclusive use and occupancy rights in vast hunting and roaming
reserves in the American West. Cornell argues that the federal government had to
“back-peddle” on its treaty commitments so as to facilitate the further incorporation
of Indian lands under the allotment program of the late nineteenth century. CORNELL,
supra note 4, at 45–50.
182. Wilkinson cites as common treaty language those provisions that
guarantee the Indian peoples’ “permanent” possession of their lands for their
undisturbed “use and occupancy.” WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 15.
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consented to a future land cession, the federal government could not get
their lands. 183
The self-limiting character of the Johnson decision became clear.
The federal government emerged from that decision as a “supermonopsonist”: the sole sovereign buyer of the Indians’ lands. But its
dominant market power position over Indian lands would prove radically
insufficient to achieve its later nineteenth-century goal of rapid western
settlement and development. 184
III. THE SECOND ERA: THE INDIAN PEOPLES’ DESCENT FROM
SOVEREIGN TO WARDSHIP STATUS
A. The Rise and Fall of the “Measured Tribal Separatism” Policy
The vast expanse of western lands could presumably
accommodate the divergent and increasingly antagonistic land uses by
encroaching non-Indian settlers and the resident Indian peoples. War
Secretary Henry W. Knox believed that an Indian Territory could be
carved out of the American West. 185 Congress indeed legislated in 1834
an expansive definition of Indian Country that encompassed virtually all
the lands west of the Mississippi River to the Sierra Nevada Mountains. 186
Indian peoples, Knox believed, should be allowed the necessary
time, space, and opportunity to adapt their cultures and economies to a
non-Indian way of life. 187 His idea of a “measured tribal separatism” was
183. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
184. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50.
185. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 58–60.
186. Congress provided a statutory definition of Indian Country in the
Nonintercourse Act of 1834:
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of
Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the
Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title
has not been extinguished, for the purpose of this act, [shall be]
deemed to be the Indian Country.
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 729 (1834) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 177, 194 (1994)).
187. Knox’s Indian policy grew out of practical motives. Prucha cites
Knox as saying that “[i]f our modes of population and War destroy the tribes the
disinterested part of mankind and posterity will be apt to class the effects of our
Conduct and that of the Spaniards in Mexico and Peru together.” 1 PRUCHA, supra
note 5, at 65–66.
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later implemented through federal “peace and friendship” treaties with the
strong Great Plains Indian tribes. 188 These treaties confirmed vast
roaming, hunting, and gathering reserves for the use and occupancy of
these tribes. 189 These treaties also preserved the Indians’ lands by
requiring that at least a majority of the adult male members of the affected
tribes consent to any future land cessions to the federal government. 190
But Knox’s assumption that there was enough western land to
long accommodate the Indian peoples’ hunting and roaming way of life
was soon proven mistaken. A tsunami wave of non-Indian demand for
western lands swamped Knox’s strategy of a measured tribal separatism.
The demand for Indian lands skyrocketed after the Civil War, fed by
successive waves of new European immigrants and an unexpected
increase in America’s indigenous non-Indian population. 191 Constituent
pressure grew for the congressional repudiation of its Indian bargains so
as to open the vast hunting and roaming reserves of the Great Plains
Indians to non-Indian settlement. 192
By the 1870s, both the enemies and friends of the Indians grew
disenchanted with existing Indian treaties. Their practical objection to
these treaties was simple: the Indians had too much land! They faulted
these Indian bargains for not forcing the Indian peoples to adopt civilized
habits such as farming or ranching. The Indians were largely left free to
pursue their traditional subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering ways
of life on their large reserves. 193
The Great Plains tribes had driven hard bargains with the federal
treaty negotiators. They succeeded in establishing a formidable legal
barrier to non-Indian incursions into their lands. 194 But critics argued that
these bargains thwarted the highest and best economic uses of these lands,
188. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14–15.
189. Id. at 14–19.
190. Indians and their congressional allies attacked proposed territorial
bills for Oklahoma in the 1870s as conflicting with treaty promises of self-governance
without non-Indian interference. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 741–43.
191. Cornell cites “[w]hite demand” for Indian lands in the 1860s as a key
impetus for the development of the Indian reservation system. CORNELL, supra note
4, at 42.
192. The reform-minded Board of Indian Commissioners had come to
support the principle of Indian allotment as a means of assimilating and civilizing the
Indian peoples. At the famous Lake Mohonk Conference in 1884, the Board endorsed
“heartily” the allotment concept. Non-Indian settlers supported Indian allotment
because it would eventually release millions of acres of Indian lands as “surplus lands”
for non-Indian entry and settlement. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–71.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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locked up, as they were, in large roaming and hunting reserves. These
lands could be “unbundled” into highly valued products, goods, and
services only through intensive use, substantial capital investment, and the
extension of private property rights into those lands. 195
B. Reformulating Marshall’s Indian Bargaining Model: The Birth of the
Plenary Power Doctrine in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock
By the 1870s, many non-Indians were convinced that the tribal
separatism policy had proven to be a disastrous failure. 196 The Great
Plains Indians clung tenaciously to their ancestral lands and cultural
traditions. They evinced little obvious interest in adapting to a non-Indian
way of life.
Furthermore, Indian peoples were regarded as
semiautonomous governmental entities. But contemporary critics viewed
Indians as dependent governmental wards, not as quasi-independent
peoples. 197 They urged that the federal Indian treaties be repudiated and
that Indian peoples be dealt with as the dependent subjects of
congressional will. 198
Three congressional actions in the late nineteenth century
combined to transform Marshall’s Indian bargaining model. First,
Congress decided in 1871 to end Indian treaty making. 199 Second,
Congress decided in 1887 to break up the Indian peoples’ communally
held lands into small homestead-size land parcels that were to be assigned
to each tribal member for farming or ranching purposes. 200 Third,
Congress decided to offer those “surplus” Indian lands that were released
by the Indian allotment process to non-Indian settlers. 201
195. Stephen Cornell frames the Indian-White conflict over land as a
struggle between precapitalist and capitalist views of land use. CORNELL, supra note
4, at 34–39. Capitalist “commercialization means that labor and land are no longer
controlled by social bonds or cultural practice but are subject instead to market
forces.” Id. at 36. By contrast, in Indian society, “[l]and, labor, and the productive
process are inextricably bound up in webs of kinship, ritual, and custom, which
themselves render the different aspects of social reality mutually intelligible and
interdependent.” Id. at 38.
196. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 19–23.
197. Bishop Whipple, among other influential friends of the Indian,
wanted President Lincoln to treat the Indian peoples as governmental wards, not as
members of quasi-sovereign political entities. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 470.
198. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 659–86.
199. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
200. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)).
201. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 668–69.
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Many friends of the Indian, including Caleb H. Smith, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, supported both the repudiation of Indian
treaties and the forced Indian allotment program. 202 By 1869, Smith
argued, Indian treaty making had degenerated into a “cruel farce.” He
urged that Indians be expressly recognized by Congress as the dependent
wards of the federal government. 203 Ending Indian treaty making, Smith
argued, would mark the beginning of a more humane and rational Indian
policy. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, headed by Smith, would become the
primary authority to regulate the Indians’ lands and lives. 204
But the end to Indian treaty making came as the pragmatic
outcome of an institutional revolt led by a handful of congressmen who
demanded a greater role for the House of Representatives in the
formulation of Indian policy. Historically, the president and his treaty
commissioners had directed Indian policy. 205 But some House members
grew increasingly resentful of the Senate’s exclusive legislative power to
ratify proposed Indian treaties submitted to it by the president. The House,
for its part, was expected to routinely appropriate the monies necessary for
the implementation of any Indian treaties agreed to by the president and
the Senate. 206
The House demanded and ultimately achieved in 1871 the passage
of an appropriations rider that ended Indian treaty making. 207 It thereby
obtained a role in the development and control of future Indian policy.
This fundamental shift to congressional, rather than executive,
administration of Indian affairs was rationalized as unifying Indian policy
and reducing the substantial transaction costs of bargaining on a

202. It was believed that the end of treaty making with the tribes and the
beginning of congressional direct rule by statute would be the departure point for a
rational and more effective, if not more humane, Indian policy. COHEN, supra note
68, at 106.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Critics of Indian treaty making increasingly advocated that Indian
tribes should be dealt with by general congressional legislation rather than through
treaties that acknowledged Indian tribes as semiautonomous government bodies.
Instead, the tribes should be considered as wards of the government and not “quasiindependent nations.” Id. at 105. The end to the process of treaty making, however,
was more a product of traditional political jealousies than of rigorous policy.
Members of the House of Representatives resented the senatorial power to ratify
Indian treaties without any role for the House in treaty formulation. The House
therefore demanded, and received in 1871, an end to treaty making, and a greater role
in the development and control of Indian affairs. Id. at 105–07.
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“government to government” relationship with each Indian tribe. 208 But
Congress did not go so far as to abrogate, as many non-Indians had
advocated, existing Indian treaties. These Indian bargains remain today as
bulwarks protecting the Indian peoples’ quasi-sovereign status. 209
Congress’ enactment of the General Allotment Act of 1887
likewise represented a clear repudiation of measured tribal separatism. 210
That policy had sought to preserve the traditional Indian cultures,
economies, and lands from undue or premature disruption by the nonIndian settlement of the West. 211 But the federal allotment program
expressly contemplated breaking up the Indian roaming and hunting
reserves into individual, Indian-owned agricultural homesteads. 212
Each Indian family and individual tribal member would receive a
federal trust patent to a homestead-sized parcel of land. 213 Only a lone
senator, Henry Teller from Colorado, opposed the General Allotment Act.
He reviled the Indian allotment policy as a thinly veiled “Indian land grab”
that was dressed up in “save the Indian” garb. He predicted that the Indian
allotment process would only serve to impoverish, not improve, the Indian
peoples’ lives. 214
But the Indian allotment program ran headlong into a potentially
lethal road block. Many Indian treaties required that future land cessions
be approved by at least a majority of adult male members of the affected
tribes. 215 Could Congress unilaterally revise these Indian bargains?
Indeed, the Kiowas and Comanches invoked just such an Indian consent
provision, Article 12 of the 1867 treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, in an
effort to enjoin the federal government’s coerced allotment of their
reservation. 216 That article required that any further cessions of Indian
lands be approved by “at least three-fourths of the adult male” Kiowas and
Comanches who were residing on the reservation. 217
208. 1 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 527–33.
209. Id.
210. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–358, 381 (1994)).
211. WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 19–23.
212. Id. at 14–19.
213. 2 PRUCHA, supra note 5, at 666–71.
214. Id.
215. Blue Clark surmises that the allotment policy implicated fundamental
express and implied treaty pledges made to Great Plains’ Indian tribes in the postCivil War era. CLARK, supra note 90, at 2–3. Common phenomena of the allotment
era were “assimilation pressures, land hunger and Indian resistance.” Id. at 2.
216. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
217. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes of Indians (Treaty of
Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 1, 1867, art. 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
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Indian Treaty Commissioner David H. Jerome was assigned the
unenviable task of persuading those Indians to consent to the allotment of
their reservation and to the sale of the surplus lands to non-Indians. 218 He
met with the assembled Kiowas and Comanches at Fort Sill in 1892. He
talked candidly to those Indians about the very limited options that the
Kiowas and Comanches faced if they refused to accept the allotment of
their reservation:
If the Indians will do what the Great Father wants them to
do, and do their part well, it will result in your having
plenty of food and clothing; and instead of having, as you
sometimes do, only one meal a day, you will have three
meals a day and have plenty of clothing and things that
will make you comfortable through the winter. Instead of
having to wait for an issue of beef every two weeks, you
can go out and kill a beef of your own and have a feast
every day if you please. I told you a little while ago that
for twenty-four years the Indians had increased very little
if any in numbers. Now, if you follow the plan that we
have told you about you will not have your babies die
from the cold, but you will have them grow up good,
strong, healthy men and women, instead of putting them
in the ground. 219
218. David Howell Jerome was a former Michigan governor who replaced
General Lucius Fairchild as head of the so-called Cherokee Commission that had been
charged in 1889 with the negotiation of the cession of Indian Territory west of the
96th degree of longitude and the “opening” of those ceded lands to non-Indian
settlement. The newly styled Jerome Commission would later facilitate 11 land
cession agreements with Indian tribes in Indian Territory that would affect some 15
million acres of Indian lands. CLARK, supra note 90, at 36–37.
219. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 200. Clark contends that the
Jerome Commission came with “fixed conceptions regarding private ownership of
land, the democratizing effects of yeomanry, and the necessity for American Indians
to enter the national marketplace of competitiveness for private gain.” CLARK, supra
note 90, at 39.
From the Jerome Commission’s viewpoint, communal land ownership was
unworkable, tribal governments had to be abolished, and Indian lands allotted to
individual tribal members if Indians were to survive in American society. By contrast,
the Kiowa Indians approached the negotiations “with their own well established
opinions” and they knew already what the commission wanted and why they came.
Id. at 39. The older warriors who had helped negotiate the 1867 treaty wanted the
federal government to adhere to the treaty’s guarantee that they would have no less
than 30 years in which to hold their ancestral and traditional lands. Jerome opened
the negotiations with ill-chosen remarks saying, “I want you to remember that the
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Indian Commissioner Warren Sayre was even more direct when
he spoke to the assembled Indians. He told them that the president could
force them to accept allotments whether they wanted them or not. He
reminded them that this forced allotment program had already occurred on
other Indian reservations. 220 But Lone Wolf answered that his people were
not ready for the allotment of their lands and that they did not possess the
skills or inclination to succeed as farmers and ranchers. 221 Commissioner
Jerome responded to Lone Wolf by pressing the Kiowas and Comanches
even harder to accept his proposed agreement. Every tribal member would
be allotted a 160-acre trust parcel of land. The Kiowas and Comanches
would be paid a lump sum of two million dollars for two million acres of
tribal lands that would then be opened to non-Indian settlement. 222
But Quanah Parker and other Indians played for time, arguing that
the treaty commissioners should either give the Indians more money for
their lands or that the negotiations should be delayed so as to allow the
Indians to consult with legal counsel regarding the proposed agreement. 223
However, Jerome would hear none of it. He wanted the Indians’ decision
regarding the proposal as presented. By the time he and his colleagues had
left the reservation he felt he had done the job that he had been sent to do:
he had successfully collected 456 Indian signatures. These were enough
Indian signatures to allow Indian agent George Day to certify that well
over three-fourths of the adult male tribal members had consented to the
Jerome Agreement as required by Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine
Lodge Creek. 224
Jerome transmitted the Indians’ signed agreement to President
Harrison in January 1893. The Indians had only grudgingly agreed to the
allotment and sale of their reserved lands, Jerome admitted in his
transmittal letter to the President, but he believed that the agreement was
legally binding. 225 Jerome was proven premature in his assessment of the
agreement’s validity. Interior Secretary Bliss decided to have a new tribal
census taken before Congress acted on the Jerome Agreement. 226 This
census revealed that Jerome had severely undercounted the adult male
members of the Kiowa and Comanche Tribes: there were 725 Indian adult
Government wants nothing from you.” Few of the assembled Indians likely gave
credence to that remark. Id. at 41.
220. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 201.
221. CLARK, supra note 90, at 41.
222. Id. at 42.
223. Id. at 42–46.
224. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 203.
225. CLARK, supra note 90, at 43–44.
226. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 200.
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males who were eligible to vote on the Jerome Agreement. Treaty
commissioner Jerome had collected only 456 signatures, which fell
considerably short of the required three-fourths majority. Secretary Bliss
recommended to the congressional committees that the Jerome Agreement
not be ratified. He pointed out that the proposed Indian allotments were
far too small to support tribal families by livestock grazing or farming. He
suggested that negotiations be held with the affected Indian tribes. 227
Despite doubts about the validity of the Jerome Agreement, the
Fifty-sixth Congress chose to move forward with final action on the
ratification of the Jerome Agreement. The Kiowas and Comanches
petitioned Congress not to ratify the Jerome Agreement. They contended
that the allotment of the reservation would mean their “destruction as a
people and [would bring them] to the same impoverished condition to
which the Cheyenne Arapaho and Indian tribes have been brought from
the effects of prematurely opening their reservations for the settlement of
white men among them.” 228 But Congress chose not to listen to the
Kiowas and Comanches or to Secretary Bliss, and by the Act of June 6,
1900, Congress ratified the Jerome Agreement. 229
C. The Effect of Lone Wolf on the Indian Land Base
Lone Wolf sued in federal court to enforce his people’s sovereign
bargain by enjoining Interior Secretary Hitchcock from allotting or selling
the Kiowas’ and Comanches’ lands. His complaint alleged that the
proposed allotting of the reservation constituted a taking of their lands in
violation of Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek. His lawyer,
William Springer, filed an injunction action on his behalf in the equity
division of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia. His action
asked the court to prevent the Interior Department from implementing the
General Allotment Act. Lone Wolf urged in his petition that the court hold
illegal the Act of June 6, 1900 as contravening the express terms of the
1867 treaty. 230
But Justice A. C. Bradley denied Lone Wolf’s request for a
preliminary injunction against the federal government’s allotment and sale
of the Indians’ lands. 231 Lone Wolf had argued that this unilateral federal
action would deprive the Kiowas and Comanches of their treaty-protected
227. Id. at 204.
228. Id. at 205.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Decree of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, No. 1109,
4 Mar. 1902, RG 267, File 18454, National Archives.
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property without the due process of law. But the judge disagreed and
reasoned that it was within Congress’ prerogative to allot any Indian
reservation regardless of alleged tribal misunderstandings, deception by
treaty commissioners, or a demonstrable failure of tribal consent. Only
Congress had the constitutional power to decide this issue, not the courts.
Therefore, Lone Wolf’s due process objections to the forced allotment and
sale of their lands, the court held, should be dealt with by the body that
could appropriately balance the competing public interests and the rights
of the Indian. 232
But time and events had overtaken Lone Wolf. By the time that
Lone Wolf’s appeal from the lower court’s decision was scheduled for
appellate hearing, more than 150,000 non-Indians had already registered
with the federal land office for some 13,000 homesteads in what had once
been Kiowa and Comanche land. 233 Those homesteads were sold to the
non-Indian settlers at a price of $1.75 an acre. 234 It came as no surprise
when the court of appeals quickly affirmed the lower court’s ruling. 235
Whether the Secretary’s allotment and sale of the Kiowa and
Comanche lands should be enjoined as violating Article 12 of the 1867
treaty would be decided by the Supreme Court. Lone Wolf urged the
Court to hold that Article 12 plainly prohibited the unconsented allotment
or sale of the Indians’ lands. 236 But requiring Indian consent as a condition
for the federal allotment or sale of their lands was unacceptable to the
Court. The judicial imposition of an Indian consent condition, Justice
White reasoned, would actually hurt the Indian people. It would “deprive
Congress . . . [of its ability] to partition and dispose[] of tribal lands . . . if
the assent of the Indians could not be obtained.” 237 Justice White readily
agreed with Lone Wolf that the Indians’ right of occupancy in their lands
was legally regarded as “sacred as the fee [title] of the United States in the
same lands.” 238 But only private parties and the states—not Congress—
were legally bound to respect Indian land titles. 239 Congress, unlike
private citizens or states, was possessed of a plenary authority over the
Indians’ lands. 240 It would be fruitless, therefore, Justice White
concluded, to require the federal courts to hear Indian testimony that
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

CLARK, supra note 90, at 62–63.
Id. at 66.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 206.
CLARK, supra note 90, at 66.
Id.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 554 (1903).
Id.
See id. at 564–65.
Id. at 565–66.
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would demonstrate that their signatures to the Jerome Agreement had been
procured by the fraud or that three-fourths of the adult male tribal members
had not signed that agreement. 241 The unquestioned tribal status of the
affected Indians, coupled with Congress’ declared purpose to give
adequate consideration to the Indians for their lands, meant to Justice
White that there were no viable issues for judicial decision.242
From White’s viewpoint, the Indians’ complaint that Congress
had illegally taken their lands was wide of the mark. 243 Congress’
allotment and sale of the Indian peoples’ lands was not a taking so much
as it was a transmutation of those lands into equivalent financial assets.
Justice White concluded his opinion with the notorious admonition that
the federal courts must “presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith
in dealing with the Indians.” 244 The Court’s decision affirmed the federal
government’s demurrer to Lone Wolf’s petition for injunctive relief. 245
The Lone Wolf decision fundamentally reformulated Marshall’s
Indian bargaining model. It replaced its “government to government”
relationship with a new judicial creation—the federal plenary power
doctrine. That doctrine freed Congress to allot and sell the Indian peoples’
lands without their consent. Congress was empowered as the Indians’
guardian to freely dispose of Indian lands. 246

241. Id. at 567–68.
242. CLARK, supra note 90, at 71–72. But from Justice White’s viewpoint,
the Indians’ right of occupancy was not equivalent to ownership of their lands. The
federal government was the owner of the Indian lands and could effectuate a change
in the Indians’ use of those lands if it was necessary for the Indians’ benefit. Id.
243. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
244. Id. Justice White characterized Congress’ allotment and sale of the
Indians’ land as effecting “a mere change in the form of the investment of tribal
property.” Id.
245. CLARK, supra note 90, at 73.
246. Id. at 102–03. Clark places Lone Wolf in the larger, international law
context when he analyzes Henry Cabot Lodge’s reliance upon that decision, among
other Indian law decisions, as the basis for the United States’ assumption of
guardianship over foreign “domestic, dependant nations” during Senate debates for
the federal government’s assumption of guardianship over the “dark skinned” peoples
of the Philippines. Id.
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IV. THE THIRD ERA: JUDICIAL INDECISION REGARDING THE
COMPENSABILITY OF INDIAN TITLE
A. Judicial Confirmation of Compensability: The Impact of United States
v. Shoshone Tribe
Sovereign bargaining had been the historic means by which Indian
peoples sought to preserve their lands from federal takings. But the idea
of an Indian Country wherein the Indian peoples were free to create their
own laws, cultures, and economies had seemingly collapsed under the
weight of the federal plenary power doctrine. No longer did the federal
government pledge to use its military forces to ensure that states and nonIndians respected the Indian Country boundary. 247 The Lone Wolf
doctrine breached this boundary by recognizing a judicially unfettered
federal plenary power over Indian lands. 248 The Indian peoples were
forced to seek a new strategy to preserve their remaining lands.
The federal courts would clearly not enjoin a congressional breach
of Indian bargains, but would the courts require the payment of just
compensation for the federal taking of Indian lands? 249 Such a
requirement would provide the Indian peoples with some measure of
substantive protection against Congress’ unprincipled exercise of plenary
power over their lands. 250
The Indian allotment program and the sale of “surplus” Indian
lands reduced the total Indian land holdings by some ninety to onehundred million acres. 251 Congress’ primary purpose in the allotment
program was to spur the non-Indian settlement of America’s western
lands. Many non-Indian constituencies—railroads, homesteaders, mineral
prospectors, and land speculators—benefitted from Congress’ largess in
disposing of the Indian peoples’ lands. 252 Indeed, Justice Reed later
remarked that the rapid and efficient development of the American West
would have been inconceivable absent Marshall’s Indian law decisions. 253

247. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 42–43. Cornell contends that Indian
“assimilation and removal” joined hands in the late nineteenth century as reflected in
federal Indian policy. Id.
248. Id.
249. See Kelly, supra note 115, at 668.
250. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How
Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 751–53 (1993).
251. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196.
252. See CORNELL, supra note 4, at 37–38.
253. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289–90
(1955); see supra note 175 and accompanying text.
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But by the advent of the New Deal Era in the 1930s, America’s
western frontier had long since closed. 254 In 1934, Congress repudiated
its Indian allotment policy and adopted fundamental Indian land and
governmental reforms as the hallmark of its “Indian New Deal.” 255 These
reforms were intended to promote the new federal policy of tribal
economic development and political self-determination. 256 But only fortyeight million acres of Indian lands remained by then. 257 Those lands were
owned by either Indian tribes or individual Indian allottees. Indian land
reform became a central focus of Roosevelt’s Indian policy. This policy
expressly rejected the flawed and failed Indian allotment policy of the late
nineteenth century. 258 A judicial rethinking of the Johnson-Lone Wolf line
of decisions that had made Indian allotment and the surplus lands sales
possible seemed likewise justified.
Renewed respect for Indian land rights was the Supreme Court’s
contribution to the goal of tribal revitalization. The Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Shoshone Tribe 259was hailed by Indians as a
major step toward the judicial protection of Indian lands. 260 The facts of
the Shoshone case were straightforward: the federal government had
decided to settle an additional band of Indians upon the Shoshone’s
reservation without their consent. By an earlier Indian treaty of 1863, the
United States had set aside a vast area of some forty-four million acres for
the hunting and gathering use of the Shoshone people. However, Congress
254. Homestead filings on “opened” Indian lands had by the late 1920s
dwindled to almost nil. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 89. Land acquisition that had been
the “motor” of Indian policy was no longer to shape Indian policy as it had in the late
nineteenth century. New social goals of progressivism, cultural pluralism, and
economic rejuvenation would have their resonance in the reshaping of federal Indian
policy in the 1930s. Id.
255. David Getches points to section 1 of the Indian Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984, 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1994)),
which ended the Indian allotment program and section 4, id. Stat. at 985 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 464 (1994)), which prohibited future alienation of Indian land
without tribal consent as evidence of this land reform impulse. GETCHES ET AL., supra
note 10, at 218–19.
256. Cornell contends that the protribal rhetoric of the Indian New Deal
only thinly disguised its assimilative character. Indian tribes were required to choose
between “an alien constitutional form of government and the uncertainties of the preIRA period.” CORNELL, supra note 4, at 94.
257. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 196.
258. Id.
259. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
260. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 294. Getches concluded that this
decision “removed considerable confusion over the extent of tribal property interests
relative to the interests of the United States.” Id.
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prevailed on the Indians to cede all but three million acres of those lands
to the federal government by the Fort Bridger Treaty of 1868. 261 Those
lands were “set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation
of the Shoshone Indians.” 262
The Shoshone Court emphasized that the federal government
knew in 1868 that the Shoshone’s lands contained valuable mineral
deposits of gold, oil, coal, and gypsum. 263 Those lands also included more
than 400,000 acres of timber, extensive well-grassed bench lands, and
fertile river valleys that were readily irrigable. 264 The lower court ruled
that the settling of the Northern Arapaho Tribe on the Shoshone’s Wind
River Reservation had amounted to a Fifth Amendment taking of one-half
of that reservation as of March 19, 1878. 265
The lands so taken amounted to 1,171,770 acres, for which the
trial court awarded the tribes $1.35 an acre or $1,581,889.50. 266 But the
United States disputed the trial court’s inclusion of certain additional
elements of value in its calculation of the just compensation owing to the
Shoshone Tribe. It argued that the Indians’ right of the use and occupancy
of the taken lands should be valued “net the value of the timber or mineral
assets.” 267
The Shoshone Court responded to this contention with a
resounding affirmation of Chief Justice Marshall’s bold and sweeping
principle that the Indians’ right of occupancy is “as sacred and as securely
safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title.” 268 It held that the federal
government’s appropriation of that tribal interest rendered the government
liable for the payment of just compensation. 269 The Court limited its 1903
Lone Wolf decision as holding only that Congress had the power to
“prescribe title by which individual Indians may hold (allotments and) to
pass laws regulating alienation and descent.” 270 In affirming the lower
court’s just compensation award, the Court observed that this federal

261. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 114.
262. Id. at 113.
263. Id. at 114.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 112.
266. Id. at 114–15.
267. Id. at 115.
268. Id. at 117.
269. Id. at 118. The Lone Wolf doctrine allows Congress to “prescribe title
by which individual Indians may hold tracts . . . within the reservation [, but this
power] detracts nothing from the tribe’s ownership.” Id.
270. Id.
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guardianship power over Indian lands “detracts nothing from the tribe’s
ownership.” 271
B. Judicial Indecision Regarding the Compensability of Aboriginal
Indian Title: The Two Decisions in United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks
The Shoshone Tribe decision gave new life to those sovereign
agreements that guaranteed the Indians’ use and occupancy rights in their
lands. But that decision seemed to cut deeper by recognizing the sanctity
of the Indian peoples’ aboriginal use and occupancy rights. 272 Some
thought that the Shoshone Tribe decision had substantially limited, if not
overruled, the Lone Wolf doctrine. Because the Court had resoundingly
reaffirmed the Indians’ right of “use and occupancy,” it seemed poised to
extend just compensation protection to the aboriginal right of “use and
occupancy.” 273 But this hope would soon be dashed by subsequent
judicial decision.
Commentators have various explanations for the Supreme Court’s
refusal to extend just compensation protection to aboriginal
lands. 274 Some suggest the Court concluded that it be would be financially
imprudent to constitutionalize all Indian land titles. That step potentially
would have required the United States to pay billions of dollars in just
compensation to satisfy those Indian takings claims. 275 Some suggest that
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. Id. at 115, 118. The jurisdictional act allowing the Indian tribe to
bring suit against the United States created no new cause of action. Therefore,
whatever legal or equitably compensable rights the Indians had unavoidably derived
from their aboriginal use and occupancy of those taken lands. Kelly, supra note 115,
at 668.
274. The Court’s analogy of aboriginal title to treaty title strongly
suggested a Fifth Amendment basis for recovery in United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946) [hereinafter Tillamooks I]. But soon after, in Hynes
v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949), the Court began to retreat from that
position. Justice Reed suggested in Hynes that the Indian right of occupancy is not
compensable without a special statutory direction to make payment for such a taking.
Id. at 105–06 & n.28.
275. The “specter of huge, fiscally ruinous interest recoveries in Indian
title litigation—recoveries far in excess of the fair market value of the appropriated
lands—may have dissuaded (the Court in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks,
341 U.S. 48 (1951) [hereinafter Tillamooks II]) from constitutionalizing its prior
decision.” Kelly, supra note 115, at 669–70.
Given that the Court has chosen to “characterize the Indian land issue as
primarily a matter for congressional determination, the future of the Indian title
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the Court conceived of the federal plenary power doctrine as a logical
complement to the federal trust authority over Indian lands. 276
The Supreme Court, whether motivated by timidity or prudence,
struggled in the 1940s and 1950s to develop a workable concept of Indian
title that would reconcile Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands with
the just compensation command of the Fifth Amendment.277 But the Court
failed in its effort to synthesize a modern Indian takings doctrine. Instead,
the Court recategorized Indian title into two classes: a judicially protected
class of Indian title based on federal recognition and an unprotected class
of Indian title based on aboriginal “use and occupancy.” 278
The Court had earlier refused to differentiate types of Indian title
in Tillamooks I. 279 Its plurality decision seemingly abolished any
constitutional distinction between aboriginally based Indian title and
federally recognized Indian title. 280 That decision seemingly protected
aboriginal use and occupancy rights from taking by the federal
government. 281 Justice Vinson concluded in Tillamooks I that the Indians
had more than a mere moral claim for just compensation. 282 Some lower
concept remains as vulnerable to political pressure as it had been in the past.” Id. at
686.
276. Newton, supra note 34, at 254–55.
277. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn traces the Court’s struggle in the
1940s and 1950s to reconcile Indian taking claims with the just compensation
command. He characterizes the “fundamental constitutional issue” as whether the
federal taking of aboriginal lands required that just compensation be paid to the
affected Indians. Washburn concludes that the Court was clearly troubled by the
federal government’s assertion that it could take aboriginal lands without any liability
to pay compensation. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–15.
278. Id. at 255.
279. 329 U.S. 40. Historian Wilcomb E. Washburn notes that the
“fundamental constitutional issue” of the compensability of taken Indian title was not
confronted until the Tillamooks I & II decisions. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–
11. This Indian band had been statutorily authorized to sue the United States in 1935
for “any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or growing out of the original
Indian title, claim, or rights in, to, or upon the whole or any part of the lands and their
appurtenances occupied by the Indian tribes or bands.” Id. at 111.
Given that the usual federal practice was “not to coerce the surrender of
[Indian] lands without consent and without compensation.” Id. at 112. This federal
practice led the Court to conclude that more than “sovereign grace prompted the
obvious regard given to Indian title.” Id. Washburn concludes that the Court
expressly rejected the federal government’s proffered distinction between
“recognized” and “unrecognized” Indian title as the basis “to rule out” the Tillamooks’
compensation claim. Id.
280. Tillamooks I, 329 U.S. at 50–54.
281. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 110–15.
282. 329 U.S. at 49–50.
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federal courts thought that the Court’s decision in Tillamooks I extended
Shoshone’s just compensation protections to the Indian peoples’ purely
aboriginal use and occupancy rights. 283
But this assumption was rudely dispelled by the Court’s decision
nine years later in Tee-Hit-Ton. 284 That decision sharply differentiated
between those Indian takings claims based on mere aboriginal use and
occupancy and those based on federally recognized Indian land
titles. 285 Two intervening factors may help explain this decision. First, in
1946, Congress created the ICC, 286 which was authorized to hear a wide
variety of Indians’ claims against the federal government consistent with
a broad jurisdictional grant that was set forth in its organic act. 287 Second,
the Department of Justice and the General Accounting Office advised the
Court of the potential liability involved if the United States were required
to pay interest from the time of taking on all pending Indian takings
claims. 288 This advice arguably influenced the Court’s decision in
Tillamooks II. 289 There, the Court noted that the principal value of the
taken Indian lands was some three million dollars, but the interest

283. The three dissenters in Tillamooks I, led by Justice Reed, seemed to
think so as well. Despite their agreement with the majority regarding the necessity of
judicial limits on Congress’ plenary power over Indian lands, the dissent did not think
that meant “Indian lands unrecognized by specific actions of Congress were protected
by the Fifth Amendment.” WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 112.
284. Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
285. The Tee-Hit-Ton Indians were a small band of Tlingit Indians who
resided in Alaska and claimed compensation for the federal cutting of timber from
lands that they claimed they held by original Indian title. WASHBURN, supra note 17,
at 113.
286. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat.
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
287. Interior Secretary Ickes and Associate Solicitor Felix S. Cohen urged
the congressional committee to amend the pending ICC legislation so as to allow for
the “broadest possible jurisdiction to hear all manner of [Indian] claims, guarantee
finality, establish an investigation division and allow review by the Court of Claims
and the Supreme Court.” ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 84–85.
288. Separation of powers concerns arguably explain Justice Reed’s
opinion in Tillamooks II. His citation to a Department of Justice’s estimate that the
interest component alone on pending Indian taking claims amounted to some nine
billion dollars recognizes that it is Congress, not the judiciary, that controls the
nation’s expenditures. Kelly, supra note 115, at 670.
289. In Tillamooks II, 341 U.S. 48 (1951), the Court held that an award of
interest against the federal government requires a specific statutory direction to do so.
Because the 1935 jurisdictional act that authorized this band to sue did not contain
such direction, the Court of Claims award of 14 million dollars in interest was in error.
WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 113.
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component of the award amounted to fourteen million dollars. 290 The
Department of Justice, in the interim, advised the Court that the estimated
total liability of the federal government, in terms of accumulated interest
owing from the time of taking of the Indian lands, exceeded nine billion
dollars!291
Tee-Hit-Ton involved a takings claim by a small Indian band
regarding the federal sale of all the merchantable timber within a 350,000acre area of the Tongass National Forest in Alaska. 292 The Tee-Hit-Tons
claimed title based on their aboriginal use and occupancy of this
area. 293 They sued for just compensation for value of the taken timber
based on either their demonstrated aboriginal use and occupancy of those
lands or by virtue of the federal government’s recognition of their title to
the lands in question. 294
The Tee-Hit-Tons contended that, unlike the nomadic Indian
peoples of the lower forty-eight states, their band had a well-developed
social order that included a clear conception of property rights and
ownership. 295 But the Court found that the Tee-Hit-Tons’ conception of
property ownership was based on shared communal use and ownership. 296
The band did not, Justice Reed opined, recognize or enforce individual
rights of ownership in distinct parcels of land. 297 He quoted the only
expert witness that was offered at trial by the Indian band. That witness
testified:
Any member of the tribe may use any portion of the land
that he wishes, and as long as he uses it that is his for his
own enjoyment, and is not to be trespassed upon by
anybody else, but the minute he stops using it then any
other member of the tribe can come and use the area. 298

290.

Tee-Hit-Ton Band of Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 283 n.17

(1955).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 273.
293. Id. at 293.
294. Id. at 277.
295. Historian Washburn cites Justice Reed’s “pejorative references” to
the Indian band’s “savage status” and “nomadic pattern of land use” as a basis for
Justice Reed’s conclusion that Indian title can be extinguished by Congress without
compensation. WASHBURN, supra note 17, at 114.
296. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 287–88.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 286.
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This testimony convinced him, as it had the trial judge, that the Tee-HitTons had only evolved to “a hunting and fishing stage of civilization.” 299
Given its status as a nomadic tribe with nomadic concepts of
property rights, Justice Reed concluded that the band possessed mere
“claims of right to use identified territory,” which were indistinguishable
from those enjoyed by the similarly nomadic Indian tribes of the lower
forty-eight states. 300 Further, because the Tee-Hit-Tons’ notion of
property was indistinguishable from those held by Indians of the lower
United States, the band’s claim was governed by the Johnson rule that
“discovery gave an exclusive right [to the federal government] to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by
conquest.” 301
Justice Reed also distinguished the Court’s holding in Tillamooks
I. That decision, which had awarded just compensation for a taking of
clearly aboriginal Indian title, resulted from a specific statutory direction
to pay that level of compensation to the wronged tribe. 302 Justice Reed
chastised the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for its wrong-headed reading
of the Tillamooks decision regarding the compensability of aboriginal
Indian title. 303 In United States v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit held that a
federal taking of the Indians’ right of aboriginal “use and occupancy”
entitled them to an award of just compensation under the Tillamooks
rationale. 304 Justice Reed sought to resolve this issue with a knockdown
holding: Indian occupation of land without governmental recognition of
ownership creates no right against taking or extinction by the United States
protected by the Fifth Amendment or any other principle of law. 305
Justice Reed also expressed his moral disquiet regarding an
arguably outsized award of just compensation to a small, possibly dying
band of Indians. 306 Imposing such a financial requirement on the federal
government did not seem, given the circumstances of the Tee-Hit-Ton
Band, to make moral or equitable sense to Justice Reed. His language
suggests reluctance to award a windfall that would be enjoyed by the few
remaining members of a now significantly diminished band of Indians. He
pointedly emphasized that the Tee-Hit-Ton Band was comprised of some
sixty-five members with only a “few women of child bearing age.” His
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 287–88.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 282–83.
Id.
159 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947).
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 284–85.
Id. at 285–86.
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factual citation illustrated his view of the contemporary Tee-Hit-Tons as a
remnant band of Indians. 307
C. Justice Reed’s Revision of Johnson v. M’Intosh: Rationalizing the
Brightline Distinction Between Recognized and Unrecognized Indian
Title
The Court in Tee-Hit-Ton seemingly sought to coordinate its
judicial function with Congress’ 1946 creation of the ICC. The ICC had
been directed by Congress to evaluate those Indian claims that arose out
of, among other things, the federal government’s takings of aboriginal
Indian title. 308 The prudential response to the ICC’s creation required the
Court’s revitalization of the political question doctrine. 309 The Court in
Tee-Hit-Ton clearly wanted to close the courthouse doors to aboriginally
based Indian taking claims. The Court’s revitalized political question
doctrine formed the “bright line” boundary that marked off takings claims
based on federally recognized title from those based on aboriginal use and
occupancy. Indian takings claims based on aboriginal use and occupancy
rights were relegated to Congress for relief. 310
Indians were entitled to just compensation for a taking of their
lands only if they could meet two conditions. First, they had to show that
Congress had taken deliberate action to recognize their permanent use and
occupancy rights. Absent evidence of such recognition—usually
embodied in an authoritative treaty, statute, or a demonstrated
congressional course of conduct—they were deemed to hold only
unrecognized and noncompensable Indian title. 311 Second, they had to
show that Congress had not acted in its Lone Wolf garb as Indian guardian
when it took their lands. 312 Congress, as the Indian guardian, had the
power to make a good faith transmutation of those lands into equivalent
financial assets. If Congress made a prima facie showing on this issue,
then it was immune from any just compensation claim regardless of the
economic injuries that may have been inflicted on the affected Indians.

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 286.
Kelly, supra note 115, at 675–76.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
Kelly, supra note 115, at 667–71.
Id. at 672–73.
Id. at 672–74.
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D. Judicial Deference to Congressional Grace in Compensating Indian
Peoples: Clearing Indian Title Through the Indian Claims Commission
Justice Reed’s opinion in Tee-Hit-Ton must be read against the
background of the 1946 creation of the ICC. 313 The ICC’s purpose was to
achieve a pragmatic and definitive settlement of longstanding Indian
claims against the federal government. 314 It was Congress’ exclusive
prerogative, according to Justice Reed, to compensate Indians for the
taking of their aboriginal use and occupancy rights. 315
The ICC grew out of the perceived need for a general mechanism
for the adjudication of longstanding Indian claims against the United
States. Non-Indian groups had long pressured Congress to either repudiate
or settle outstanding aboriginal Indian land claims. They sought the
enactment of a title-clearing mechanism that would remove the troubling
cloud of original Indian title from their lands. 316 Those present-day
occupiers of former Indian lands justifiably worried that Indians would
seek the judicial enforcement of their aboriginal Indian titles through
common law ejectment or trespass actions. They sought congressional
protection that would extinguish those Indian claims. 317
By contrast, the friends of the Indians pointed to their well-known
heroism during World War II and earlier as warrant for congressional
action that would fairly settle the many outstanding Indian
claims. 318 These ideas converged as the ICC. This administrative tribunal
would maximize several values. It would ensure congressional oversight
of proposed ICC compensation awards to prevailing Indian tribes or bands,

313. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat.
1049 (1946) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
314. The ICC was established with the “explicit purpose of disposing of
all pre-existing Indian claims against the government.” Sandra C. Danforth, Repaying
the Historical Debt: The Indian Claims Commission, 49 N.D. L. REV. 359, 360 (1972).
315. Kelly, supra note 115, at 670–71.
316. One purpose of the commission was to “wipe the slate clean” of
Indian claims “that weighed upon the white conscience.” ROSENTHAL, supra note 47,
at 49.
317. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 311–18.
318. Congress’ desire to right moral wrongs to Indians focused on two
issues: first, the ICC mechanism would eliminate the historic discrimination that
Indians had faced in being barred from bringing takings and other claims against the
United States; and second, the ICC mechanism would allow resolution of all
outstanding Indian claims, not only those with a basis in law or equity. Danforth,
supra note 314, at 366–67.
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and would provide an efficient and flexible vehicle for the liquidation of
Indian claims against the United States. 319
The ICC’s expected efficiency and flexibility was a relative
concept. Historically, Indian claims could be heard only if Congress
enacted a jurisdictional grant that authorized a particular tribe or band to
bring suit against the United States.320 This Indian claims process was
both time consuming and cumbersome. It functioned much like a lottery
in that chances for recovery were arbitrarily allocated by widely varying
jurisdictional grants of authority to the Court of Claims. 321
Congress sought to standardize the jurisdictional guidelines under
which the ICC would hear and determine authorized Indian
claims. 322 However, critics of the ICC fault the process as not achieving
either flexibility or efficiency in its administrative implementation of its
jurisdictional authority. 323 The ICC’s failure stems from many factors.
First, only Indian tribes, not individual Indians, were authorized to
prosecute any claims within the purview of the ICC’s jurisdictional
grant. 324 Second, the ICC could only adjudicate those Indian claims that
arose on or before August 13, 1946. 325 Third, although the federal
government agreed to waive its defenses that it may otherwise have
asserted to bar those Indian claims, it exacted concessions from the Indian
claimants as well. 326 Indian claimants were not entitled to receive interest
from the time of taking regardless of whether their claims arose in 1846 or

319. The Indian claims processing policy contemplated that the ICC’s
jurisdiction would extend to recommendeding claims awards to Congress, but
Congress would be the “focal point” in that it could “finally dispose of claims, by
rejecting them or granting awards, or it could stipulate that a court hearing was
necessary to resolve all relevant issues.” Id. at 372.
320. Id. at 362–63.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Danforth concludes the ICC became “more concerned with
accomplishing its task than ensuring that all just claims receive a hearing and
appropriate compensation.” Id. at 402.
324. Only groups of Indians, not individuals, were authorized by the ICC
statute to file claims with that commission. Id. at 388.
325. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 24,
60 Stat. 1049, 1056 (1946) ) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3).
326. Danforth, supra note 314, at 388.
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1946. 327 Furthermore, the taken Indian property was to be appraised as of
the time of taking, not at its contemporary highest and best use value. 328
Fourth, the ICC failed to fully utilize its jurisdictional grant so as
to achieve the full remedial intent of the statute. 329 Few innovative or
novel Indian takings claims were heard by the ICC, despite its broad grant
of authority to do so. 330 By a crabbed interpretation of its authority, the
ICC heard only a limited claims docket of standard Indian claims. By its
narrow construction of its authority, the ICC arguably eviscerated the “fair
and honorable dealings” provision of the ICC Act. 331 The ICC’s practice
was to disallow Indian damages claims that were based on novel legal
theories. 332 For example, it refused to hear those Indian claims that alleged
real, but intangible, injuries such as the destruction of aboriginal hunting
or fishing reserves; or the purposeful destruction of tribal governmental
structures; or the imprisonment of tribal members in remote detention
sites. 333 The actual cases decided by the ICC fell into a narrow bandwidth
of its potential jurisdiction. A cursory assessment of the ICC’s docket
reveals standard Indian land claims and claims that were based on the
federal government’s failure to perform specific treaty obligations or to
pay specified amounts of annuities. 334
Fifth, the ICC limited its remedies to damage awards, while some
prevailing Indian claimants clearly desired the replacement or restoration
327. The ICC adopted the general rule that, in the absence of a specific
statutory direction to pay interest or unless the taking occurred in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, no interest was to be paid to the prevailing Indian parties. Id. at 397.
328. Valuations of Indian lands were to be made at the time of taking with
no consideration of the element of future profits that could have been made by the
Indians from their exploitation of their agricultural, mineral, or timber resources. Id.
329. Danforth cites the ICC’s view that it “had no role in claims filing”
and the lawyers’ conservative claims strategy that led them to avoid the “risks of using
new causes of action . . . for which there were now precedents to indicate how
assessments might be made and thus how large recoveries would be.” Id. at 391.
330. Id. at 389–90.
331. Section 2, clause 5, of the ICC Act authorizes the commission to
“hear and determine . . . claims based upon fair and honorable dealings that are not
recognized by any existing rule of law or equity.” Indian Claims Commission Act,
ch. 959, Pub. L. No. 79-726, § 2, 60 Stat. 1049, 1050 (1946) ) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3). Danforth believes that the “most important reason . . .
was related to the nature of compensation to be awarded and to the novel character of
parts of Section 2.” Danforth, supra note 314, at 390. She concludes that lawyers that
represented the Indian claimants on a contingent fee basis were, by nature, wary of
novel claims that may not result in large monetary awards. See id. at 391.
332. See Danforth, supra note 314, at 391.
333. See id.
334. See id. at 389.
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of their taken lands. 335 Certain intangible values—the lands’ roles as
sacred cultural or religious sites—could not be addressed via a damages
award. Furthermore, the futility and failure of small per capita
distributions of Indian claims awards as meaningful remedies is well
documented.336 Those per capita distributions were patently insufficient
to allow injured Indians to replace, at contemporary market prices, their
taken lands or resources. History shows that these meager per capita
distributions were quickly expended to meet current subsistence needs.
Only a small amount of the accumulated ICC claims monies were used to
provide meaningful substitutes for taken tribal resources so as to provide
injured Indians with replacement subsistence values or incomes. 337
Eight-hundred million dollars in ICC awards was hailed by Felix
S. Cohen as having finally and fairly “closed the books” on the federal
government’s duty to fairly compensate its Indian wards. 338 But this idea
of retrospective justice, Cohen would likely agree, is elusive given the
historic harms done to the Indian peoples. Cohen’s conclusion was not
intended to address the contemporary need for an Indian takings doctrine
that will protect today’s vestigial Indian Country from similar
depredations. 339 Today’s Indian peoples seek practical approaches, not
retrospective remedies, to preserve their lands. This desire must translate
into practical means for enforcing sovereign bargains that guarantee their
use and occupancy of their lands. 340

335. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 250.
336. See id.
337. Rosenthal characterizes the ICC as a “legal-bureaucratically oriented
structure more concerned with accomplishing its task than insuring that all just claims
receive a hearing and appropriate compensation.” Id. at 245 (citation omitted).
Rosenthal cites legal scholar Morton E. Price’s conclusion as evidence of the
ICC’s overall failure to treat the Indians justly:
If there had been full compensation, the Indians would have
gathered enormous wealth, either in land or money. Economic
development—in the sense of providing immediate financial
security—would have been assured. . . . On the other hand, it was
preposterous to recognize fully such extraordinary claims of a
handful of poor people, even to the extent that they were based on
legitimate entitlement.
Id. at 245–46.
338.
43 (1947).
339.
340.

See Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 34–
See id.
See id.
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The Tee-Hit-Ton decision represents the extreme parameter of
judicial thinking on this issue. 341 It suggests that Indian lands remain in a
judicially declared “state of nature” wherein federal plenary power can
trump the Indian peoples’ rights. 342
V. RECONSTRUCTING MARSHALL’S INDIAN BARGAINING
MODEL: A SKETCH OF A MODERN INDIAN TAKINGS
DOCTRINE
Analyzing the 1949 congressional taking of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation aids in reconstructing Marshall’s Indian bargaining
model. The Fort Berthold Indians ostensibly bargained with the federal
government for a fair agreement for the taking of their lands. 343 But the
forty-three-year-long struggle by those Indians to obtain just
compensation exemplifies the power disparity that allows Indian
congressional committees to ignore basic principles of just compensation
doctrine and practice. The formulation of modern Indian takings doctrine
encompasses three basic issues. First, should the plenary power doctrine
immunize Congress from an Indian taking claim regardless of the
economic and governmental injuries imposed on the affected Indian
people? Second, should congressional guardianship power over its Indian
341. Newton points out that the decision “greatly narrowed the protection
of the fifth amendment for Indian land.” Newton, supra note 34, at 255. The Court
narrowed the definition of Fifth Amendment protected property so as to exclude
aboriginal Indian land titles established by use and occupancy. See id.
342. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 39–49.
343. Meyer quotes anthropologist Ruth Hill Useem regarding the
dominant assumptions that govern the federal government’s relations with the Indian
peoples:
(1) That over the years, the Indian can expect no consistency in
policies regarding him; (2) That the interests of the dominant
society will take precedence over the interests of Indians in any
policy decision; (3) That the Indian can do little to affect decisions
concerning Indians; (4) That whatever the policy enacted, the
Indian will be told that such policy “is in his best interests” or is
“for his own good”; and (5) That the stated goals of a policy may
be and usually are quite different from the consequences, with the
goals being more favorable to the Indians than the consequences.
Meyer, supra note 45, at 349.
Meyer concludes that the Fort Berthold Indians likely shared in these beliefs
given their “disillusioning experiences” that “characterized the period of negotiations
over the Garrison project.” Id.
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wards limit judicial scrutiny of federal takings of Indian lands? Third,
should subjective legislative valuation of Indian lands be deemed just
compensation when it is plainly at odds with the “make whole” command
of the Just Compensation Clause? 344
A. The Fort Berthold Indians’ Challenge to the 1949 Congressional
Taking of Their Reservation
Congress decided in 1949 to take 156,035 acres of the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation as the site for a federal dam and
reservoir. 345 The Army Corps of Engineers determined in 1946 that it
needed those lands as the preferred engineering site for the Garrison Dam
and Reservoir. 346 This dam was to be the main structural component of
the large Pick-Sloan Program for the harnessing of the Missouri River for
basinwide economic and social development purposes. 347 The Flood
Control Act of 1944 had earlier authorized a plan that directed the Bureau
of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to harness the Missouri
River for the multipurpose water resources development: hydroelectric
power production, navigation improvement, irrigation development, flood
control, and public recreation. 348
The Fort Berthold Indians had been required to bear a substantial
and disproportionate share of the needed public investment for the PickSloan Program. 349 The Garrison Diversion Unit Commission (“GDUC”),
344.
345.

See Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60.
Fort Berthold Taking Act, ch. 790, Pub. L. No. 81-437, 63 Stat. 1026

(1949).
346. Colonel Lewis A. Pick, head of the Missouri River Division of the
Army Corps of Engineers, was determined to go ahead with the Garrison Dam even
though that site had reportedly been considered and rejected earlier by the Corps’
engineers as impracticable. See Meyer, supra note 45, at 239.
347. See id.
348. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat 887, 897.
The states in the lower and upper Missouri River Basin differed as to why the Missouri
River should be controlled by a series of federal dams and reservoirs. The upstream
states (North and South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming) were interested primarily in
developing the irrigation potential of the river. The downstream states (Nebraska,
Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri) were more interested in flood control. Meyer, supra note
45, at 239.
349. This was the finding of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission
(“GDUC”), an 11 member congressional commission that had been created in 1984 to
assess the impacts of the Garrison Project on the peoples of North Dakota.
Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission and H.R. 1116, A Bill
to Implement Certain Recommendations of the Garrison Diversion Unit Commission
Pursuant to Public Law 98-360, Hearings on H.R. 1116 Before the Subcomm. on
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an eleven member congressionally appointed body, made this finding
based on its review of the legislative record of the 1949 taking act. 350 It
was convinced that the Fort Berthold people had suffered devastating
economic, cultural, and social losses due to the federal taking of their most
productive agricultural lands. 351 It also found that Congress may have
failed to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for losses arising from the
1949 taking. 352 It therefore directed the Indians’ trustee—the Secretary of
the Interior—to hold administrative hearings on the Indians’ just
compensation and related claims. 353
Interior Secretary Donald Hodel was directed by the GDUC report
to establish a secretarial commission that would examine the Fort Berthold
Indians’ claims that arose from the 1949 Garrison taking. 354 He was also
directed to recommend appropriate implementing legislation if his
Water and Power Resources of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th
Cong. 114 (1985) [hereinafter GDUC Recommendations].
350. The GDUC was charged by section 207(c)(2)(A) of its authorizing
statute to assess the “costs and benefits incurred and opportunities foregone” by
affected stakeholder groups due to the construction of the Garrison Dam. Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-360, § 207(c)(2)(A), 98 Stat.
403, 412 (1984). The commission concluded that the “Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing Pick-Sloan Missouri
River Basin Program mainstem reservoirs.” GDUC Recommendations, supra note
349, at 114.
351. GDUC Recommendations, supra note 349, at 114.
352. Id.
353. It recommended that the Interior Secretary establish a five-member
commission to assess and report on the steps necessary to “complete the
indemnification of Indian communities of North Dakota that were disrupted by
construction of Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program dams and reservoirs.” Id. at 74.
The GDUC recommended that the Interior Secretary appoint the fivemember commission no later than January 31, 1985, that would address the following
issues on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation:
—Full potential for irrigation;
—Financial assistance for on-farm development costs;
—Replacement of infrastructures lost by the creation of Garrison Dam;
—Preferential rights to Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin power;
—Development of shoreline recreation potential;
—Return of excess lands;
—Additional financial compensation;
—Protection of reserved water rights;
—Other items the five-member Commission may deem appropriate;
—Funding of all items from Garrison Diversion Unit funds, if authorized.
Id. at 187.
354.

See id. at 74, 187.
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commission concluded that the federal government had failed justly to
compensate the Fort Berthold Indians. 355 He established the Joint Tribal
Advisory Committee (“JTAC”) by secretarial charter in 1985 to hear and
evaluate the Fort Berthold Indians’ claims arising from the 1949
taking. 356 That commission construed its charter so as to allow the Fort
Berthold Indians to present relevant lay and expert testimony regarding
their just compensation claim. 357 The Indians urged the JTAC to review
the entire circumstances surrounding the federal taking of their
lands. 358 Such a comprehensive review was essential for a reliable inquiry
into the fairness of the 1949 federal taking of the affected Indian lands. 359
355. The GDUC cited section 207(c)(2)(H) of Pub. L. No. 98-360, 98 Stat.
412, the institutional equity section of that statute, as the legal basis for directing the
Secretary to establish the Joint Tribal Advisory Committee (“JTAC”) and to
“recommend corrective measures, if warranted.” GDUC Recommendations, supra
note 349, at 188.
356. Secretary Donald Hodel created the JTAC on May 10, 1985, and that
committee submitted its final report to the Secretary on May 23, 1986. See S. REP.
NO. 102-250 (1992).
357. The JTAC report documented the devastating effects of the Garrison
and Oahe Dams, which caused the removal of tribal peoples and communities and
flooded “prime tracts of the Missouri River bottomlands.” Id. at 3.
It also recommended a range of just compensation for the respective injured
Indian tribes—between $181.2 million and $349.9 million for Standing Rock and
$178.4 million and $411.8 million for Fort Berthold. This just compensation
recommendation was “intended to substitute for or replace the [tribal] economic base
that was taken as the site for Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe.” Id.
358. Chairman Edward Lone Fight testified in oversight hearings
regarding the JTAC Report that the lengthy negotiations from 1946 to 1949 between
the Fort Berthold Indians and the federal government demonstrated the Three
Affiliated Tribes’ entitlement to just compensation in the amounts recommended by
JTAC. Final Report and Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory
Committee, Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, Senate
Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, and House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 100th Cong. 30–41 (1987).
359. The Senate report on the JTAC recommendations recites that:
The Pick-Sloan Plan was presented to the tribes as a fait accompli.
The Corps of Engineers was so confident that it could acquire the
Indian land it needed through the Federal power of eminent domain
that it began to construct the dams on the reservations even before
opening formal negotiations with tribal leaders. Consequently the
tribes realized that resistance was futile. Gradually they resigned
themselves to making the most of whatever compensation might
be offered.
S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 2.
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Whether the federal government had made a good faith effort to
justly compensate the Fort Berthold Indians was the most significant issue
confronted by the JTAC. That issue focused the JTAC’s attention on the
administrative and legislative record that justified the 1949 Indian
taking. 360
Testimony by natural resource economists and related experts
aided the JTAC in its examination of the Indians’ claims. 361 They
provided the JTAC with a valuation theory of Indian lands that fulfilled
the “make whole” standard of the Just Compensation Clause. 362 Other
expert testimony provided the JTAC with historical and sociological
evidence of the 1949 taking’s devastating effects on the tribal farming and
ranching economy. 363

Chairman Murry of the JTAC testified before the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs that the federal government had in 1946 and 1947 given “specific
and implicit promises of just compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians but that “in
many instances [these promises] were never fulfilled and in other instances only
partially fulfilled.” Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Equitable
Compensation Act of 1991, Hearings on S. 168 Before the Senate Select Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 102d Cong. 15–19 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 168].
360. Chairman Murry’s testimony refers to the 1946 congressionally
authorized Missouri River Basin Investigations (“MRBI”) as concluding that the Fort
Berthold Indians were “for all practical purposes, self sufficient.” His testimony
emphasizes that “Congress recognized that the bottomlands of these reservations
represented the sole remaining economic base for the tribes’ welfare and their social
existence.” Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16.
361. See RONALD G. CUMMINGS, VALUING THE RESOURCE BASE LOST BY
THE THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES AS A RESULT OF LANDS TAKEN FROM THEM FOR THE
GARRISON PROJECT (1986) (unpublished report prepared for the JTAC, on file with
author).
Dr. Cummings valued these lost tribal lands by estimating the “flow of the
land-base earnings or income that was attributable to that resource.” Hearings on S.
168, supra note 359, at 17. Dr. Cummings then “capitalized [the expected income
flows] at 3.5 percent, which was then the Congressionally mandated rate in 1950, and
then he raised this [amount] to 1986 dollars at the time we were filing the report this
totaled $178.4 million for the Fort Berthold Reservation.” Id.
362. The JTAC retained Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a leading natural
resources economist, to prepare a valuation report that would assess the nature and
amount of “damages to [tribal] infrastructure” that was caused by the construction of
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir on the Fort Berthold Reservation. See Hearings on
S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
363. Chairman Murry testified that enactment of S. 168 “would move
toward just compensation” for the Fort Berthold Indians as a means of helping that
tribe re-establish a viable economic base “that was destroyed by the construction of
the two dams and the resulting impoundments.” Id. at 18.
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The Fort Berthold Indians’ misfortune was to be in the way of the
federal government’s proposed development of the water resources
potential of the Upper Missouri River Basin. Congress’ conflicting roles
as Indian guardian and as the resource developer of last resort on behalf of
its non-Indian constituencies in the Upper Missouri River Basin
fundamentally compromised its institutional ability to justly compensate
the Fort Berthold Indians. Congress ultimately chose to sacrifice the
Indians’ economic and cultural interests to achieve its latter goal.364
But the Fort Berthold Indians’ claim for just compensation was
strenuously opposed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). 365 Indeed,
Secretary Hodel eliminated the just compensation issue from the JTAC’s
charter despite the GDUC’s explicit direction to the contrary. However,
the JTAC construed the “other issues” portion of its charter so as to allow
it to hear the Indians’ claim. 366 The BIA argued that the taking act barred

364.

Michael L. Lawson asserts that:

Without prior warning the Corps of Engineers entered Fort
Berthold Reservation to begin construction of the dam in April
1946. The first of the army’s Pick-Sloan projects on the main stem
of the Missouri River was Garrison Dam, which became America’s
fifth largest dam at a cost of over $299 million. The 212-foot-high
structure provided a storage capacity of 24.2 million acre-feet and
a generating capacity of 400,000 kilowatts. Its long reservoir, Lake
Sakakawea, was named for the famous Shoshone woman who
helped guide Lewis and Clark on their expedition up the Missouri
in 1804.
MICHAEL L. LAWSON, DAMMED INDIANS: THE PICK-SLOAN PLAN AND THE MISSOURI
RIVER SIOUX, 1944–1980, at 59 (1982).
365. The Senate report recounts that the Bureau of Indian Affairs’
testimony was “strongly opposed to S. 168 [because] the United States is under no
continuing legal liability to provide any additional compensation to either tribe.” See
S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 7 (1992).
The BIA’s hearings representative contended that the Fort Berthold Indians
had “already been compensated by the Federal Government for the taking of their
land,” and the United States has “no legal liability to provide additional
compensation.” Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 53 (statement of Patrick
Hayes, Deputy Assistant Director of Trust Services).
366. The GDUC’s finding that “tribes of the Standing Rock and Fort
Berthold Indian reservations bore an inordinate share of the cost of implementing
Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program mainstem reservoirs” and its direction to the
Secretary that he “find ways to resolve inequities borne by the tribes” were interpreted
by the JTAC as a warrant for hearing the Indians’ just compensation claims. S. REP.
NO. 102-250, at 3.
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this claim. 367 But the GDUC’s express directive and its own secretarial
charter persuaded the commission to hear the Fort Berthold Indians’ just
compensation claim. 368
B. The Background of the 1886 Sovereign Bargain that Established the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
The Three Affiliated Tribes—the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan
peoples—had resided from time immemorial within the riparian lands and
valleys of the Missouri River and its tributaries. 369 The Missouri River,
called the “Big Muddy” by unappreciative non-Indian settlers, once
flowed freely through lands then carpeted with mixed grass prairie. Its
basin had been home to vast herds of buffalo and prong horn antelope. It
also served as home to the Arikara, Hidatsa, and Mandan peoples, whose
material and spiritual cultures were inextricably linked to both these lands
and herds. 370
The Mandans were especially dependent on the Missouri River for
their subsistence. They were farmers who cultivated the alluvial soils near
the rivers where the water table was high enough to support their crops
without using irrigation and where temperatures were more moderate than
on the plains. 371 But they also hunted the wild game that frequented the
river valleys. They used the river valleys’ abundant cottonwood and other
trees for firewood and building materials. They used the lush vegetation
as pasturage for their thriving livestock herds. 372 The Mandans were later

367. The BIA viewed the Fort Berthold Taking Act, Pub. L. No. 81-437,
63 Stat. 1026 (1949), as a full and complete settlement of all Indian claims that may
have arisen from that taking. See Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 29.
368. See id. at 30–31.
369. Meyer, supra note 45, at 232–34.
370. The Treaty of Fort Laramie in 1851 confirmed the Fort Berthold
Indians’ rights to a large aboriginal area of some 12.5 million acres. This area included
the right bank of the Missouri River from the mouth of the Heart River to the mouth
of the Yellowstone River. This description enclosed a vast land mass that extended in
line from the mouth of the Powder River in Wyoming to the headwaters of the Heart
River. See id. at 223.
371. See id. at 233.
372. The Fort Berthold Indians, Meyer notes, made a “satisfactory
adjustment” to a “forbidding” country and climate during the “centuries they had lived
in the Upper Missouri Valley.” Id. Meyer concludes that they had become “even
more attached” to the land by the 1940s. Id. The Indians made full use of the available
natural resources of their reservation: “the wild game, the fruits and berries, the timber
that grew in the river bottoms and along the tributary ravines, [and] the lignite coal
found here and there in readily accessible form.” Id.
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joined by two other Indian tribes, the Hidatsa and Arikara. These three
tribes banded together for common defense against the influx of
woodlands Sioux who had flooded into the Great Plains from the forest
lands of Minnesota in the early eighteenth century. 373 In 1886, the Three
Affiliated Tribes reluctantly agreed to occupy the present Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation that was established by agreement with the United
States. 374
The Missouri River was a friend to the Fort Berthold Indians. But
non-Indian settlers and urban city dwellers viewed the river’s frequent
floods as a menace to their lives and property. Several times during the
early 1940s, the Missouri River overflowed its banks and wreaked havoc
on downstream cities, including Omaha, Nebraska. 375 Colonel Lewis Pick
of the Army Corps of Engineers had to ask civilian volunteers for help in
manning the levees along the river in 1943. On April 15 of that year, the
river crested at twenty-two feet, some twelve feet above its normal level. 376

Gordon Macgregor, the chief author of the 1946 congressionally mandated
MRBI Reports, examined the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians
and concluded that “[p]eople and land make a virtually unbroken social and
geographical unit.” Meyer, supra note 45, at 233.
Meyer comments that this fact is “usually overlooked” by “those who
believed that the Indians could be adequately compensated for the loss of their land
by a cash payment. By far the greater part of their income was derived, directly or
indirectly, from the land.” Id. (emphasis added).
373. Meyer describes the reduced state of the Fort Berthold Indians by the
1860s. Their numbers had been decimated by small pox and other diseases. They
were “penned up” in their agency-established village and unable to defend themselves
against the increasingly aggressive Sioux. Meyer, supra at 225. Ironically, the hostile
Sioux were able to obtain horses, firearms, and annuity goods from traders and
government agents. Chief White Shield of the Arikaras complained in 1870 that prior
to becoming “agency Indians” they had been able to defend themselves; now “when
we listen to the whites we have to sit in our villages, listen to [the Sioux’s] insults, and
have our young men killed and our horses stolen, within sight of our lodges.” Id.
374. By that 1886 agreement the Fort Berthold Indians ceded all their
lands north of the 48th parallel and west of a north-south line drawn six miles west of
the most westerly point of the Big Bend in the Missouri River. This agreement was
not ratified until 1891. Id. at 224.
375. Constance Hunt contends that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’
channelization and diking of the Missouri River from 1912 to 1927 contributed to the
flood potential that later devastated downstream cities such as Omaha during the
1940s. See CONSTANCE E. HUNT, DOWN BY THE RIVER: THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL
WATER PROJECTS AND POLICIES ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 116–17 (1988).
376. Disastrous floods in the early 1940s led the downstream Missouri
River states to demand a comprehensive congressional plan for flood control. See id.
at 117.
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Congress, after the massive floods of 1943 subsided, directed
Colonel Pick to propose a comprehensive approach for the multipurpose
control and development of the Upper Missouri River Basin. 377 But two
rival water resource development plans were offered for congressional
consideration: the Bureau of Reclamation’s plan, sponsored by W. Glenn
Sloan, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ plan, sponsored by Colonel
Pick. At the behest of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s staff, these two
plans were eventually merged in a “shotgun wedding” and emerged from
Congress in 1944 as the Pick-Sloan Program. 378
The Pick-Sloan Program was hailed by its proponents as the
answer to the region’s prayers for an end to the twin devastations caused
by recurring summer dust bowls and spring floods. 379 The program called
for a mammoth multipurpose water development programs that entailed
the construction of five major main stem dams along the Missouri River.
The contemplated dams would include Gavins Point near Yankton, South
Dakota; Big Bend at Fort Thompson, South Dakota; Oahe at Pierre, South
Dakota; and Garrison at Riverdale, North Dakota. 380 But the Pick-Sloan
Program was as much a product of interagency political competition as it
was of rational water resources planning. 381 According to resource
economist David C. Campbell:
[T]he Pick-Sloan Program was a victory of politics and
bureaucracy over economics and nature. The Corps had
lost a huge chunk of its jurisdiction with the creation of
the Tennessee Valley Authority. BuRec, which has
converted much of California water resources into an
intricate plumbing network, was looking to expand
eastward. There was serious talk of creating a Missouri
Valley Authority [(“MVA”)] modeled on the Tennessee
Valley Authority, which would have displaced both the
Corps and BuRec. They, along with the Federal Power

377. As a result of the disastrous 1943 flooding of the Missouri River,
Congress directed the Army Corps of Engineers to draw up a flood control program
for the Upper Missouri River Basin. Colonel Pick responded with a brief ten-page
plan that called for the construction of levees along the river, dams on several
tributaries, and several major dams between Sioux City and Fort Peck. See Meyer,
supra note 45, at 239.
378. HUNT, supra note 375, at 117.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 117–118.
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Commission and the Department of Agriculture, resisted
the proposed MVA. 382
Both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) and the Bureau
of Reclamation (“BuRec” or “Bureau”) had substantial roles in the
development of the Pick-Sloan Program. The Corps was assigned the job
of constructing the multipurpose facilities on the Missouri River and flood
control facilities on the tributaries. The Bureau was assigned the job of
building the program’s irrigation facilities on the Missouri River, as well
as the multipurpose dams on the tributary streams. 383
The Corps and the BuRec carefully planned the Pick-Sloan
Program so that its reservoirs would not inundate any non-Indian towns
along the Missouri River. But the Three Affiliated Tribes were not so
fortunate. The Garrison Dam was intended to serve as the “high dam—
the major regulating structure—in the Pick-Sloan Program. It was to be
sited on the Fort Berthold Indians’ last remaining riparian lands.” 384 These
lands were remnant of the Indians’ historic treaty lands of some 12.5
million acres. By its 1886 agreement with the Fort Berthold Indians,
Congress had expressly guaranteed their exclusive use and occupancy of
these riparian lands. 385
Congress commissioned in 1946 a comprehensive social and
economic assessment of the likely impacts on the Fort Berthold Indians of
the siting of the Garrison Dam and Reservoir on that reservation. 386 These
interdisciplinary assessments were based on extensive on-site work and
analysis of the lives and economy of the Fort Berthold people. The team
382. Id. at 118.
383. See id.
384. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER OF PERIL: THE
POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 65 (1994).
385. Congressman Lemke from North Dakota made it clear that by taking
the affected Indian lands, Congress was “again violating a treaty solemnly entered into
[in 1886] with these tribes—a treaty in which we promised never to disturb them
again.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 3.
386. Meyer reports that the BIA began “making surveys as early as the
summer of 1945 to determine who and what would have to be moved where.” Meyer,
supra note 45, at 265. Additional contract planning staff was employed to complete
a series of investigations regarding the impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort
Berthold Indians. These reports became part of the MRBI Reports that would help
inform the Indian congressional committees about needed legislative action. These
reports, published as MRBI Report, No. 46, include H.D. McCullough, Social and
Economic Report on the Future of the Fort Berthold Reservation, North Dakota (Dec.
24, 1947), and Gordon Macgregor & John C. Hunter, Survey of Attitudes Regarding
Resettlement Among the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indians (Nov.–
Dec. 1946). Meyer, supra note 45, at 266 n.2.
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of economists, anthropologists, and sociologists that compiled the
Missouri River Basin Investigations Reports (“MRBI Reports”) confirmed
what the Fort Berthold Indians had long asserted before the Indian
congressional committees: siting one of the world’s largest earth-filled
dams on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation would irretrievably disrupt
the economic and social life of an ancient tribal people. 387
These reports recited the expected impacts of the Garrison Dam
on the Fort Berthold people. First, approximately ninety percent of the
Indian people would have to be removed from their historic settlements
along the bottom lands of the Missouri River. 388 Second, the agricultural
treaty purposes of the Fort Berthold Reservation would be frustrated due
to flooding of the Indians’ arable land base. 389 Third, the only
agriculturally self-sufficient Indian tribe on the Great Plains would have
its economic and social base destroyed by the proposed flooding and

387. Gordon Macgregor, a leading sociologist, commented on the future
impact of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians and succinctly summarizes
the reservation lands’ value to those Indians:
The “reservation” is to the Fort Berthold Indian his homeland.
Within it are abandoned village sites of the Gros Ventre and
Mandan and the site of the last village where they and the Arikara
lived in a common community following their old village life. They
were never assigned this land and forced to reside on it as prisoners
of war as were many tribes of the nomadic plains culture. The
“reservation” is the last holding of their former lands where they
farmed and hunted before the coming of the white man.
Meyer, supra note 45, at 237–38 (quoting Gordon Macgregor, Attitudes of the Fort
Berthold Indians Regarding Removal from the Garrison Reservoir Site and Future
Administration of Their Reservation, 16 N.D. HIST. 56 (1949)).
388. Ralph Shane, agency superintendent, estimated that the Garrison
Dam would require “that 90% of the total population were moved ‘lock, stock and
barrel’ from their old homes to new homes on the highlands.” They were to be
“uprooted, shuffled and mixed” and every “semblance of organization was destroyed.”
Meyer, supra note 45, at 266.
But the economic impact was even more devastating. Meyer estimates that
while the Indians “lost one-fourth of the reservation lands, the Indians were losing
nearly all of the Class I and II agricultural lands—the rich bottomlands on which they
had lived for generations.” Id.
389. The MRBI Reports exhaustively and meticulously detailed the
expected adverse effects of the Garrison Dam on the Fort Berthold Indians. More
importantly, they how Congress should act legislatively to mitigate and ameliorate
these impacts. Meyer, supra note 45, at 265–74.

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

88

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 11:39 AM

Special Issue

would likely be reduced to dependence on the federal government for their
future subsistence and maintenance. 390
Meanwhile, the Corps was working feverishly to lay the major
earthen groundworks of the Garrison Dam. Critics of the Pick-Sloan
Program contended that project proponents hoped that by the time the
MRBI Reports were made to Congress, so much time, money, and effort
would have been sunk into the Garrison project that Congress would be
loathe to cancel it or to force major project revisions on behalf of the Fort
Berthold Indians. 391 However, in 1946 Congress did respond to the Indian
pleas to stop the dam’s construction. Congress statutorily forbade the
Corps’ building of any of the dam’s major structural features until the
Secretary of War located and offered an adequate replacement reservation
to the Fort Berthold Indians. 392
The Secretary of War was required to locate and offer this
substitute reservation to the Fort Berthold Indians before he could actually

390. Meyer, supra note 45, at 235–37. The House Subcommittee on
Public Lands concluded that the Fort Berthold Indians in 1949 were “in sight of
complete economic independence” due to their “strong and growing cattle industry
and steadily expanding agricultural program.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 6.
391. Meyer reports that “work was speeded up in 1946, and by August the
construction of an access road to the damsite, the work bridge, and the town site of
Riverdale was well under way.” Meyer agreed with the “calloused” view of project
proponents that the federal government would not abandon this six-million dollar
investment regardless of the “Indians’ plight.” Meyer, supra note 45, at 249.
392. A tribal delegation was assured in 1945 by Congressmen that “no
work can be done until some settlement is made as to their status.” Id. at 246. That
assurance was statutorily embodied in the War Department Civil Appropriations Act
for 1947. Section 6 of that act stated:
No part of the appropriation for the Garrison Reservoir herein
contained may be expended for actual construction of the dam
itself until the Secretary of War shall have selected and offered,
through the Secretary of the Interior, to the Three Affiliated Tribes,
land which the Secretary of the Interior approves as comparable in
quality and sufficient in area to compensate the said tribes for the
land on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation which shall be
inundated by the construction of the Garrison Dam: Provided
further, That said selection and offer by the Secretary of War and
approval by the Secretary of the Interior shall be consummated
before January 1, 1947, after which consummation actual
construction of the dam itself may proceed.
War Department Civil Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 79-374, § 6, 60 Stat. 167
(1946).
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construct the Garrison Dam, 393 and had to provide them with replacement
compensation for their lands. 394 But dam proponents argued that such a
standard of compensation was too high and would set a dangerous
precedent for the Corps’ negotiations with the downstream Indian tribes
who likewise opposed taking of their lands for the Pick-Sloan Program. 395
The Secretary of War suggested that it would be hard to convince
local non-Indian communities to accept the creation of a large replacement
reservation for the relocated Fort Berthold Indians. 396 He nonetheless did
locate and propose a couple of potential new reservation sites. But the
Secretary of the Interior rejected these sites as failing to meet the statutory
requirement that the replacement lands be of “like quality and quantity” as
the taken Indian lands. 397 In the meantime, project proponents contended
that the Indians’ refusal to accept these replacement lands demonstrated
the impracticability of this congressional compensation scheme. 398

393. The Secretary of War commenced his efforts to locate replacement
reservation lands well before the statutory requirement to do so was enacted. One
such proposal was to add some 470,000 acres of land that lay to the west and southwest
of the Fort Berthold Reservation. However, tribal leader Martin Cross characterized
that offered land as “good country for rattlesnakes and horned toads.” His attitude
was representative of the Indians’ unwillingness to exchange any of their present lands
for the so-called “lieu lands” that were to be offered by the War Secretary in
compliance with the statutory command. Meyer, supra note 45, at 249.
394. First Deficiency Act, 1946, ch. 589, Pub. L. No. 79-269, 59 Stat. 632,
654 (1945).
395. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 62–63.
396. Meyer reports that only one non-Indian community in the proposed
lieu land areas was at all “ambivalent.” That was the town of Stanton, which would
be excluded from the lieu lands grant but saw a money-making opportunity if it were
to become the agency headquarters of the “new” Fort Berthold Reservation. Meyer,
supra note 45, at 253.
397. The War Department’s “last offer” of the Stanton block of lieu lands
was rejected by Interior Secretary Krug in January, 1947, as failing to meet the
statutory requirement of “like quantity and quality” of the reservation lands. Krug’s
rejection signaled the death knell for the lieu lands proposal and congressional
attention shifted to the possibility of a cash payment to the Indians for their taken
lands. Id. at 255.
398. Governor Aandahl and Senators Young and Langer of North Dakota
agreed that the Garrison Dam must go forward and that the Fort Berthold Indians must
be removed to make way for the dam. Senators Young and Langer proposed to
introduce a bill that made possible either the piecemeal relocation of the Indians or a
general cash settlement. The governor pushed for a new Garrison Dam bill without
any “Indian clause limitation,” which would allow the Indians to be removed upon
payment for their lands on the same basis as the affected non-Indians in the area. Id.
at 255.
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Substantial constituent pressure motivated Congress to move
speedily on the construction of the Garrison Dam. 399 Given the Indians’
and the Interior Secretary’s 1947 rejection of the proffered “Stanton
Block” as the War Secretary’s last offer of replacement Indian lands, it
rescinded the Garrison construction ban. 400 The Fort Berthold Indians
were now to be removed from their lands so as to make way for the
Garrison Dam and Reservoir. 401
The Fort Berthold Indians continued their battle for just
compensation. But Colonel Pick intensely lobbied the Indian leaders to
accept a proposed contract that would facilitate the removal of the Indian
people and hasten the construction of the dam. His proposed agreement
treated the Fort Berthold Indians as if they were mere private condemnees
whose lands were taken for a federal purpose. 402 The proposed contract
also required the federal government to pay for removing the Indians. 403 A
leading commentator concluded that the tribal leaders accepted this
contract as the only way of ensuring that their tribal members had some

399. Congress’ rescission of the “Indian Clause” was regarded as a victory
for the pro-dam forces represented by the Governor and State Water Commission of
North Dakota. Id. at 256.
400. War Department Civil Appropriations Act, ch. 411, Pub. L. No. 80296, 61 Stat. 686, 690 (1947).
401. Meyer comments that Pub. L. No. 80-296 represented “forced”
legislation that ignored the interests and treaty reserved rights of the Fort Berthold
Indians. The language of the bill, regarded as a triumph for the Governor and North
Dakota Water Commission, specified that the Indians would be paid $5,105,625.00
for the “acquisition of lands and rights therein within the taking line of Garrison
Reservoir which lands lie within the area now established as the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation, North Dakota, including all elements of value above or below the surface
thereof including all improvements, severance damages and reestablishment and
relocation costs.” 61 Stat. at 690. This appropriation was contingent upon the
conclusion of a contract between the Indians and the United States or the money was
to return to the Treasury on a certain date. Tribal representatives, such as Jefferson B.
Smith, who appeared to testify regarding this bill were given the “cold shoulder” and
were later told that they had agreed to accept this appropriation as compensation for
their taken lands. Meyer, supra note 45, at 256–57.
402. Meyer ironically comments that this proposed contract gave the
Indians a better deal than they were to ultimately receive via the 1949 Taking Act.
For example, the Indians, under Article 10, were to have free use of the area between
the taking line and the actual shoreline for hunting, fishing, trapping, and grazing uses
as well as boat harbor and other recreational uses. Under Article 12, they were to
receive a one-eighth royalty from any oil or gas that may be later extracted from lands
within the taken area. Id. at 258–59.
403. Id. at 259.
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subsistence support after they were removed from their lands. 404 Colonel
Pick, believing that he had been insulted by tribal members at a meeting
in 1947, characterized the Fort Berthold Indians as belligerently
uncooperative, and used that incident as a “reason to dictate his own
settlement terms to Congress.” 405
The Fort Berthold Indians objected to their treatment as mere
private non-Indian condemnees. 406 They insisted that their right to sue for
just compensation in the appropriate judicial forum be preserved in any
agreement. 407 They argued that just compensation was owed for real
losses that arose from the devastation of their tribal economy and
governmental capabilities. 408 A Corps-Indian contract was signed in an
emotion-filled ceremony in Secretary Krug’s office on May 20, 1948. 409
Senator Watkins reasoned that Congress, not the courts, was the
appropriate forum for the determination of a “just and generous”
settlement for the Fort Berthold Indians, one that would “prevent[] the
necessity for any further action in the Court of Claims.” 410 Senator
Watkins urged his Indian committee colleagues to reject any Indian
agreement that recognized the Indians’ right to just compensation.
Terminating the Fort Berthold Indians’ right to a judicial determination of
404. Meyer comments that the Fort Berthold Indians accepted their
inevitable fate and began “working out a contract so as to avoid losing the money that
had been conditionally appropriated for them.” Id. at 258.
405. LAWSON, supra note 364, at 60.
406. Meyer, supra note 45, at 257.
407. The Indians were successful in inserting a provision that would allow
them to bring a just compensation suit in the Court of Claims for any additional
damages “of any treaty obligation of the Government or any intangible cost of
reestablishment or relocation, for which the said tribes are not compensated by the
said $5,105,625.” War Department Civil appropriations Act, 1948, ch. 411, Pub. L.
No. 81-296, 61 Stat. 686, 690 (1947).
408. Meyer, supra note 45, at 261.
409. Id. at 259.
410. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 18. The original version of House
Joint Resolution 33 ratified the terms of the contract and added $9.5 million dollars in
additional compensation to cover items not covered by the contract. Attorney Case,
on behalf of the tribe, argued that the capitalized value of the factors of income from
the reserved lands totaled $24,561,000, from which he deducted $2,580,000 as the
value of the residual reservation lands, leaving a just compensation claim of
$21,981,000. But the chairman of the House subcommittee accepted the BIA’s just
compensation figure of $14,605,625. This amount of compensation, coupled with a
three million dollar readjustment fund and grant of 20 megawatts of preference power
to the Indians from the future Garrison power plant, proved far too generous to Senator
Watkins of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. His committee struck out everything
in the contract, changed the purpose of the bill, and reduced the just compensation
appropriation to four million dollars. Meyer, supra note 45, at 261–63.
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just compensation was appropriate, he reasoned, given the “substantial
unanimity of opinion [in the Senate] to the effect that the Congress should
provide for a definitive settlement with the Three Affiliated Tribes.” 411
Watkins’ counsel to his committee colleagues to formulate the
“complete and final settlement of all [Indian] claims and demand[ed]”
congressional plenary power over Indian lands. 412 Nonetheless, he
assured the Fort Berthold Indians that any congressional settlement would
be “both just and generous . . . thereby removing any reason [or] necessity
for any further action in the Court of Claims.” 413 But the Fort Berthold
Indians remained unconvinced of Senator Watkins’ sincerity regarding the
justice of a congressionally imposed settlement. 414
C. The Doctrinal Basis for a Modern Indian Takings Doctrine
The Fort Berthold Indians argued before JTAC that Senator
Watkins’ Indian committee demonstrably failed to justly compensate them
for their taken lands, that their lands should be valued on the same basis
as non-Indian lands that serve comparable governmental or public welfare
functions. 415 They contended that this valuation standard would fulfill
two important underlying goals of the Just Compensation Clause. First,
such a valuation standard would ensure the continued viability of the Three
Affiliated Tribes as a recognized government consistent with the purposes

411. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 17. Cummings quotes Interior
Secretary Krug’s letter to Watkins’ Indian committee wherein Krug concludes that
such a congressional settlement may eliminate the “more protracted and less certain
remedy of a suit in the Court of Claims” given that there “might be a question of
whether the real needs of the tribes, directly caused by the taking of their lands, could
be made the legal basis of an award.” Id. at 18.
412. Id. at 18.
413. Id.
414. Cummings cites the fact that each “successive effort by Congress to
propose a settlement for the Tribes’ taken lands seemed to offer less and less to the
Tribes—a trend that did not escape the attention of the Tribes.” Id. at 18–19.
415. Cummings concluded that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
represented a dedicated public or governmental entity whose lands and territory
possessed a value to the tribal community that far transcended their fair market value.
He cited the 1886 agreement between the Fort Berthold Indians and the United States
as confirming the governmental and public welfare status of the Indians’ reserved
lands: “[[T]his Reservation is formed] in order to obtain the means necessary to enable
[the Fort Berthold Indians] to become wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the
soil and the other pursuits of husbandry.” Id. at 14–15 (quoting Agreement of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1032).
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of its 1886 agreement with the federal government. 416 Second, such a
valuation standard would discourage future “rent seeking” initiatives by
Indian congressional committees that sought to exploit their plenary power
over Indian lands for their non-Indian constituents’ benefit. 417
The 1886 sovereign bargain that established the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation declared that the reservation was formed in order for
the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Tribes “to obtain the means necessary
to enable them to become wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the
soil and other pursuits of husbandry.” 418 This goal was to be realized by
the Indians’ development of the agricultural potential of their reserved
riparian farming and grazing lands along the Missouri River and its
tributary streams. 419 The 1946 MRBI Reports confirmed that without
these riparian lands, the Three Affiliated Tribes would not achieve the
treaty’s goal of economic and social independence. 420
416. Cummings points to the Indian committees’ keen awareness, in light
of the MRBI Reports, that the Fort Berthold Indians would lose the vast majority of
their arable and irrigable land base that was the essential means for carrying out the
purposes of the 1886 treaty agreement. Id. at 23–24.
417. See Lunney, supra note 250, at 753–61.
418. 26 Stat. at 1032.
419. The critical role of the Indians’ reserved Missouri River bottom lands
as the keystone economic base for their tribal future and security is expressed in an
August 1949 MRBI Report to Congress:
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians depend for
subsistence will be wiped out by the completion of the Garrison
project. These losses must be replaced by cash income. The
reservoir area includes most of the timber land from which building
materials, fence posts and firewood are obtained. In these river
bottomlands are the june-berries, wild plums and chokecherries
which form such an important part of the Indian diet. It is estimated
that the wild life losses will cut off most of the supply of deer and
other game since these animals and birds are dependent upon the
brush and timber for their existence. Most of the surface coal
deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be flooded . . .
families obtain almost all their fuel, a large portion of their meat
and fruit, a considerable amount of garden vegetables, and most of
their building material without the expenditure of any cash. After
the inundation of these natural resources by the Garrison Reservoir
Project, the amount of cash required for subsistence will be greatly
increased.
CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 21.
420. Mr. R. W. Rietz, Indian Agency Relocation Officer, concluded that
although there were 420 Indian families on the historic reservation, the residual
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In other words, these Indian lands formed the essential trust res of
the Fort Berthold Indians’ Tribes’ economic and governmental
infrastructure. 421 That res was composed of the easily irrigable bottom
lands of the reservation. Destruction of these lands imposed on the Fort
Berthold Indians economic losses to be measured by the capitalized value
of the expected future incomes that would be generated by their lands. The
Corps’ flooding of the Fort Berthold lands destroyed the Indians’
governmental and economic resource base as completely as would any
comparable natural cataclysm. 422
Private lands, assets, and capital are protected by the Just
Compensation Clause from similar demolition by governmental
action. 423 But Senator Watkins worked to persuade his congressional
colleagues that the Fort Berthold Indians deserved less compensation for
their lost capital assets than similarly situated non-Indian entities. 424 The
value of these Indian lands transcended their individual parcel value, but
Senator Watkins’ Indian committee failed to acknowledge this basic
reality. 425
reservation lands would be able to support only 175 families. The rest would likely,
in his opinion, have to be re-educated in vocational skills to survive in off-reservation
job placement. Id.
421. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians had
abided by the terms of the 1886 agreement and that their development of a ranching
and agricultural industry had rendered them in sight of complete economic
independence and justified compensation for the “reestablishment of a sound
economic base for the future of said tribes.” 95 Cong. Rec. 8930 (1949).
422. The Indian committees recognized that the Fort Berthold Indians
were bound by treaty agreement, tradition, and custom to their reserved tribal lands
that were intended to serve in perpetuity as their homeland. Unlike the non-Indian
farmer or rancher who can take his condemnation payment from the government and
buy like farmland in a nearby state, the Fort Berthold Indians could not replace their
unique territory, social, and governmental status through the payment of fair market
value. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 20.
423. The Supreme Court enunciated the equivalent value or “make whole”
standard for just compensation in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 326, 341 (1893). The private owner of lands that are taken for public use is
to be put in “as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
424. Cummings cites the “log-rolling” between the House Subcommittee
on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs Committee that resulted in progressive
and arbitrary reductions of the proposed just compensation amounts to the Fort
Berthold Indians as evidence of an institutional failure to comply with anything
resembling the “make whole” command of the Just Compensation Clause.
CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 22–24.
425. In October 1845, Acting Interior Solicitor Felix S. Cohen gave his
legal opinion before Watkins’ Senate Indian Affairs committee regarding the Corps’
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However, the JTAC did recognize that the federal government had
a legal duty to make the Fort Berthold Indians whole for their economic
losses. 426 Therefore, the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald G. Cummings, a
leading natural resource economist, to do an assessment of the Indians’
economic losses imposed by the 1949 taking. 427 He was directed to use
known and accepted 1949 valuation standards as the means to capitalize
the stream of income the Indians would have received from those lands. 428
Such a valuation approach replicated Congress’ 1946 valuation standard
that required the War Department to provide the Indians with the “in-kind”
replacement value of their taken lands.429 The War Secretary had been
instructed to provide the Indians with “land . . . comparable in quality and
sufficient in area to compensate the said Tribes for the land on the Fort
Berthold Reservation which shall be inundated by the construction of
Garrison Dam.” 430 Only “in-kind” replacement or substitute
compensation would fairly compensate the Fort Berthold Indians for the
taking of their lands. 431
The 1946 Congress expressly rejected the Corps’ claim that
“parcelized” valuation of the Indian lands would provide just
compensation to the Fort Berthold people. Congress recognized that the
Indians’ treaty-reserved lands were tribal public welfare and governmental
facilities whose intrinsic value could not be measured by the Corps’
traditional land valuation approach. 432 Those Indian lands had been
power to condemn the Fort Berthold lands. He testified that a right of condemnation
by the Corps did not exist over tribal lands and that if Congress exercised its plenary
power to take those lands, it would be in breach of its treaty agreements with the Fort
Berthold Indians. Meyer, supra note 45, at 244.
426. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16–19.
427. Id. at 17.
428. Id.
429. Senate Report 102-250 emphasized that the JTAC’s recommended
compensation amount was intended to “substitute for or replace the value of the
economic base that was taken as the site for Lake Sakakawea and Lake Oahe.” See S.
REP. NO. 102-250, at 3 (1992).
430. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246.
431. Id. at 251–52.
432. Chairman Murry emphasized the JTAC’s awareness that “Congress .
. . required the War Department, by statute, [in 1946] to provide a suitable replacement
reservation called ‘in lieu lands’ so that the reservation as an ongoing concern could
continue.” Recommendations of the Garrison Unit Joint Tribal Advisory Committee
Regarding the Entitlement of the Three Affiliated Tribes and the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe to Additional Financial Compensation for the Taking of Reservation Lands for
the Site of the Garrison Dam and Reservoir and the Oahe Dam and Reservoir,
Hearings on H.R. 2414 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 102
Cong. 109 (1992) (statement of Emerson Murry, Former Chairman of the Joint Tribal
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perpetually dedicated to tribal governmental and economic uses by the
1886 agreement. These background factors persuaded the JTAC that the
just compensation owed the Indians should be measured by the capitalized
value of the expected stream of income that they would have derived from
their lands. 433
The JTAC also rejected the BIA’s contention that the 1949 Taking
Act barred the Indians’ claim for just compensation. The JTAC read its
explicit directive from the GDUC and its own charter as requiring the
renewed scrutiny of the federal government’s conduct in the taking of the
Fort Berthold Indians’ lands. 434 It had been empowered to recommend an
equitable solution as the basis for possible congressional
legislation. 435 Like the GDUC, its congressional predecessor, the JTAC
was to investigate fully the impacts on Indians of the Garrison Project and
to recommend remedial legislation that would redress those impacts in a

Advisory Commission) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2414]. Because the department
was unable to do so, “Congress decided to pay [the Fort Berthold Indians]
compensation in lieu of replaced lands, with the amount to be a substitute for the
replacement valuation.” Id.
Chairman Murry described the valuation methodology undertaken by the
JTAC to establish a just compensation amount for the taking of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation in 1949.
The JTAC, in an attempt to value these lands that were taken and
damages to the infrastructure did procure the services of a Dr.
Ronald G. Cummings, who specializes in resource economics, to
prepare a report on the issue. He emphasized that the 156,000 acres
of land taken were the sole major resource available to carry out
the purposes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. He chose the
value of these resources by estimating the flow of land-base
earnings or income that was attributable to that resource and the
methodology he used contemplates the exchange of one income
producing asset for another. Of course, that “in lieu” or income
producing asset to be exchanged was money damages. He then had
this cash that would have been received capitalized at 3.5 per cent,
which was then the Congressionally mandated rate in 1950, and
then he raised this to 1986 dollars at the time we were filing the
report this totalled $178.4 million for the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation.
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
433. Id.
434. S. REP. 102-250, at 3.
435. The JTAC was expressly created by Secretary Hodel “to find ways to
resolve the inequities” borne by the Fort Berthold Indians. Id.
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fair and equitable manner. 436 It concluded that only such an equitable
remedy would put the Fort Berthold Indians in as good a position
pecuniarily as they would have occupied if their property had not been
taken. 437 The JTAC concluded simply that just compensation had not been
provided to the Fort Berthold Indians. 438
The JTAC then determined that replacement or substitute value of
the taken lands would adequately compensate the Indians for their losses
due to the 1949 taking. 439 Such an alternative valuation standard has been
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the federal taking of lands that served
essential governmental or public welfare functions. The Court held that
the just compensation standard required that such essential governmental
resources be valued at their substitute or replacement cost.440 The Fort
Berthold Indians’ taken lands provided the social welfare and
governmental benefits described by the Court, by their use in ranching and
agricultural employment as was contemplated by the 1886 agreement.
Only the continued existence of those lands, or the just compensation
equivalent, would ensure that the Fort Berthold Indians would be able to
fulfill the governmental and economic goals that were contemplated by
the 1886 sovereign bargain between them and the federal government. 441
436. Congress concurred in the JTAC’s findings that the Fort Berthold
Indians had never been adequately compensated for their lands taken as the site for
the Garrison Dam and Reservoir. Id. at 8.
437. Cummings cites fair market value as the baseline standard of
valuation that the Supreme Court typically applies as the basis of just compensation
to private parties whose lands have been taken for governmental purposes. He
synthesized the leading Supreme Court decisions on the appropriate valuation
standard for private property or resources. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 9–14.
438. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
439. Id.
440. The taking of dedicated governmental or public welfare facilities
triggers the application of the substitute valuation doctrine that was articulated in
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923). The Court recognized that when land or
public welfare facilities are condemned or taken by the federal government, an
alternate valuation standard other than fair market value may be used to make the
wronged party whole. The Court in Brown held that “(a) method of compensation by
substitution would seem to be the best means of making the parties whole.” Brown,
203 U.S. at 82. Cummings cites the post-Brown decisions that expanded the reach
and scope of the substitute valuation doctrine as it applies to unique or irreplaceable
lands or resources that are either not traded on any market or have elements of value
that transcend market value. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 12–14.
441. Cummings points to the 1886 Fort Berthold treaty language and
legislative history of Public Law 479 as clearly establishing the inextricable
relationship between the “Tribe’s arable lands [virtually all of which were in their
taken lands] and the basic purposes intended for the Reservation [to allow the Tribes
to become ‘wholly self-supporting by the cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of
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The JTAC fashioned an equitable remedy based on the substitute
or replacement value of the taken Indian lands.442 It recognized that
payment of the fair market value of any taken property generally satisfies
the “full and perfect” equivalent and “make whole” standard of the Just
Compensation Clause. 443 But the Court in Olson v. United States held that
it is “the property and not the cost of it that is safeguarded by state and
Federal Constitutions.” 444 The Court also made it clear that if a fair market
price prevailed for private property taken for public use, then that ruling
market price should define the just compensation amount owed to the
injured private party. 445 Conversely, if there is no active market for
specialized public or social welfare resources, then a commission, like
JTAC, is authorized to resort to alternative valuation methods other than
fair market value. 446 The JTAC recognized that the Court had stringently
limited the application of this alternative valuation standard to those
circumstances wherein the property taken was of a kind that is seldom
exchanged on a market or that has a value transcending any ostensible
market price. 447 The Court in Miller v. United States further qualified the
husbandry.’]” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 15 (citations omitted). He concludes
that the Tribe’s reserved bottom lands unequivocally represented treaty-established
“public welfare facilities” that were intended to serve as the perpetual homeland for
the Fort Berthold Indians. Id.
442. Cummings had been directed by the JTAC to recommend an
equitable valuation methodology that addressed the Indians’ claims that their treatyreserved lands that were taken in 1949 had served as the unique situs for their
governmental, associational, and cultural homeland pursuant to the 1886 Fort Berthold
agreement. He concluded that an equitable valuation methodology would have
capitalized the values of all the n-factor and related incomes that the Fort Berthold
Indians would have derived from their reserved lands in perpetuity. Id. at 25–31.
443. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
444. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
445. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923)
(“When private property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing
at the time and place of the taking, that price is just compensation . . . . More would
be unjust to the United States and less would deny the owner what he is entitled to.”
(citations omitted)).
446. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
447. The testimony of JTAC’s Chairman Murry before the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs recognized that fair market value is not the exclusive
valuation method for taken Indian lands. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
The JTAC’s valuation approach is likewise confirmed by a Second Circuit decision
holding that “fair market value ‘is not an absolute standard nor an exclusive method
of valuation’. . . . It should be abandoned ‘when the nature of the property or its uses
produce a wide discrepancy between value of the property to the owner and the price
at which it could be sold to anyone else.”’ United States v. Certain Property Located
in the Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1968) (citation omitted).
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general applicability of the fair market value standard, holding that
“[w]here, for any reason, property has no market, then resort must be had
to some other data to ascertain its value.” 448
The JTAC was persuaded that the Fort Berthold Indians’ lands
were a paradigmatic example of governmental or social welfare resources.
Therefore, the JTAC concluded that the value of the taken Indian lands
could not be reliably determined by resort to fair market value. 449 The
1946 Congress had recognized this same fact by its adoption of the
substitute or replacement value as the basis of the just compensation award
to the Fort Berthold Indians. 450
The JTAC’s valuation approach sought to do justice to both the
federal government and the Fort Berthold Indians. It refused to make a
fetish of market value as the only or best measure of just compensation.
But it was also appropriately wary of “those . . . special circumstances” of
Indian lands that have no fair market value. It sought expert testimony and
evidence regarding the appropriate valuation methodology that would
fairly value those lands from an objective viewpoint. 451 It recognized that
the fair market valuation method would not capture the unique

448. Miller, 317 U.S. at 374.
449. The JTAC’s Chairman Murry cited Dr. Cummings’ extended
treatement of the public welfare character of the Fort Berthold Indian lands as strongly
influencing the JTAC’s recommendation of the equitable award of just compensation
for those taken lands. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 17.
450. Id.
451. Emerson Murry, Chair of the JTAC, testified before the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs that the JTAC employed Dr. Ronald G.
Cummings, a natural resource economist, to prepare a valuation report regarding the
just compensation issue raised by the Fort Berthold Indians. Murry pointed out that
the 156,000 acres of taken reservation lands were the “sole resource available to carry
out the purposes of the reservation.” Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 110.
He emphasized that the JTAC wanted Cummings to construct an “exchange value” of
the taken lands for an equivalent income-producing financial asset. Id. He explained
the JTAC’s response to the “grossly inadequate amount” of compensation paid to the
Indians under the 1949 taking act that did not allow the Indians sufficient
compensation to “replace their economic base” that was taken as the site for the
Garrison Dam. Id. Murry cited the MRBI Reports to Congress evidencing that the
Three Affiliated Tribes were “self-sufficient, well-integrated Societies” before the
advent of the Garrison Dam. The just compensation amount of $178.4 million
recommended by the JTAC was derived from Dr. Cummings capitalization of the
factor returns or perpetual earning capacity of the Indians’ taken lands at a 1949 rate
of 3.5%. Chairman Murry hoped the House committee would recommend that amount
of just compensation on behalf of the Fort Berthold Indians because it would
“materially move the Tribes forward in their efforts to establish a viable economic
base.” Id. at 11.
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characteristics of the Fort Berthold lands, and thus resorted to the
alternative valuation approach announced in Brown v. United States. 452
The circumstances of the 1949 Fort Berthold taking strikingly
resembled the facts presented in the Brown decision. In Brown, the federal
government took three-quarters of the business center of a town as the site
for a water reservoir. 453 The town’s lands had provided the region’s
inhabitants with a wide array of economic and public welfare values. The
injured parties were the region’s inhabitants who had historically
depended and relied on the services provided by this town. The Court
concluded that the real value of these nonmarket services and
opportunities could not be captured by any market-based concept of
value. 454
By adopting the alternative valuation approach, the JTAC
acknowledged that the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation was established
in 1886 for specific governmental and public welfare purposes: to provide
a permanent homeland for the Three Affiliated Tribes. 455 The Indians’
ethnographic and legal history persuaded the JTAC that the 1886
agreement contemplated the perpetual use of the reservation’s fertile and
productive bottomlands as the Indians’ resource base. 456 The 1946
Congress rejected the idea that the Fort Berthold Indians were only entitled
to the fair market value of their individual parcels of trust lands.457 Thus,
both JTAC and the 1946 Congress agreed that only replacement value for
the taken lands would ensure that the Indians were made whole. For that
reason, the JTAC directed Cummings to prepare a land valuation
452.

The Court reasoned that:

A town is a business center. It is a unit. If three-quarters of it is to
be destroyed by appropriating it to an exclusive use like a reservoir,
all property owners, both those ousted and those in the remaining
quarter, as well as the State, whose subordinate agency of
government is the municipality, are injured. A method of
compensation by substitution would seem to be the best means of
making the parties whole.
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1923).
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 16–18.
456. Id.
457. The 1946 Congress required that the Fort Berthold Indians be
provided “land . . . comparable in quality and sufficient in area to compensate the said
tribes for the land on the Fort Berthold Reservation which shall be inundated by the
construction of the Garrison Dam.” War Department Civil Appropriations Act, PUB.
L. NO. 79-374, § 6, 60 Stat. 167 (1946).
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assessment that would allow the commission to reasonably ascertain the
cost of providing property in substitution for the Fort Berthold Indian
lands. 458
D. Why the Congressional “Good Faith” Standard Fails to Provide Just
Compensation to Injured Indian Peoples
The 1949 Congress’ alleged failure justly to compensate the Fort
Berthold Indians was a key issue for JTAC investigation. That
investigation required an examination of the legislative record of the 1949
Taking Act. 459 Although Congress does enjoy a qualified immunity to
Indian taking claims, 460 it must make a good faith effort to provide the
injured Indians with the fair value of their taken lands. 461 The Indians
argued that the legislative record demonstrated that Congress did not make
such a good faith effort. 462 They also contended that JTAC’s charter and
the GDUC’s directive required a searching inquiry into the issue of
congressional good faith. 463
Congress is no longer allowed to take Indian lands as a mere
incident of its exercise of guardianship power over those lands. 464 It must
satisfy a reviewing federal court that it made a good faith effort to fairly
compensate the affected Indians for their lands. 465 The reviewing federal
judge must evaluate the relevant legislative history and surrounding
circumstances of an alleged taking in making this good faith
determination. 466
But this good faith test may well prove illusory, as it did in the
Fort Berthold experience, to ensure that the affected Indians are justly
458. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 15–16.
459. Id. at 14–25.
460. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
461. Id. at 416–17.
462. Cummings concluded that “Congress was a sea in terms of a well
developed line of reasoning as to just what would compensate the [Fort Berthold
Indians] for their loss of an economic base.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 25. This
was true, despite the fact that it was “well established in economic theory” that
governmental or public welfare resources “such as land, water and minerals may
constitute a ‘resource base,’ or ‘economic base,’ whose value extends well beyond the
market value of the resource per se.” Id.
463. Professor Newton emphasizes the difficulty that a reviewing court
faces in implementing the good faith inquiry into Congress’ compensation of injured
Indian peoples. Newton, supra note 34, at 259.
464. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371.
465. Id. at 416–17.
466. Professor Newton demonstrates the inquiry burden that the good faith
standard imposes on a reviewing court. Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60.
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compensated for their taken lands. Absent an objective valuation standard,
there is simply no reliable reference point for the court’s evaluation of
claimed congressional good faith. 467
Restricting the JTAC’s inquiry to a review of the legislative record
of the 1949 Fort Berthold taking illustrates this point: two congressional
Indian committees—the House Public Lands Committee and the Senate
Indian Affairs Committee—agreed that it was necessary to take the Fort
Berthold Indians’ lands as the site for the Garrison Dam, 468 but there is
little or no discussion regarding the value of those lands to the Indian
people. 469 The JTAC would have searched in vain for any principled
guidance on the meaningful calculation by those committees of the just
compensation amount that was owed to the Fort Berthold Indians. 470
Indian congressional committees, given their deeply conflicting
interests, are rarely capable of objectively valuing Indian lands as is
envisioned by the Court’s Sioux Nation decision. They are neither
sufficiently disinterested nor sufficiently expert to be entrusted with the
task of calculating the just compensation amounts that are owed to injured
Indian peoples. 471

467. Cummings cites the congressional committees’ “admixture of
interests” as the lead developer of the Pick-Sloan Project as preventing Congress from
fairly valuing and compensating the Fort Berthold Indians for their taken lands. He
cites to the Court’s admonition that “[t]he right of the legislature . . . to apply the
property of the citizen to public use, and then to constitute itself the judge to determine
what is the just compensation it ought to pay therefor . . . cannot . . . be tolerated under
our constitution.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 24.
468. Meyer, supra note 45, at 260–64.
469. Professor Newton perhaps would not find surprising the Indian
committees’ failure to evaluate the Indians’ economic losses in objective economic
terms. Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60.
470. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19–24.
471. Cummings rhetorically asks:
In light of the above, we might well ask: what was Congress’ view
of that amount of money that would justly compensate the Tribes
for their taken lands? $17 million, “more than” $20 million, $21plus million, or $30 million? Moreover, we might inquire as to the
logical grounds on which any of these possible settlements were
derived. In the end, of course, the “how much” question was
resolved at still a different amount: $5.1 million for the Tribes’
lands and relocation costs . . . and $7.4 million for, essentially, any
other claim that one might think of. The question as to how the
Congress arrived at these figures remains open. We find no
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Reliance on congressional Indian committees’ subjective land
valuations renders the Just Compensation Clause nearly
meaningless. 472 A “make whole” standard that begins and ends with
Indian congressional committees’ good faith assertions subjects Indian
compensatory rights to the vagaries of the political process. 473 The JTAC
would have been unable to perform its mandate consistent with its GDUC
directive and its secretarial charter if it had been bound by this review
standard. 474 It would have ignored the fundamental gap between what the
1946 Congress promised as compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians and
the amount that the 1949 Congress actually provided to them under the
1949 Taking Act. 475 The 1949 report of the Senate Indian Committee
declared that “the real needs of the tribes directly caused by the taking of
their lands” must be the basis for a legislative award of just
compensation. 476 But this rhetorical flourish is empty of meaning unless
it is read in conjunction with the 1946 congressional directive to provide
replacement or substitute compensation to the Fort Berthold
Indians. 477 The JTAC gave substance to this promise by “reading in” the

discussions in the Congressional records that describe the bases for
this determination of what would be just compensation to the
Tribes for their taken lands.
Id. at 24–25.
472. Newton, supra note 34, at 259–60.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 50.
476. The Senate report accompanying H.R.J. Res. 33, 81st Cong. (1949),
concludes that the:
proposed legislation provides for a complete and final settlement
of all claims and demands of said tribes for all damages sustained
by reason of the taking of said lands and rights in the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation, and of all other claims and demands of said
tribes whether of tangible or intangible nature, or any alleged
claims or demands, arising out of the said treaty of September 17,
1851 (11 Stat. 749), or any other treaty (including any unratified
treaty) or agreement, prior to the approval and acceptance of the
provisions of this resolution.
S. REP. NO. 81-605, at 3–4 (1949).
The Senate Report explains that this resolution “remove[s] any reason for
further petition to Congress for additional money and prevent[s] the necessity for any
further action in the Court of Claims.” Id. at 6–7.
477. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 18.
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1946 Congress’ valuation of the affected Indian lands. 478 The JTAC found
that only this amount of compensation would enable the Fort Berthold
Indians to survive as a viable economic and governmental entity. 479
The Indian committees were obviously aware of this issue. The
House Committee on Public Lands poignantly expressed its concern about
the future survival of the Three Affiliated Tribes. 480 But it did not translate
its concern into any cognizable just compensation theory or valuation
principle. It found that the Fort Berthold Indians’ development of an
agricultural livestock industry on their reserved bottom lands had rendered
them “in sight of complete economic independence” as contemplated by
the Fort Berthold agreement.481 It concluded that compensation was
required “for the destruction of the basic industry of the said tribes; for the
intangible costs of relocation and for the reestablishment of a sound
economic base and the future of said tribes.” 482
These Indian committees were well aware of the critical role of
the taken lands in light of the Department of Interior’s report in August of
1949, which stated:
Most of the natural resources upon which the Indians
depend for subsistence will be wiped out by the
completion of the Garrison project. These losses must be
replaced by cash income. The reservoir area includes
most of the timber land from which building materials,
fence posts and firewood are obtained. In these river
bottomlands are the june-berries, wild plums and
chokecherries which form such an important part of the
Indian diet. It is estimated that the wild life losses will cut
off most of the supply of deer and other game since these
animals and birds are dependent upon the brush and
timber for their existence. Most of the surface coal
478. Hearings on H.R. 2414, supra note 432, at 109–10.
479. Murry points to the original version of H.R.J. Res. 33, which called
for a just compensation amount of $17.1 million to be paid to the Fort Berthold Indians
for their taken lands. Murry notes that not even this admittedly “inadequate
congressional amount” was paid to the Indians. Instead, the Indians were later offered
$12.6 million by Congress on a “take it or leave it basis.” See Hearings on H.R. 2414,
supra note 432, at 109–10.
480. The House Committee on Public Lands explained that because of the
Garrison dam the Indians’ “homes will be lost, their cattle industry will be ruined,
their churches and schools, and their social life will be completely disrupted.” H.R.
REP. NO. 81-544, at 3 (1949).
481. Id.
482. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 20–21.
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deposits from which Indians mine their coal will be
flooded. . . . [Indian] families obtain almost all of their
fuel, a large portion of their meat and fruit, a considerable
amount of garden vegetables, and most of their building
materials without the expenditure of any cash. After the
inundation of these natural resources by the Garrison
Reservoir Project, the amount of cash required for
subsistence will be greatly increased. 483
But the Indian committees’ failure to fairly value the taken Indian
lands reflects Senator Watkins’ power over the legislative process. The
harsh reality was that a “governmental subsystem” of western
congressional delegations and related constituency interests
disproportionately influenced Indian congressional committees. 484 This
influence is patently evident in the 1949 legislative hearing record
regarding the Fort Berthold taking. It is virtually silent regarding the just
compensation that would respond to the economic costs imposed on the
Fort Berthold Indians by the taking of their treaty-reserved lands. 485 The
House Committee on Public Lands and the Senate Indian Affairs
Committee did briefly debate this cost versus loss basis of just
compensation. 486 For example, the House committee was clearly uneasy
with the Corps’ cavalier assertion that payment of fair market value to
individual Indian allottees would adequately compensate Fort Berthold
Indians:

483. Id. at 21 (quoting BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR, REPORT NO. 94, SOCIAL & ECONOMIC REPORT OF FORT BERTHOLD
RESERVATION 12, 17 (Supp. I 1949) (emphasis added)).
484. Lunney, supra note 250, at 753–56.
485. Cummings found this congressional silence puzzling given three
factors that would have enabled Congress to fashion an appropriate just compensation
methodology for the Fort Berthold Indians: First, he cited “legal precedents . . . which
would provide guidance . . . to . . . insure[] that sufficient damages will be awarded to
finance replacement for the condemned facility.” CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19–
20. Second, he cited Congress’ grasp of the Fort Berthold lands as a permanent
“homeland to the Tribes” as expressed in the 1886 agreement, which specified the
terms that the Indians were “‘to become wholly self supporting by cultivation of the
(Missouri river bottom lands)’, . . . their sole resource base for pursuing agricultural
activities.” Id. at 20. Third, he cited the Indian congressional committees’ failure to
use established precedent to establish a baseline valuation of the taken Indian lands as
an analytic departure point for providing the Fort Berthold Indians with just
compensation for their taken lands. Id. at 21–23.
486. Id. at 22–24.
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The Committee on Public Lands feels that ($17 million
dollars) is small compensation for the disruption forced
upon the 2,215 Indians. A conservative estimate of the
basic value of the lands and their annual use value is
approximately $21,981,000. Therefore, the United States
by making the settlement (at $17 million), will obtain the
reservoir right-of-way at about two thirds of its basic
value and its annual use value to the Three Affiliated
Tribes. 487
Individual congressmen, such as Mr. Lemke from North Dakota,
expressed their dismay that the Fort Berthold Indians were to be paid an
amount of compensation substantially less than the real economic value of
their treaty-reserved lands. 488 He colorfully expressed his opinion on this
issue:
Here is a factory . . . that produced a net income last year
of $774,000. That alone capitalized at 4 percent equals
about twenty million. Surely no one would voluntarily
surrender an income of 4 percent on twenty million for
less than twenty million cash. . . . In taking these lands,
we are . . . depriving these tribes of their land for less than
its value.” 489
Interior Secretary Krug commented ironically about the fairness
of the House committee’s proposed $17 million payment as just
compensation to the Fort Berthold Indians:
[I]t is well to bear in mind that the Indians would much
prefer to retain their existing reservation intact. In the
discussions preceding the execution of the contract, they
expressed the belief that it would require $30 million to
compensate them properly for what is being taken from
them. If they are willing to accept the lesser benefits
provided for in the contract and in House Joint resolution
33, I believe the approval of this compromise would be to
the best interests of the United States.” 490
487. H.R. REP. NO. 81-544, at 3–4 (1949).
488. Meyer, supra note 45, at 263.
489. 95 CONG. REC. 15052, 15051 (1949) (statement of Rep. William
Lemke) (emphasis added).
490. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 23–24 (emphasis added).
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Secretary Krug was referring to the House committee’s proposed
compensation package that was to serve as the basis for just compensation
to the Three Affiliated Tribes.491 This proposed compensation package
was embodied in House Joint Resolution 33 and included these elements:
1. $5.1 million for the fair market value of the Indian trust
parcels of lands that were to be taken and related relocation
costs; 492
2. $3 million for a land readjustment fund that would be used to
consolidate fragmented land holdings of tribal members into
viable economic units and for purchasing private lands for needy
tribal members; 493
3. $6.5 million as additional compensation to the Three
Affiliated Tribes for “values not compensated for under the
contract;” 494
4. 20,000 kilowatts of electric power (when available from the
Garrison Dam): for sale and distribution by the . . . Tribes . . .
delivered at such point or points on the reservation . . . as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior. Payment shall be
made for the power actually used at the lowest wholesale rate or
rates, applicable to the same class of service made available to
other customers. . . . The transmission and distribution system
necessary for the delivery of such . . . power . . . shall be
constructed with funds made available . . . by the U.S. without cost
to the said Tribes; 495 and
5. Construction of “any irrigation works and related facilities
which . . . the Secretary of the Interior determines to be feasible. .
. . 496 If constructed, the irrigation works must be operated on a
basis not less favorable than to non-Indian lands, and the costs
thereof must be repayable in accordance with the terms of other
laws applicable to Indian lands.” 497
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Id. at 22–23.
H.R. REP. NO. 81-544.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 36.
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This proposed compensation package—including the 20
megawatts of future-delivered low cost hydroelectric power—was valued
by the House Committee on Public Lands at approximately seventeen
million dollars. 498 The committee members stated that the seventeen
million dollars proposed compensation to the Indians “would be to the best
interest of” the federal government. 499 The earlier MRBI Reports to
Congress had capitalized the economic value of the taken Fort Berthold
lands at a conservative estimate of $21,981,000. 500
The harsh reality was that the Fort Berthold Indians—when all the
“horse trading” was completed between the House and Senate Indian
committees—were to receive substantially less compensation than was
recommended as the “bare minimum” by the House Committee on Public
Lands. 501 The Fort Berthold Indians did not receive an amount between
the seventeen million to thirty million dollar range that was judged by the
House committee as the minimum fair amount of compensation for the
Indians’ taken lands. 502 Indeed, the minimum just compensation amount
proposed in House Joint Resolution 33 was substantially reduced by the
Senator Watkins’ committee. 503 This dramatic downward spiral of
proposed just compensation did not escape the Fort Berthold Indians’
attention: 504 “We (the tribal council) advised them (the tribal members)
that if we should reject the Act (P.L. 437), the next offer of the government
would probably not be even as good as the one we are considering.” 505
The Fort Berthold Indians were well aware that the amount of
compensation they would receive would be determined by the
comparative power of the House Committee on Public Lands and the
Senate Indian Affairs Committee. Senator Watkins’ influence was
reflected in that, in each negotiation round, the proposed amount of just
compensation substantially went down. 506 Ultimately, the House and
498. Id. at 12.
499. Id.
500. See CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 23.
501. Meyer asserts that “unfortunately the bill did not survive long after it
was referred to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.” Meyer, supra
note 45, at 263. That committee struck out everything “except the legal description
of the taking area,” and the additional just compensation amount was reduced to four
million dollars. Id.
502. Id. At conference on the rival bills, “some House members expressed
dissatisfaction with the bill in its final form, as well they might, but a sense of urgency
and perhaps of the futility of further wrangling led them to accept it.” Id.
503. Id.
504. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 19.
505. Id.
506. Id.

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

2017

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS

9/9/2017 11:39 AM

109

Senate Indian committees agreed on a just compensation figure of $12.6
million that would be offered to the Fort Berthold Indians in exchange for
taking 156,035 acres of their reservation. 507 On March 15, 1950, the Fort
Berthold Indians reluctantly agreed to accept that amount of compensation
and to remove from their historic reservation lands. 508
E. The Articulation of a “New” Compensation Standard in the Three
Affiliated Tribes Equitable Compensation Act of 1992
The JTAC issued its final report in 1986 and recommended that
the Secretary of Interior propose legislation on behalf of the Three
Affiliated Tribes that would award just compensation to the Three
Affiliated Tribes for the 1949 taking of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation. 509 The JTAC recommended just compensation to the Fort
Berthold Indians in an amount ranging between $178.4 million and $411.8
million. In calculating the amount, the JTAC directed Dr. Ronald
Cummings to use two alternative formulas. The JTAC’s range of just
compensation values reflects the application of these alternative land and
resource valuation formulas. 510
But Secretary Hodel declined to implement the JTAC’s
recommendation. 511 Instead, the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs and the House Interior Subcommittee on Indian Affairs initiated
joint oversight hearings on the JTAC’s final report in 1986. 512 The
507. Meyer, supra note 45, at 264.
508. Meyer reports that “(t)he approval by the Tribes called for was
obtained by a vote in which 525 affirmative votes were cast out of 900 eligible voters
and on March 15, 1950, council chairman Carl Whitman, Jr., with a seven man
delegation, presented a briefcase containing the ballots to Secretary Chapman.” Id.
Local newspapers described this as yet “another emotion laden ceremony.” Id. Meyer
concludes that this ceremony marked the end of the “long struggle between the Fort
Berthold Indians and the United States government over the Garrison Dam project.”
Id.
509. See S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 3 (1992).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 1.
512. The Senate report notes that the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs held three oversight hearings on the JTAC recommendations beginning on
March 31, 1987, with a joint oversight hearing with the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee and the Water and Power Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. That hearing examined the need for
legislation to implement the recommendations of the JTAC report. The second
hearing was held on November 19, 1987, wherein the committee “urged” the Tribes
to provide “further justification for the level of additional financial compensation to
which the tribes felt they were entitled” and “explore a budget neutral mechanism to
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JTAC’s just compensation recommendation was referred by the Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs to the General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) for its review and response. 513 The GAO report, issued in 1990,
concluded that, although it somewhat disagreed with the economic
methodology utilized by the JTAC, the JTAC’s findings provided a
substantial basis for Congress to consider an equitable award of just
compensation to the Three Affiliated Tribes in the amount of $149.5
million. 514 Legislation to implement the JTAC’s just compensation
recommendation was introduced by Senator Kent Conrad from North
Dakota. 515 It provided $149.5 million in just compensation to the Three
Affiliated Tribes for the 1949 Fort Berthold taking. 516 The BIA testified
that it had no opposition to this legislation as long as it otherwise met the
“pay-as-you-go” constraints of the controlling budget resolution. 517
The Fort Berthold Indians, after lengthy discussions with various
interested groups such as the National Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association were able to craft an agreement that would authorize the
deposit of a specified amount of Pick-Sloan hydropower receipts into a
Treasury account on behalf of the Three Affiliated Tribes. 518 The Three
Affiliated Tribes were required to submit an economic and social recovery
plan for approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 519 The Tribes would
have access to the interest from their Treasury account beginning in fiscal
year 1998. 520 President Bush threatened to veto the legislation, but

finance the compensation needed to carry out the recommendations.” The third
hearing was held regarding S. 168 wherein the tribes “expressed their overall support
for the bill” and the GAO “expressed its approval of the compensation figures set forth
in (S. 168).” Id. at 6.
513. Id.
514. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFF. (GAO), REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, INDIAN ISSUES:
COMPENSATION CLAIMS ANALYSIS OVERSTATE ECONOMIC LOSSES (May 1991).
515. Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 13–15.
516. Id.
517. The BIA representative testified that if the “Budget Enforcement Act
provisions can be complied with . . . , the administration would look at that and give
consideration to that additional compensation.” Id. at 31–32.
518. A brief exchange between Senator Conrad and Mr. Dennis Hill,
executive vice president of the North Dakota Association of Rural Electric
Cooperatives, made clear that, “as drafted,” the North Dakota rural electric
cooperatives “did not oppose.” Id. at 26.
519. S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 9 (1992).
520. Id. at 4.
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nonetheless signed the Tribes’ compensation act into law in November
1992 as part of a larger water resources development bill. 521
V. CONCLUSION
The 1949 Fort Berthold taking demonstrates the need for a modern
Indian takings doctrine. Marshall sought to reconcile the competing
interest of the United States and the Indian people in his Johnson v.
M’Intosh opinion. 522 By incorporating the Indian lands into paramount
federal ownership, while simultaneously confirming the Indian peoples’
exclusive use and occupancy rights in those lands, he created an inherently
unstable and ultimately untenable land-based relationship between these
sovereigns. The Indian peoples were recognized by Marshall’s opinions
as possessing inherent sovereign authority over their lands. But their
subordinated status as governmental wards portended federal dominion
over the Indian peoples and their lands.
Indian Country was originally conceived as a federally protected
territory wherein Indian peoples would be free to exercise selfgovernance and to incrementally adapt to non-Indian ways of life. But
this Indian Country idea would not survive the later nineteenth-century's
vision of an American manifest destiny. 523 Perhaps Marshall hoped that
Indian Country would be preserved by his imposition of an Indian
bargaining model. That model contemplated that by mutual agreement, the
Indian peoples and the federal government could ensure a safe haven
for threatened tribal societies and cultures. But Indian bargains over land
soon degenerated into a diplomatic shell game. Indian land cession
agreements served as the transparent means for the Indian peoples’
systematic dispossession. Lone Wolf’s resort to the courts to prevent
the coerced allotment of his reservation prompted the Court to jettison
Marshall’s model as inconsistent with the Indian peoples’ contemporary
status as governmental wards. 524
The contemporary survival of Indian societies requires their
protection from the ill-advised federal takings of their lands. 525 Indian
treaties once recognized a vast “ Indian-only” zone in the American West:
a geographic area wherein the Indian peoples were free to choose a legal,

521. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731.
522. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
523. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 36–38.
524. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903).
525. Newton, supra note 34, at 264–65.
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cultural, and economic system that best suited their members’ needs. 526
The federal government pledged to use its regulatory and military
capabilities to preserve this Indian Country boundary. 527
But federal protection of Indian lands was always halfhearted
at best. Congress eventually repudiated its treaty commitments and
bargains in favor of fulfilling its superseding goal of manifest destiny. 528
The federal plenary power doctrine became the engine that would drive
Congress’ Indian allotment and assimilation policies.
Definitive
resolution of the “Indian question” was expected in one generation or
two at the most. 529 But the Indian peoples proved far more resilient and
resistant than expected to federal programs that were designed to
destroy their tribal land base and their cultural structures. 530
The Indian peoples’ tenaciousness was rewarded by Congress’
repudiation of its allotment program in the 1930s and its adoption of a
tribal revitalization program that championed tribal self-determination
and self-governance. 531 This contemporary federal Indian policy seeks
to reinstate Marshall’s idea of Indian peoples as domestic, dependent
nations. But this policy will have little meaning unless it is accompanied
by the effective judicial protection of Indian lands. The contemporary
Supreme Court seemingly wants to have it both ways: it rhetorically
supports the concept of tribal self-determination while reaffirming the
congressional plenary power doctrine. 532
The federal government’s plenary power over Indian lands
threatens to reduce the Indian self-determination policy to rhetorical
extravagance. This power threatens those Indian lands that will make
possible the hoped-for revitalization of Indian economies and cultures. 533
Just as Congress repudiated its Indian allotment program in the
1930s, so should the Supreme Court now repudiate Lone Wolf’s plenary
power doctrine. Felix S. Cohen’s assertion that the Indian peoples were
fairly compensated for the taking of their historic lands need not be
debated anew. 534 Such a retrospective assessment merely reinforces the

526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 14–19.
Id.
Newton, supra note 34, at 251–52.
CORNELL, supra note 4, at 45–50.
Id. at 80–84.
Id. at 89–93.
Newton, supra note 34, at 264–65.
Id. at 264.
GETCHES ET AL., supra note 10, at 310.
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contemporary need for judicial protection of the Indian peoples’ lands
from congressional overreaching under the plenary power doctrine. 535
The American West has long been settled by non-Indians by
virtue of the Indian allotment and land sales program of the late nineteenth
century. 536 Cohen may well be right that the books should be closed on
this sad era of America’s treatment of Indian peoples. 537 But Cohen would
likely agree that any merit in retaining the plenary power doctrine is
outweighed by its potential to thwart the contemporary Indian selfdetermination and self-governance policy. 538
Objections to a modern Indian takings doctrine do not hold up
against analysis. First, a modern Indian takings doctrine will not cost the
federal Treasury “too much” money. 539 The 1992 congressional act that
revisited the 1949 Fort Berthold taking illustrates the practical benefits of
fairly valuing Indian lands. The Fort Berthold Indians were provided with
an equitable amount of compensation that will enable them to make a
meaningful recovery from the devastating effects of the Garrison taking.
Furthermore, Congress designated that compensation to be paid out of
hydropower receipts derived from the sale of electric power from the PickSloan generating plants. This approach effectively internalized the just
compensation payment to the project itself. This stream of income from a
replacement resource—hydroelectric power—was intended by the 1992
equitable compensation act to replace the Three Affiliated Tribes’

535. Newton, supra note 34, at 251–52.
536. CORNELL, supra note 4, at 93–101.
537. Id.
538. Newton supposes a hypothetical “Indian Allotment Act of 1982”
whereby the federal government unilaterally allots each tribal member a 2 acre
“ceremonial parcel” and puts the balance of the Indian lands up for sale. The
legislative record states that this act intends that the Indians should use their retained
lands as purely ceremonial sites for spiritual regeneration from time to time. The sale
proceeds from the lands are to be used to train the Indians to acquire marketable skills
for deployment within the “civilized” urban areas of America. She further supposes
the federal government conducts no geological surveys of the lands’ value and does
not require competitive bidding at auction. She concludes that the affected Indians
may well have no remedy against the federal government in light of the Sioux Nation
rule. Newton, supra note 34, at 261–62.
539. Cummings’ analysis emphasizes that costs and benefits attributable
to large federal works projects are simply the opposite side of the same coin.
Congress’ undervaluing in 1949 to appropriately value the Fort Berthold Indians’
resource base is a project related “cost” insofar as Congress ignores the real economic
value of that foregone public natural resource. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 25–31.

SOVEREIGN BARGAINS PROOF (Do Not Delete)

114

PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV.

9/9/2017 11:39 AM

Special Issue

expected revenue stream that would have been generated by its taken
lands. 540
Second, a modern Indian takings doctrine would impose a salutary
“stop and think” burden on federal agencies and Indian congressional
committees. Such a standard will likely tend to preserve the Indian land
base. 541 The War Secretary was effectively precluded under the 1946
Garrison statute from taking the Fort Berthold Indians’ lands until he
provided them with the replacement value of their taken lands. 542 Just so,
those federal agencies or congressional committees that face the true value
of Indian lands will be motivated to more carefully deliberate about the
need for taking Indian lands or for mitigation measures that will ameliorate
the deleterious features of proposed projects. 543

540. Reclamations Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. 35, 106 Stat. 4731. Cummings suggests an analogous
approach when he looks toward so-called Pick-Sloan “excess power revenues” that
are not committed to repayment of project-related costs as the source of just
compensation for the Fort Berthold Indians. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 43.
541. Paragraph 2 of section 4(a) of S. 168 provided that:
deposits equal to 25% of the receipts from deposits to the United
States Treasury for the preceding fiscal year from integrated
programs of the Eastern Division of the Pick-Sloan Missouri River
Basin Project shall be deposited automatically in the fund each
fiscal year. The amounts so appropriated are to be “nonreimbursable and non-returnable. But the aggregate amount to be
deposited in the recovery fund shall not exceed $149.2 million.”
S. REP. NO. 102-250, at 8–9 (1992).
542. Meyer, supra note 45, at 246–47.
543. Lunney characterizes a measure of compensation as just if it redresses
two “systemic mistakes” that a legislature will make under what he calls the
“majoritarian” and “interest group” models. Lunney, supra note 250, at 757. He
describes the two mistakes as follows: “(1) fiscal illusion will lead the legislature to
impose improper burdens on a scapegoat; and (2) the scape-goating process will lead
the legislature to refuse to compensate a scapegoat for a taking.” Id. 757–58.
He asserts that the compensation requirement must therefore meet two
objectives:
First, it must force the government to consider the full costs of its action
when it would force a scapegoat to bear the burden of government action
(and thereby) reduce the likelihood that . . . the scapegoat (will be required)
to bear a significant government imposed burden either when a member of
majority faction could better have borne the burden or when the government
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Third, an Indian takings doctrine would give substance to the
fiduciary duty that Congress owes to the Indian peoples. 544 The 1992
Three Affiliated Tribes Equitable Compensation Act provides the Fort
Berthold Indians with the financial resources to replace their economic
base that was lost to the 1949 taking of their lands. 545 Requiring the
federal government to fully compensate Indian peoples for their
economic losses would allow them to more effectively replace those
lands and resources that are essential to a viable tribal economy and
society. 546
Fourth, an Indian takings doctrine would recognize that Indian
lands many times serve as specialized public welfare and
governmental assets—not merely fungible commodities. 547 Indian
peoples by custom, heritage, and treaty bargain are highly immobile.
Their lands represent their collective entwinement with their
spiritual, emotional, and economic lives. Such immobility is an
appropriate circumstance for judicial consideration under a modern
Indian takings doctrine. 548
Fifth, an Indian takings doctrine requires no heroic innovations
in existing federal takings law or doctrine. The JTAC in the Fort
Berthold case easily applied well known and judicially accepted
resource valuation methodologies so as to arrive at a just compensation
value for the 156,035 acres that were taken from the Fort Berthold
Indians. 549 This just compensation amount was accepted by the GAO
as the basis for a congressional award of equitable compensation to
those Indians in 1992.550
Sixth, an Indian takings doctrine is a vital component of a
contemporary Indian self-determination policy. Those lands that form the
economic and governmental base for tribal governments must be
preserved just like lands held by the federal, state, and local
should not have taken the action at all. Second, to ensure that the property
interests of the scapegoat are protected when they should be.
Id.
544. Newton, supra note 34, at 264.
545. S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 3.
546. CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 28.
547. Id. at 12.
548. Id. at 20.
549. Id. at 32–39.
550. Harry Finley testified on behalf of GAO that the Congress would be
“using a very defensible method in determining compensation” if it relied on the lower
bound of JTAC’s compensation recommendation for the Fort Berthold Indians.
Hearings on S. 168, supra note 359, at 23.
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governments. 551 How else can a legitimate “government-to-government”
relationship between the federal government and the respective Indian
peoples be expected to work? Just as the just compensation principle
prevents injury to similarly situated governmental entities, so too should
the contemporary Indian peoples be shielded from overreaching by federal
agencies or congressional committees under the guise of the plenary power
doctrine.
The fate of the Fort Berthold Indians in their direct bargaining
with the federal government is a real and symbolic reminder of the need
for a modern Indian takings doctrine. Such a doctrine would impose no
significant burdens on the federal government while ensuring that the
Indian peoples’ bargains with the federal government would be reasonably
respected.

551.

CUMMINGS, supra note 361, at 12–13.

